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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Cross-Sector Capabilities, Resources, and Needs Assessment:
Research
to Support
the Drafting of the Oregon Cybersecurity
Executive
Summary
Center of Excellence Proposal

Oregon’s Senate Bill 90 (SB90), signed into law and effective as of July 1, 2017, requires
the Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer (OSCIO) to draft a proposal for
an Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE). SB90 specifies that the CCoE must
include information sharing and incident response support functions, and liaise and
participate in cybersecurity initiatives nationwide; the Center also bears responsibility for
drafting both a Cybersecurity Strategy and Cyber Disruption Response Plan. The CCoE
has also been identified as the body responsible for carrying out strategic initiatives on
behalf of the Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council (OCAC). To assist with the process
of drafting the proposal for this high-priority initiative that fulfills all these requirements,
the OSCIO engaged Portland State University’s Center for Public Service (CPS) to
conduct comprehensive research on the state of cybersecurity in Oregon and initiatives
in other states that can serve as templates for the CCoE to follow. More specifically, CPS
conducted the following research activities:
•
•
•
•
•

A policy analysis of cybersecurity efforts in other states;
An online survey of Oregon organizations regarding their cybersecurity policies,
processes, staffing, and needs;
Cross-sector focus groups with cybersecurity professionals throughout Oregon;
Catalogs of current funding opportunities for potential CCoE activities; and
An inventory of cybersecurity resources that currently exist in Oregon.

Comparative Policy Analysis
The comparative policy analysis shows that cybersecurity best practices exist in several
other states that can inform Oregon’s approach to a CCoE. This portion of the report
utilized a public health framework to consider the cybersecurity activities of 11 states
(California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington) in terms of their prevention, monitoring, response and
recovery activities, as well as leadership structures. The findings of this analysis are that
states vary widely in terms of the activities and initiatives they pursue to meet
cybersecurity goals. Funding varies widely across states, as does the reporting of this
funding. The findings of this analysis suggest that Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, and
Virginia provide the most relevant examples of activities that are consistent with the
State of Oregon’s approach to cybersecurity under SB90. Additionally, increasing
Page 5
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transparency and accountability, as well as engaging in collaborative strategy planning
processes, are identified as criteria for successful policy interventions in this field.
Engaging a diverse group of multi-sector stakeholders can help ensure that initiatives
are considering the needs of the state as a whole, and provide valuable perspectives
that may be missed through government engagement exclusively with the cybersecurity
field to address important cybersecurity issues and threats.
Online Survey of Oregon Organizations
The online survey of 205 respondents resulted in answers to 33 questions regarding the
cybersecurity policies, practices, staffing, and concerns of Oregon organizations. This
data, once quantitatively analyzed, provided insights into trends across organizations
regarding these topics. In general, organizations of all types and located in all parts of
Oregon have a difficult time staffing cybersecurity positions and expect finding qualified
applicants for these positions to become more difficult over the next 5 years. The most
common concerns noted by respondents centered around the creation of a cyber-aware
staff, including both those in technical and non-technical positions, and shifting the
organizational culture to allow a role for cybersecurity. A majority also indicated that
they would be willing to use one or more hypothetical services provided to improve
either the cybersecurity prevention, monitoring, or response to incidents by their
organizations.
Statewide Focus Groups
To complement the quantitative data collected by the survey, eight focus groups with a
total of 39 participants were conducted across Oregon. The data from focus groups
essentially triangulated the findings of the survey, especially those from characteristic
groups (location, industry, etc.) with lower response rates. Respondents nearly
unanimously agreed that developing Oregon’s workforce is the most important initiative
that the CCoE could contribute to. Participants from southern and eastern Oregon noted
that they perceive that they experience more difficulties when trying to find qualified
applicants and access continuing education opportunities and cybersecurity services
than those in metropolitan areas. Portland participants were also aware of this disparity
and seem enthusiastic about addressing it. Overall, respondents indicated that resource
availability and their organizations’ cultures constituted the biggest barriers to
improving cybersecurity postures.
Recommendations for CCoE Programming and Leadership
These research efforts, when considered together, culminate in three broad
recommendations for the direction of the CCoE proposal:
Page 6
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•

•

•

Workforce development initiatives: Successful cybersecurity initiatives in other
states most often include programs and activities designed to grow the
cybersecurity workforce. There is also a perceived need and high level of support
for these kinds of initiatives throughout Oregon.
Cyber hygiene training: Training non-technical employees in the basics of safe
cyber practices was a major pain point noted by cybersecurity practitioners in the
survey and focus groups. Additionally, other states have experienced quantifiable
benefits from offering materials and programs covering these topics to state
employees, educational institutions, and (in some cases) the general public.
Multi-sector engagement: There is a lot of interest in contributing to the
decision-making process for the CCoE from Oregon cybersecurity professionals
across all industries, and inclusive advisory and leadership structures is a common
characteristic across leading cybersecurity initiatives in other states.

Funding and Resources
These recommendations should be considered in conjunction with the catalog of
funding opportunities and Oregon cybersecurity resources included in Chapters 5 and 6.
Funding opportunities are abundant for workforce development initiatives, and
accessible through a variety of sources including foundations and various agencies and
departments in the federal government. The cybersecurity resource maps show where
colocation of educational programs and cybersecurity industry goods and services are
limited; two 2-year education institutions that lack computer science and cybersecurity
curricula are also identified. There is potential to quickly and effectively expand
cybersecurity efforts in Oregon by capitalizing on existing infrastructure in communities
that lack sufficient cybersecurity educational and professional opportunities and
focusing on initiatives that are good candidates for external funding through existing
grant programs.
Next Steps for Decision Makers
The wealth of data included in this report, and the practicalities of undertaking such a
broad and inclusive statewide initiative, lead to the following recommendations for
decision makers’ more immediate next steps:
•
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Decide on a legal structure: This decision will both help to determine the types
of funding pursued for the CCoE, and communicate leadership, decision-making
structures, and priorities to key beneficiary groups.
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•

•

•
•

Engage funding experts: Funding a massive statewide initiative requires
experienced professionals to provide input on funding strategies and targeted
and efficient grant applications.
Bring key beneficiary groups into the proposal process: Opportunities for key
beneficiary groups to positively contribute to deliberative processes are highly
desired by these groups, and consistent with a public health approach to
cybersecurity policy.
Focus on workforce development: These initiatives can have a large immediate
impact and be cost effective for an initiative with limited resources.
Continue learning from other states: Efforts to learn from other states that
have successful cybersecurity initiatives, or have implemented programs and
policies of interest to the OSCIO and OCAC, can help determine specific proposal
design elements. These include start-up costs, necessary positions and job duties,
and effective leadership structures. Leveraging this valuable experience and
taking lessons learned from those with prior experience should play an important
role in the CCoE proposal drafting process.

The timeline for the CCoE development process may be aggressive, but the evidence
collected and analyzed through this report shows that there are many opportunities to
make a positive impact on cybersecurity for all Oregonians. Targeting high-priority
needs of key beneficiary groups has been successful in other states, and by utilizing
existing resources and strategically engaging funding sources, the same success is
possible in Oregon.
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Introduction and Research Approach
Introduction
As high-profile system breaches and data theft continue making headlines,
cybersecurity has become an increasingly salient point of concern for individuals and
organizations across the United States. The State of Oregon is no exception as the
recent passage of Senate Bill 90 (SB90) shows. While much of the bill focuses on
centralizing and unifying the cybersecurity technologies, policies, and procedures of the
State of Oregon’s executive agencies, the legislation also acknowledges the integrated
nature of state cybersecurity concerns with partners and other entities beyond state
government. This is most clearly shown in Section 4, which calls for the Oregon Office of
the State Chief Information Officer (OSCIO) to draft a proposal leading to the creation of
an Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE) by January 1, 2019. The CCoE will
coordinate and communicate with other sectors, organizations, and initiatives within
Oregon, across other states, and at the federal level. More specifically, the new CCoE is
to serve six primary functions1:
1. Coordinating information sharing regarding cybersecurity risks and incidents;
2. Supporting cybersecurity incident responses and investigations;
3. Serving as an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization that officially liaises
with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (within
the Department of Homeland Security in the federal government);
4. Participating in federal, multistate, and private sector organizations that are
relevant to the mission and activities of the CCoE;
5. Receiving and disseminating cybersecurity threat information from a wide range
of sources;
6. Drafting the Oregon Cybersecurity Strategy, as well as the Cyber Disruption
Response Plan, each to be updated biennially.
These functions go beyond servicing state entities, and require that the proposed CCoE
have the resources and abilities to impact cybersecurity for organizations of all sizes and
sectors in every part of Oregon. As further elaborated by the OSCIO, the CCoE is
intended to provide “…a state-civilian interface”2 that allows for cross-sector
Oregon. State Legislature. Senate Bill 90- Establishing the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. 2017.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB90/Enrolled . Section 4.
1

Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon” - Written
Testimony for the Joint Legislative Committee on Information Management and Technology. December 12, 2016. Pg 10-15.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/96166.
2
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involvement and participation by key beneficiary groups (defined a local governments,
educational institutions at all levels, nonprofit organizations, small businesses, law
enforcement, and critical infrastructure). The creation of this center therefore depends
on the incorporation of the perspectives of multiple stakeholders into a single
coordinated effort that positively impacts the cybersecurity postures of all.
Beyond ascribing these functions to the CCoE, SB90 also created a multi-sector Oregon
Cybersecurity Advisory Council (OCAC) to serve as a cybersecurity advisory body to the
OSCIO3. The OCAC has several key roles to play, including providing a statewide forum
for discussing cybersecurity issues, recommending best practices, and encouraging
cybersecurity workforce development. The advisory nature of the OCAC makes a close
partnership between this body and the CCoE likely, and the implementation of OCAC
objectives within the purview of the CCoE. Additionally, the OSCIO has tasked the OCAC
with developing the key tenets of the CCoE proposal, further cementing the relationship
between the two entities.
Given the scope of this initiative, the intended impacts on all Oregonians, and the
ambitious timeline of January 1, 2019, the OSCIO engaged Portland State University’s
Center for Public Service (CPS) to conduct background research on cybersecurity
initiatives in other states, gather data on the needs and resources of Oregon
organizations, and more generally support the CCoE proposal deliberations and initial
CCoE proposal drafting efforts by the OCAC. A statement of work created through a
collaborative process between CPS, OSCIO, several OCAC members, and other
interested stakeholders ultimately resulted in a consulting agreement with CPS to
perform five primary research tasks:
•
•
•
•
•

Conduct a comparative policy analysis of the cybersecurity efforts in other states
that are similar in size and scope to the CCoE proposed by SB90;
Administer an online survey of Oregon organizations regarding their
cybersecurity policies, processes, staffing, and needs;
Facilitate a series of cross-sector focus groups with cybersecurity professionals
located throughout Oregon;
Catalog current funding opportunities for potential CCoE activities from both
public and private institutions; and
Inventory cybersecurity resources that currently exist in Oregon.

Oregon. State Legislature. Senate Bill 90- Establishing the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. 2017.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB90/Enrolled . Section 3.
3
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The intent of the CPS research as reported in this document is to support the OCAC in
their proposal drafting process by providing raw data and thorough analysis for making
evidence-based policy decisions regarding the CCoE’s initial formation. This research
report synthesizes CPS’s findings and related conclusions associated with each
contractual task. These conclusions are accompanied by tangible recommendations for
CCoE programming in light of the requirements of SB90. These recommendations are
meant to contribute to further collaborative discussion on the direction a CCoE proposal
should take to fulfill the obligations set forth by the legislature, to serve the needs of
Oregonians as identified through analysis of robust data, and to follow the best
practices embedded in the successes of other statewide initiatives to address
cybersecurity. The report also includes specific next steps recommended for the CCoE
proposal drafting process.
Research Approach
The research approach used in this report is consistent with the “public health
approach” to cybersecurity that has previously been identified by the OSCIO as an
applicable guiding framework for this statewide initiative4. This approach is a departure
from more traditional defense-oriented cybersecurity perspectives that invoke images of
warfare5, armed conflict,6 and protecting castle walls.7 Such perspectives tend to result in
policies that focus most heavily on securing access points (strengthening the walls) and
effectively reacting to attacks8. A public health approach, by contrast, recognizes the
importance of facilitating preventative action by the general public9 in effecting
cybersecurity strategies. The metaphorical underpinnings of this approach are rooted in
the comparison of the interdependent systems created through networked technologies
to environments or ecosystems10,11, with their complex biological components that
combine to produce positive system-wide effects. Viewing cybersecurity from this
4

Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon”

Josephine Wolff, “Cybersecurity as Metaphor: Policy and Defense Implications of Computer Security Metaphors,” Paper presented
at the Conference on Communication, Informaiton, and Internet Policy,
5

6

Nathan Sales, "Regulating Cyber-security," Northwestern University Law Review 107, no. 4 (2013):1521-1525.

Christian Leuprecht, David Skillicorn, and Victoria Tait, “Beyond the Castle Model of cyber-risk and cyber-security,” Government
Information Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2016): 250-257.
7

8

Ibid.

9

Josephine Wolff, “Cybersecurity as Metaphor”: 11-13.

Wojciech Mazurczyk, Szymon Drobniak, and Sean Moore, “Toward a Systematic View on Cybersecurity Ecology,” in Combatting
Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism, ed. Babak Akhgar and Ben Brewster (Switzerland: Springer International, 2016), pg. 17-37.
10

Kristen Osenga, “The Internet is Not a Super Highway: Using Metaphors to Communicate Information and Communications
Policy,” Journal of Information Policy 3 (2013): 30-54.
11
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perspective likens it to traditional public goods12,13 (clean air, for example) that are
neither rivalrous nor excludable. These goods also tend to experience market failures as
a result of reduced incentives for private investments14 and generate negative
externalities15 when these failures occur. To approach cybersecurity from a public health
perspective requires both an emphasis on increasing investments in cybersecurity using
non-market incentive structures, and an emphasis on preventative measures that reduce
the likelihood of “contracting” cybersecurity issues and prevent the spread of “disease”
should this contraction occur16. This emphasis occurs alongside the more typical
monitoring and response activities that find space in the traditional defense-oriented
perspectives and approaches.
The application of the public health perspective to cybersecurity policy deliberations is
most descriptively presented by Sedenberg and Mulligan17, and Rowe, Halpern, and
Lentz18. The latter’s work is primarily instructive for those designing and implementing
specific activities and programs to address cybersecurity issues. By contrast, Sedenberg
and Mulligan describe the application of 12 public health principles for public
cybersecurity that are instructive in terms of both content of policies, and the methods
by which those policies are constructed19:
1. …address systemic design weaknesses and underlying behavioral causes
through the preventative orientation to prevent adverse security outcomes.
2. …achieve community health in a way that respects the rights of the
individuals in the community.
3. Public cybersecurity policies, programs, and priorities should be developed
and evaluated through processes that ensure an opportunity for input from
community members.

12

Nathan Sales, “Regulating Cyber-security”: 1527.

13

Steven Weber, “Coercion in cybersecurity: What public health models reveal,” Journal of Cybersecurity (2017): 1-11.

Alfredo Garcia and Barry Horowitz, “The potential for underinvestment in internet security: implications for regulatory policy,”
Journal of Regulatory Economics 31, no. 1 (2007): 37-55.
14

Bruce Kobayashi, “An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security
Goods”, Supreme Court Economic Review 14 (2006): 261-280.
15

Jeff Rowe, Karl Levitt, and Mike Hogarth, “Towards the Realization of a Public Health System for Shared Secure Cyber-Space,”
Proceedings of the 2013 New Security Paradigms Workshop (2013): 11-18.
16

Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Berkeley Technology
Law Journal 30, no. 3: 1687-1739.
17

Jeff Rowe, Michael Halpern, and Tony Lentz, “Is a Public Health Framework the Cure for Cyber Security?” CrossTalk,
November/December 2012, 32.
18

19

Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing”: 1737-1738.
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4. …advocate and work for the empowerment of disenfranchised community
members…
5. …seek the information needed to implement effective policies and programs
that protect healthy networks, systems, infrastructure, and use of Internetbased communication.
6. …provide communities and stakeholders with the information they have that
is needed for decisions… and should obtain the community and stakeholder’s
consent for their implementation.
7. …act in a timely manner on the information they have within the resources
and mandate given to them by the public.
8. …incorporate a variety of approaches that anticipate and respect diverse
values, beliefs, and cultures in the community.
9. Public cybersecurity programs and policies should be implemented in a
manner that most enhances the physical and social environment.
10. … protect the confidentiality of information that can bring harm to an
individual or community if made public.
11. Public cybersecurity institutions should ensure the professional competence
of their employees.
12. …engage in collaborations and affiliations in ways that build the public’s trust
and the institution’s effectiveness.
These principles are explicitly referenced in the construction of the research tasks and
methods of analysis employed by CPS. Specifically requesting the perspectives of the
broader public using a variety of methods aligns with these principles, as does the
emphasis on underlying behavioral drivers of cybersecurity inefficiencies. This is
accomplished by asking respondents about habits, policies, and processes of
organizations through surveying and focus group methods, rather than evaluating the
implementation of specific technologies. The collaborative discussions encouraged by
this approach also allow opportunities for meaningful engagement, as well as education
on current issues and policy initiatives20. In addition, the criteria used to consider the
programs implemented in other states in the comparative analysis place a high value on
the aspects of cybersecurity highlighted in this specific approach that are not necessarily
found in others: systemic prevention measures and collaborative multi-sector
leadership.
Peter Shane, “Cybersecurity Policy as if ‘Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making,” I/S:
A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 8, no. 2 (2012): 433-462.
20
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By embracing the public health approach to cybersecurity, this report provides a
comprehensive analysis that reflects the challenges and opportunities Oregon
organizations face with the prevention and monitoring of cybersecurity risks, as well as
responses to incidents, and comparable ways all three of these elements have been
addressed elsewhere. The data generated using this framework recognizes the human
component of cybersecurity, and the potential of the CCoE to positively impact both the
social and technical aspects of effective public cybersecurity policy. The research also
constitutes one arm of an outreach effort that can help legitimize policy outcomes from
the CCoE proposal process.
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Chapter 1: State Cybersecurity Comparative Policy
Analysis
“While community institutions may fall outside the traditional ambit of state
cyber security policy, our interdependence and shared information systems
render individual and isolated interventions insufficient to stem the tide of
cyber security threats—we are more resilient when we stand together.”
- Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer
The Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE) aims to create an integrated
cybersecurity resource hub working to protect the cyber health of Oregon’s digital
ecosystems. The Oregon CCoE aims to emphasize a shared responsibility for
cybersecurity21 by embracing the evidence growing over the last decade that networkwide cyber health is a public good that is currently underdeveloped and underfunded.
This comparative analysis of cybersecurity policies in other US states assesses the
initiatives and activities that have brought success to cybersecurity efforts by
considering these efforts through the public health lens.
The Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer has enlisted the Center for
Public Service to apply a public health approach in comparing existing cybersecurity
initiatives in other states with those resembling the planned responsibilities and
statutory vision for the Oregon CCoE.22 We identify innovative practices for
comprehensive and interoperable cybersecurity emphasizing the public health methods
geared toward creating a Competent Authority that can address the Prevention,
Active Monitoring, and Response and Recovery of Cyber ecosystems.23,24,25 This
evidence-based philosophy necessitates that individuals, organizations, and
governments all share a responsibility in keeping our networks healthy. This involves

Oregon. Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon” - Written Testimony for the Joint
Legislative Committee on Information Management and Technology. December 12, 2016. Pg 10-15.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/96166.
21

Oregon. Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon” - Written
Testimony for the Joint Legislative Committee on Information Management and Technology. December 12, 2016. Pg 10-15.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/96166.
23 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." The Pell Center. February 01, 2015. Accessed September 05, 2017.
http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
24 Ibid, Mulligan and Schneider, 2011
25 Ibid Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2015
22
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keeping them free from infection and able to provide nimble and robust response,
engaging in effective recovery, and astutely focusing on prevention and proper cyber
hygiene.26, 27 Compiling an Oregon specific evaluation framework allows our research to
examine cyber health consistently with Oregon’s vision for the Cybersecurity Center
for Excellence as an innovative entity embedded in the future-oriented cyber
ecosystem of the Silicon Forest. This vision for the Oregon CCoE is illustrated by the
OSCIO in the graphic below.

Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence – Vision

From the Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon”

This report’s comparative policy analysis is meant to inform the CCoE Advisory Council’s
vision with a comparative analysis of other states’ cybersecurity programs and initiatives
that resemble the Oregon CCoE’s mission to create cyber safe ecosystems.28 Digital
communities with low rates of infection and crime create collective economic impact
Sedenberg, Elaine M., and Deirdre Mulligan. "Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing." Berkeley Technology
Law Journal 30, no. 2 (2015): 1737-9. Accessed September 05, 2017. doi:https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PZ61.
27 Hathaway, Melissa. "Cyber Readiness Index 1.0 | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs." Harvard Kennedy School Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs. 2013. Accessed September 07, 2017. http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyberreadiness-index-10.
28 Oregon. Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon” - Written
Testimony for the Joint Legislative Committee on Information Management and Technology. December 12, 2016. Pg 10-15.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/96166.
26
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and shared value that is beneficial to everyone in the ecosystem; individuals,
organizations, businesses, states, and federal networks. In other words, cybersecurity is a
public good, allowing us to benefit from a virtual shared commons.29

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS METHODS
Policy Analysis Methodological Framework & Comparators
Key Research Questions
•
•
•

What efforts and initiatives exist in other states that are comparable in size and
scope to the Cybersecurity Center of Excellence as described in SB 90?30
What best practices regarding Centers of Excellence and cybersecurity initiatives
have been recognized in academic and industry literature?
What has contributed to the success or failure of cybersecurity initiatives in other
states?

Framework
Compiling a Public Health Framework for Oregon’s Unique Aims
The research questions are answered through a qualitative comparative policy analysis
of similar initiatives in other states. We use a comprehensive literature review and apply
an evaluative public health framework that holistically compares multiple states’
efforts.31 Viewing cybersecurity through the lens of a cohesive public health and safety
framework, we combine literature and best practices from esteemed institutions to
identify criteria by which we will evaluate existing cybersecurity initiatives against the
backdrop of Oregon’s unique needs.
The research questions are investigated by combining criterion to form an evaluation
matrix (see Evaluation Matrix below). Criterion are compiled from the following guiding
documents to identify innovative practices for comprehensive and interoperable

Mulligan, Deirdre K., and Fred B. Schneider. "Doctrine for Cybersecurity." Daedalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, May 15, 2011, P.3, 9-12, 28-30. Accessed September 13, 2017. doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00116.
30 Oregon. State Legislature. Senate Bill 90- Establishing the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. 2017.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB90/Introduced.
31 Hathaway, Melissa. "Cyber Readiness Index 1.0 | Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs." Harvard Kennedy School Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs. 2013. Accessed September 07, 2017. http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyberreadiness-index-10.
29
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cybersecurity that emphasize cybersecurity as a public good. We isolate methods
across the literature geared toward creating Competent Leadership that can facilitate
and guide Prevention, Active Monitoring, and Response and Recovery of Cyber
ecosystems32,33,34 as per the OSCIO’s CCoE vision.
The Evaluation Matrix draws on these sources from the literature:
•
•
•
•
•

Mulligan and Schneider’s “Doctrine of Cybersecurity”35
Sedenberg and Mulligan’s “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity
Information Sharing”36
Hathaway’s Cyber Readiness Index 1.0 & 2.037
Spidalieri’s State of States on Cybersecurity report38
Sales’ “Regulating Cybersecurity”39

Evaluation Matrix

Central Hub
Strategic Planning
Multi-Sector
Capacity Building

Cyber Hygiene
Immunization
Education &
Workforce
Training

Early Detection
Real-time Info
Sharing &
Threat Monitoring
Federal
Collaboration

RESPONSE &
RECOVERY

Competent
Authority &
Resources

MONITORING

PREVENTION

LEADERSHIP

Promoting Healthy Cyber Ecosystems

Coordinated
Incident
Response
Outbreak
Containment
Cyber Laws

Plus: Ongoing Cybersecurity-Related Spending

Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." The Pell Center. February 01, 2015. Accessed September 05, 2017.
http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
33 Ibid, Mulligan and Schneider, 2011
34 Ibid Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2015
35 Ibid, Mulligan and Schneider, 2011
36 Ibid, Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2015
37 Melissa, Hathaway, and Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. The Cyber Readiness Index 2.0: A Plan for Cyber Readiness Baseline
and Index. Publication. November 2013. http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/CRIndex2.0.pdf
38 Ibid. Spidalieri 2015.
39 Sales, Nathan Alexander. "Regulating Cyber-security." Northwestern University Law Review 107, no. 4 (2013)
32
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The composite evaluation matrix consists of five categories of cybersecurity activities
prevalent in the cybersecurity-from-a-public-health-perspective literature. These areas
are Leadership, Prevention, Monitoring, Response & Recovery and Cost. Each
category includes several sub-categories of activities that are recognized by the
literature as essential to a cross-sectoral and state-wide cyber readiness plan to maintain
healthy cyber ecosystems.
The comparative evaluation categories and sub-category activities encompass all of the
statutory aims of the Oregon CCoE.40 Eleven states were selected for the comparative
analysis based on their identification in the literature as prioritizing cyber security as
critical. Each has taken a proactive approach to creating innovative mechanisms and
efforts that produce resiliency in the face of threats.41 The Spidalieri baseline report is
the source for 8 of our state cases. The Spidalieri study is largely based on the criteria of
the Cyber Readiness Index 1.0. We have created a unique set of evaluative comparators
that includes, but is not limited to some of those included in the Spidalieri analysis and
the Cyber Readiness Index. Those studies heavily informed our research and provided an
excellent baseline to identify states that employ exceptional cybersecurity practices. Our
evaluative framework focuses on cybersecurity as a public good and goes beyond a
threat readiness mindset by emphasizing the community-based public health literature.
Three states were added to the states identified in the baseline Spidalieri research; these
states (Colorado, Florida, and Illinois) were chosen because of recent national
recognition for their innovative efforts. Our comparative analysis identifies key actions in
each of the eleven states and categorizes them according to the five areas specified in
the evaluation matrix as vital to promoting cyber health as a public good.
Our analysis found that each state has a different system and policy structure for
handling cybersecurity. Some execute through the executive branch, others through the
legislature. This makes cross-state comparisons difficult. We chose to focus on available
cybersecurity strategic plans and government documents to piece together what the
cybersecurity climate looks like in each state. The goal of this research is to identify
how each state addresses the goals that Oregon would like to pursue. It is
important to note that Oregon’s population is smaller than each of our 11 comparative
states. Each state may have pieces of an integrated strategy in place, there may be a

Oregon. State Legislature. Senate Bill 90- Establishing the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. 2017.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/SB90/Introduced.
41 Ibid. Spidalieri, p 4.
40
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number of departments involved, some comparators included in our analysis may not
be present in each state. This analysis attempts to clarify between stated strategic goals
versus what actually gets funded and implemented, but this is not possible in all cases.
The states examined are not expected to be “meeting” our public health criteria or
applying any specific public health framework. Our criteria and framework are
intended to provide a scaffold by which Oregon can examine how to best utilize
policy examples from other states to address cybersecurity as a public good. This
analysis aims to figure out where other state’s pieces might fit our puzzle. This
research is not attempting to score other states based on our criteria.
Evaluative Comparators
This section elaborates on the five evaluation categories that are used in our
comparative analysis of the 11 selected states.
1. LEADERSHIP
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning, Multi-Sector
Capacity Building
The Oregon CCoE aims to be a central cybersecurity hub and authority working across
sectors to improve Cyber health and safety through prevention, monitoring, incident
response and education and workforce capacity building.42 The public health sector
employs the Center for Disease Control to be the central authority and data collection
hub for preventing, monitoring, and responding to public health crises. The CDC is
relied upon to synchronize the diverse and highly de-centralized public health
community on the appropriate measures of infection prevention, monitoring, response
and recovery.43 The Oregon CCoE would ideally be akin to an equivalent state
institution responsible for digital public health. The literature emphasizes the need
for a state to have a highly competent central authority. This authority serves as
the figure head for a central hub for cybersecurity with sufficient investment
resources to design strategy, develop new capacity, and ensure effective and
efficient implementation. The authority should pursue the goals of sharing best
practices, promoting cross sectoral, multi-state, and national cooperation, coordinating
response to outbreaks, aligning public-facing educational resources about preventative
Oregon. Office of the State Chief Information Officer. Implementation of E.O. 16-13, “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon” - Written
Testimony for the Joint Legislative Committee on Information Management and Technology. December 12, 2016. Pg 13-14.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/96166.
43 Ibid. Mulligan and Schneider p 27-30
42
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behaviors, and facilitating information sharing and monitoring of the health of the
digital ecosystem. Strategy design should include workforce development, cybersecurity
R&D, and academic/economic goal alignment.44,45,46,47,48
Contributions from the Stanford Social Innovation review and Harvard Business review
provide the guiding principles and evaluation mechanisms of shared value and
collective impact created by communities when there exists a shared responsibility to
improve systems and practices that hold potential to provide immense social and
economic good. Multi-sectoral collaboration is essential to this process in order to
spur and sustain innovation and growth. We include multi-sectoral collaboration as a
comparator specifically because the literature emphasizes that in order to create
shared value and collective impact, you must first build the capacity for multisectoral collaboration. 49,50 Multi-Sector Capacity is defined for this purpose as actively
involving state, federal, academic, health, business (not just cybersecurity or IT), and
social sectors. Almost all states included state, federal, academic, and cybersecurity
company involvement.
2. PREVENTION
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Key to addressing any public health crisis are preventative measures. Avoiding infection
and spread of pathogens starts with basic hygiene tasks like handwashing, teeth
brushing, staying home when sick, and prophylactics. In cybersecurity, preventative
measures are just as important in avoiding the spread of infection among machines in a
cyber community.51 Effective Cybersecurity strategies emphasize and educate about
cyber hygiene and immunization. Cyber hygiene includes public-facing cybersecurity
resources, and policies aimed at requiring regular system threat monitoring, penetration

Ibid. Spidalieri P 7.
Ibid. Hathaway 2013, p 2
46 ibid. Sales, p 1547-1551
47 Ibid. Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2015 p 13-14
48 Vez, Jean-Luc. "Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership against Cybercrime." World Economic Forum Cybercrime Project.
January 2016. Accessed September 13, 2017. doi:http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cybercrime_Principles.pdf.
49 Kramer, Mark R., and Michael E. Porter. "Creating Shared Value." Harvard Business Review. August 25, 2015. Accessed September
05, 2017. https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-creating-shared-value.
50 Kania, John, and Mark Kramer. "Collective Impact." Stanford Social Innovation Review. Winter 2011. Accessed September 05, 2017.
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/collective_impact.
51 Ibid. Sales. 2013. P 1539, 1541, 1561
44
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testing, and updates for effective patching of vulnerabilities.52 Employee training and
public information campaigns promote safe browsing habits to increase defense against
dangerous phishing attacks, email attachments, and nefarious sites.53 Immunity in
increased by bolstering the human firewall to protect individual machines and networks
by creating a kind of digital herd immunity increasing the safety of the overall
ecosystem.54 Immunity is also increased by promoting the use of stronger passwords
and authentication methods.55,56 Education and workforce training programs both in
cybersecurity specific academic-to-employment tracks and via public-facing media
campaigns about Cyber Hygiene and Immunization are encouraged best practices. 57,58
3. ACTIVE MONITORING
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing, Real-time Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The Center for Disease Control monitors our dispersed health care systems with a robust
system of data sharing and reporting standards that increase our collective ability to
monitor and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases. Digital infections can be
monitored in much the same way. Monitoring responsibilities are a key feature of a
successfully integrated state resource hub like a CCoE.59 Collaboration and coordination
of information sharing across public and private sectors, multi-state, and national
entities is paramount to maintain safe cyber communities. Early Detection of threats
and infections, real-time info sharing, and real-time threat monitoring are essential
to success.60,61, 62 National Collaboration includes public-private partnerships,
implementation of state-level best- and next-practice cybersecurity controls, and
supporting coordinated incident response via cyber intelligence sharing. Coordination
with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), MultiState Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), regional Information Sharing
Center for Internet Security Response To Commission On Cybersecurity. "CIS Response to NIST RFI for the Cybersecurity
Framework: Input to the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity." National Institute for Standards and Technology, 2016, P
2. Accessed September 14, 2017. https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/15/cis_rfi_response.pdf.
53 Ibid Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2015 p 1696, 1704, 1736-38
54 Ibid. Mulligan and Schneider, 2011 p 11-12
55 Ibid. Sales. 2013 p 1512, 1517, 1535
56 Ibid. Mulligan and Schneider, 2011, p 19
57 Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015 p 8
58 Ibid. Hathaway. 2013. P 4
59 Ibid. Sales. 2015. P 1540-41
60 Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015 p 8
61 Ibid. Sales. 2015. P 1508-09, 1512, 1530, 1567
62 Ibid. Sedenberg and Mulligan, 2013. P 1708, 1729, 1736
52
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and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), and sector specific counterparts are encouraged.63,64
An ongoing culture of evaluating state specific cyber threat analysis & cybersecurity
strategy planning, like a Cyber Disruption Plan or coordinated Incident Response plan, is
also recommended.65
4. RESPONSE & RECOVERY
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
Coordinated Incident Response that facilitates rapid containment of outbreaks is
becoming the centerpiece of state and national cyber preparedness. Security Operations
Centers are employed by some, others coordinate with law enforcement and various
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), National Guard, Homeland Security, and
volunteer Cyber Corps. Consumer protections in the form of cyber health laws like data
breach notifications, stronger personal information protection laws, criminalization of
cyberattacks, more inclusive private sector coordination and cyber intelligence sharing,
and products like cyber insurance, have also been recognized as productive tools for
responding to and recovering from threats.66,67, 68
5. COSTS
Recent Cybersecurity Related Spending
The cost comparator is mostly anecdotal but included to provide a reference frame for
the scope of differing state-reported cybersecurity costs. Many of the initiatives
examined exist in their incipient stages. It was not possible to compare state-by-state
cybersecurity costs due to the disparate departments and funding structures that are
responsible for cybersecurity spending. Recent significant expenditures are noted for
most states.

Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015 p 6
Ibid. Sedenberg and Mulligan 1698-99
65 Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015 p 5-9
66 Ibid. Mulligan and Schneider p 7-8
67 Ibid. Sales. 2013. 1558-59
68 Ibid Spidalieri. 2015 pg 7, 11
63
64
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STATE ANALYSIS: CALIFORNIA
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
The California Department of Technology and the Office of Emergency Services (as a
homeland security function) are responsible for the IT strategic plan, which includes
some cybersecurity specific planning.69 California is moving toward a more centralized
entity for cybersecurity leadership through an executive order from 2015 that
consolidated cybersecurity strategic efforts with the California Cybersecurity
Integration Center (Cal-CSIC). The center will be responsible for cybersecurity strategic
planning and aims to increase the state’s cyber defenses against threats to the
economy, critical infrastructure, or public and private networks. The first strategic plan
from the Cal-CSIC is due in June 2018.
In September 2017, the legislature approved the creation and funding of the Cal-CSIC
administered by the Office of Emergency Services in close coordination with the
California Cybersecurity Task Force. Sixteen agencies are required to participate
including the highway patrol, military services, Office of the Attorney General, Health
and Human Services Agency, Utilities Emergency Association, university system,
community colleges, FBI, U.S. Secret Service, and Coast Guard. The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security is the sole funder of the endeavor at $1.8 million annually. The CalCSIS will be responsible for coordinating with these and other agencies and private
sector partners to develop a comprehensive state-wide cybersecurity strategy, secure
multi-sector information sharing online platform, cyber incident response team, and
data privacy safeguards.70
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
The Cal-CSIC will work closely with the California Cybersecurity Task Force. The task
force consists of 7 sub-committees (risk mitigation, information sharing, workforce
development and education, economic development, emergency preparedness,
legislation and funding, and digital forensics). The task force is a joint endeavor of the
Office of Emergency Services and Department of Technology that began by executive
California. Department of Technology. Director. California Information Technology Strategic Plan 2016 Update. By Carlos Ramos.
2016. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://cdt.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CA-IT-Strategic_Plan_2016.pdf.
70 California Legislative Information. 2017- 2018 Regular Session. Bill Text - AB-1306 California Cybersecurity Integration
Center. September 15, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017.
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1306.
69
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order in 2013 and focuses on education, information sharing, workforce development
and economic growth.71
“All members of the Task Force work diligently to promote a culture of cybersecurity,
cyber-hygiene, and best practices where all Californians can work, play, and explore
freely and safely”72
California explicitly recognizes that 95% of critical infrastructure is owned and operated
by private industry, requiring robust public-private partnerships to create a “community
of information sharing and mutual aid.” With the inclusion of public, private, academic,
and economic development organizations the Cal-CSIC resembles a truly multisector
effort.73
Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
The California Information Security Office (CISO) works with agency officers to develop
education and training of the state’s workforce.74 California requires that all state
employees and contractors receive information security and data privacy training.75 The
Workforce and Development Sub-committee of the Cybersecurity Task Force publishes
detailed cybersecurity workforce objectives and proposals in conjunction with academic
institutions.76
The CyberCalifornia initiative works to generate public-private partnerships that relate
to cybersecurity in business and commerce. CyberCalifornia manages the Innovation
Hub (iHUB) and facilitates threat information sharing and research of cybersecurity in
business, commerce, and the Internet of Things (IoT).77,78 The California CIO has its own

Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 9. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
72 California. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. Cybersecurity Task Force Task Force Subcommittees. Accessed November 14,
2017. http://www.caloes.ca.gov/for-individuals-families/cybersecurity-task-force/task-force-subcommittees.
73 California. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Accessed November 14, 2017.
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/law-enforcement/california-cybersecurity-integration-center.
74 Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015. pg. 9
75 "State Agency Annual Security and Privacy Training." California Department of Technology. Accessed November 14, 2017.
https://cdt.ca.gov/do-all-employees-in-a-state-agency-need-to-take-annual-security-and-privacy-training/.
76 California. State of California Cybersecurity Task Force Workforce Development and Training Objectives. June 2015. Accessed
November 14, 2017.
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/CybersecurityTaskForceSite/Documents/Workforce%20Objective%201%20Proposal%202015-06.pdf.
77 State of California. CyberCalifornia Initiative. 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://cybercalifornia.biz/.
78 Ibid. Spidalieri, 2015, pg. 12
71
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YouTube channel that includes cybersecurity PSA’s for the general public as well as IT
and state employee specific informational videos.79
The California Mentors Program connects young IT professionals with one-on-one
senior IT leaders in an effort to address the IT shortage, facilitate knowledge transfer,
and leadership and management skills.80
The California’s academic institutions offer some of the most prominent IT and security
education programs in the nation that are often coordinated with federal defense. (see
below)81,82

ACADEMIC INSTITUTION

PROJECT

University of Southern California (USC)

Computer Systems Security (CCSS)
DETER—Cyber Defense Technology
Experimental Research project ($16 Mill
DHS expansion)

Sacramento State College of Continuing Education and the
College of Engineering and Computer Science

Information Security Leadership
Academy Certificate Program targeted
at state and local employees

UC Berkeley, Stanford University, San Jose State University

Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure
Technology (TRUST)

California State Polytechnic University, California State
University Sacramento, Naval Postgraduate School

selective National Science Foundation
CyberCorps Scholarship for Service

California State Polytechnic, California Military Department

California Cyber Training Complex,
Central Coast Cyber Forensic Lab

UC Davis, Irvine, San Jose State University, National
University, California State University, Sacramento, San
Bernardino, Coastline Community College, Naval
Postgraduate School, California State Polytechnic University
Pomona

Designation as NSA/DHS Academic
Centers of Excellence

California Chief Information Office. "Protecting Your Computer." YouTube. March 22, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDXpDIbpIZ4.
80 State of California. California Mentor Program. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://www.camentorprogram.cdt.ca.gov/.
81 Ibid. Spidalieri. 2015. Pg. 11-12
82 U.S. National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security. Current National CAE Designated
Institutions.https://www.iad.gov/nietp/reports/current_cae_designated_institutions.cfm.
79
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Active monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
California recently adopted a new information security policy AB-670 that requires at
least 35 of the 77 state offices undergo an information security assessment each year.
The state standards are a compiled from federal and state policies guided by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Security and Privacy Controls.83,84,85
Implementation of AB-670 is overseen by the California Department of Technology, the
Chief Information Security Officer and the Office of Emergency Services. The cost of the
assessments, estimated at $10,000 to $40,000 each, are the responsibility of the agency
being assessed. The development of the standards and updates to state protocols and
the State Administrative Manual will cost $100,000- $150,000. The state estimates the
cost to the Department of Technology to begin and fund the program are $2 Million the
first year and $1.9 million per year for 12 full-time personnel plus additional “hundreds
of thousands” in travel costs annually. These costs are weighed against the possibility of
a single attack on critical infrastructure costing upwards of $1 Billion.86 For many of
these assessments the governor has proposed a one-time $14 million-dollar allotment
to fund 58 positions, over 12 departments for FY 2017-2018.87
The California Information Security Office provides a security evaluation tool and
requires state agencies to submit an IT security Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM)
that are assessed quarterly. The Cal-CSIC plans to facilitate information sharing between
local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities, academic institutions,
NGOs, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.88

California Legislative Information. 2015- 2016 Regular Session. Bill Text - AB-670 Information Technology Security. October 6,
2015. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB670.
84
U.S. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Science and Technology. Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative. NIST
Special Publication 800-53: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Revision 4. Accessed
November 14, 2017. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf.
85
California Department of Technology. CDT Services. Information Security Program Audit. By State Of California. Accessed
November 14, 2017. https://cdt.ca.gov/services/information-security-program-audit/.
86
California Legislative Information. 2015-2016 Regular Session. Assembly Analysis 9/08/15.Bill Analysis-AB-670 Information
Technology Security. September 8, 2015. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB670.
87
California. Legislative Analyst's Office. Governor's Budget Proposal 2017-18. Governor's Proposal to Strengthen Information
Security. February 28, 2017. http://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3594 see entire Governor’s Budget here:
http://www.lao.ca.gov/Budget?yr=2017
88
California. Department of Technology. Director. California Information Technology Strategic Plan 2016 Update. By Carlos Ramos.
2016. Accessed November 14, 2017.p 7. https://cdt.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CA-IT-Strategic_Plan_2016.pdf.
83
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Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
In addition to the Cal-CSIC, in 2017 California established a cybersecurity Strategic Operations Center
(SOC) for state systems that will support incident response and share threat intelligence with the CalCSIC.89 To begin, the Cal-CSIC was co-located alongside the State Threat Assessment System in order to
immediately integrate the California cyber intelligence community.90 The SOC operations are being
phased in over 2 years, phase one focuses on prevention and detection on the state network, phase 2
expands the SOC to cover assets owned or managed by the Department of Technology, phase 3 creates a
pilot program with state partners, and phase 4 expands the pilot to other state entities.91
California requires state agency cyber incident reporting through the Office of Information Security (OIS)
portal, the California Compliance and Security Incident Reporting System (Cal-CSIRS). Detailed instructions
and resources are provided. The OIS coordinates with the Cal-CSIC, Highway Patrol, California Military
Department, and Office of Health Information Integrity.92 The Cal-CSIC is currently developing a
centralized cyber incident response team.93 The office also provides a list of resources connecting to the
MS-ISAC, US CERT, SANS, and NIST.94
California has a data breach notification law where businesses and state agencies must report the breach
of personal information.95 The use of ransomware was recently criminalized by the state. 96 All state
employees must complete mandatory cybersecurity training. 97 California’s leadership has introduced
Cyber Hygiene legislation at the federal level. 98

California Department of Technology. "CDT Launches State's First Security Operations Center." CDT TechBlog. 2017.
http://techblog.ca.gov/2017/09/cdt-launches-soc/.
90 California. Governor's Office of Emergency Services. California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Accessed November 14, 2017.
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/law-enforcement/california-cybersecurity-integration-center.
91 California Department of Technology. "CDT Launches State's First Security Operations Center." CDT TechBlog. 2017.
http://techblog.ca.gov/2017/09/cdt-launches-soc/.
92 California. Department of Technology. CDT- Policy Resources. Accessed November 14, 2017.
https://cdt.ca.gov/security/policy/#Policy-Resources.
93 California Legislative Information. 2017- 2018 Regular Session. Bill Text - AB-1306 California Cybersecurity Integration
Center. September 15, 2017. http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1306.
94 California Department of Technology. CA Information Security Office. Incident Management Program Resources. August 18, 2016.
https://cdt.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Incident_Management_Program_Resources.pdf.
95California Department of Justice. Office of the Attorney General. Data Security Breach Reporting. Accessed November 14, 2017.
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/reporting.
96 California Legislative Information. 2015- 2016 Regular Session. Bill Text - SB-1137 Computer Crimes: Ransomware. September 27,
2016. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1137.
97 State Agency Annual Security and Privacy Training." California Department of Technology. Accessed November 14, 2017.
https://cdt.ca.gov/do-all-employees-in-a-state-agency-need-to-take-annual-security-and-privacy-training/.
98 Chalfant, Morgan. "Senators Introduce 'cyber Hygiene' Bill." The Hill. June 30, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017.
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/340160-senators-introduce-cyber-hygiene-bill.
89
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Recent Cybersecurity Spending
$14 M State Systems
Assesments
$1.8 M Cal-CSIC
$14

$16

$16 M Education
Funding
$1.8
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$32.8 Million:
•
$14M for state cybersecurity
assessment staffing
•
$1.8M DHS funds Cal-CSIC
•
$16M DHS Education Partners
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STATE ANALYSIS: COLORADO
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
Colorado’s Cybersecurity authority is centralized under the Office of Information
Technology (CoOIT) and the Chief Information Security Officer (CoCISO). The Chief
Technology Officer is responsible for day-to-day access provisioning, network and endpoint security monitoring, threat and vulnerability management, computer forensics,
and incident response. In 2016 the state passed a comprehensive cybersecurity bill
creating and appropriating funding for the Colorado Cybersecurity Council,
Cybersecurity Cash Fund, a cyber operations center, education and workforce
development plan, and research and development goals. Research and development
goals including everything from working with local businesses and universities to
certifying a Top Secret and Special Access Facility.99
The CoCISO is tasked with developing and implementing the larger IT strategic security
plan titled Secure Colorado in partnership with the Colorado Information Security
Advisory Board.100 The National Governor’s Association, National Association of State
Chief Information Officers (NASCIO), and the Cybersecurity Leadership and Innovation
Awards have all recognized the Secure Colorado plan as a landmark initiative in statewide cybersecurity- particularly for states new to forming cybersecurity strategy.
“Secure Colorado was chosen as a model for the National Governor’s
Association policy academy to help states who are less mature in their
cybersecurity programs to develop a sustainable cybersecurity strategy.”
Secure Colorado’s strategic priorities include the goals of protection, research and
development, building partnerships, and compliance. These goals relate to 18 specific
initiatives. Evaluation metrics quantifying the status of progress are applied yearly. The
Secure Colorado Initiative is in its 3rd year, last year the program was approved to
continue based on measurable evidence of security progress.

Colorado. General Assembly. 2016 Regular Session. HB16-1453 Colorado Cybersecurity Initiative. 2016.
https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016a/bills/2016A_1453_signed.pdf.
100 Colorado. Governor's Office of Information Security and Risk Management. Secure Colorado Colorado’s Strategy for Information
Security and Risk Management Fiscal Years 2017-2019. January 1, 2017.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0IQVOYmWcOoa2dadGQwZURUdVU/view.
99
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Multi-Sector Capacity Building
The Colorado Information Security Advisory Board is responsible for evaluating and
recommending improvements or other changes to the Secure Colorado plan. The
Advisory Board consists of representatives
Colorado Information Security
from over 30 multi-sector entities (State,
Advisory Board Pecent of MultiFederal, Local, Academic, Health and Social,
Sector Representation
and private industry). The board provides
State
6%
ongoing evaluation, coordination, and
9%
Private
capacity building within the project.101
37%
Health & Social
Secure Colorado objectives are also
14%
supported through the 2016 cybersecurity
Academic
8%
bill. The Cybersecurity Council is
26%
Federal
responsible for aligning the multiple
Local
objectives.

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Secure Colorado conducts regular risk assessments and ranks each agency using a
combination of risk Index evaluations, agency report cards, level of compliance, and
systems hardening milestones to measure progress. The goal is decreasing each
agency’s risk index. Over the last two years, the initiative has measured a very
significant 48% risk reduction. Colorado requires all state employees undergo
cybersecurity awareness training and recently increased from annual to quarterly
training, 95% of employees have completed the online training according to monthly
reporting. This year, a new cyber hygiene community outreach program instructed its
first 900 students in 6th-8th grades with internet safety presentations, the program is
expected to grow. 102
Colorado has recently embarked on a multi-sector, federal, and volunteer effort to begin
the National Cybersecurity Center (NCC) that will coordinate response, training,
education, and research for cybersecurity efforts in the state and nationally. The NCC is

101
102

Ibid. Secure Colorado Colorado’s Strategy for Information Security and Risk Management Fiscal Years 2017-2019. 2017. Pg 15.
Ibid. Secure Colorado. 2017. Pg 11.
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harnessing a combination of state, federal, and independent resources.103 Colorado’s
goals for the program include designing, building, and operating tools, programs, and
self-healing systems. Colorado is home to a robust cyber defense infrastructure and
houses nine DHS/NSA certified Cyber Defense Centers of Excellence including: Colorado
School of Mines, Colorado State University-Pueblo, Colorado Technical University,
Pueblo Community College, Red Rocks Community College, Regis University, United
States Air Force Academy, University of Colorado- Colorado Springs, and University of
Denver.104

Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
Colorado reports that 98% of the state’s systems are actively monitored using
security tools in near-real time. All twenty Center for Internet Security (CIS) security
controls are utilized.105 Only a few years prior, before developing the Secure Colorado
plan, the cybersecurity budget for the entire state was just $6,000. The first draft of
Secure Colorado was simply working to implement the basic best practice of applying
the first five critical CIS controls in 2014.106 As mentioned, Colorado has dramatically
reduced their risk index over these 3 years to below “low risk.” It has been reported
Colorado’s risk score is below 11.107 This is more secure than some banks with a score of
20 being a reasonable industry standard for financial institutions.108,109,110
Colorado is currently developing more robust identity management systems including
two-way authentication methods as part of an effort to harden their network against

Robinson, Helen. "NCC Seeks Volunteers, Donations." The Colorado Springs Business Journal, July 07, 2017. Accessed November
25, 2017. http://www.csbj.com/2017/07/07/ncc-seeks-volunteers-donations/. See also: https://www.nationalcybersecuritycenter.org/nccpartners/
104 U.S. National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security. Current National CAE Designated
Institutions.https://www.iad.gov/nietp/reports/current_cae_designated_institutions.cfm
105 Colorado. Office of Information Technology. FY 2018 OIT Performance Plan. July 2017. Pg 20-21.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ZUv6gW8QZMTDlDNGxEMVBNblU/view.
106 Colorado. Governor's Office of Information Technology. FY15 Annual Report Transforming Colorado Government for Today and the
Future. Pg 11. 2016. Accessed November 25, 2017. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ZUv6gW8QZMVlVGN0xzeXNJckk/view.
107 Colorado. Office of Information Technology. FY 2018 OIT Performance Plan. July 2017. Pg 20-21.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ZUv6gW8QZMTDlDNGxEMVBNblU/view.
108 Ibid. Secure Colorado. 2017. Pg 3,4, 11
109 Shueh, Jason. "For Funding, Colorado Cybersecurity Chief Says Strategy First." StateScoop, March 13, 2017.
http://statescoop.com/for-funding-colorado-cybersecurity-chief-says-strategy-first.
110 Colorado. Office of Information Technology. FY16 Annual Report. Accessed November 25, 2017.
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B_ZUv6gW8QZMcl9PcFVJb2ZtQzg.
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unauthorized access and endpoint vulnerabilities. The state is an active participant in
National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) Privacy and Security
Committee, MS-ISAC, and the SANS institute.
Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
The CoCIO reports that the average time it takes teams to respond to a cyber incident–
from threat detection to containment and restoration of services–is less than 4 hours
total.111 Colorado strengthens incident response plans and multi-sector coordination by
leading and participating in simulated cyber hazard and incident drills. These drills focus
on investigation, containment, and response to cyber threats across Colorado’s systems.
The cyberwar games are conducted in partnership with the National Guard, academic,
state, federal and local partners.112 According to the National Cybersecurity Center’s
Interim director, the NCC Colorado Springs project will include a Rapid Response Center
geared toward providing services to the 50,000 small-to-medium sized businesses113 and
individuals114 in Colorado. This is in alignment with Secure Colorado’s current biennium
security goals that state Colorado aims to create and maintain a state-wide incident
response and forensics team that can identify and isolate threats, recover systems, and
potentially prosecute those responsible.115

Ibid. Secure Colorado. 2017. Pg 11
Ibid. Secure Colorado. 2017. Pg 3-4.
113 Baillie, Amber. "National Cyber Center Takes Shape." The Colorado Springs Business Journal, October 31, 2016. Accessed
November 25, 2017. https://www.csbj.com/2016/10/31/national-cyber-center-takes-shape/?v=402f03a963ba.
114 Walker, Chris. "Colorado's National Cybersecurity Center Plans to Serve and Protect." Westword. September 25, 2017. Accessed
November 25, 2017. http://www.westword.com/news/national-cybersecurity-center-in-colorado-springs-filled-a-growing-need-fortech-protection-9269280.
115 Ibid. Secure Colorado. 2017. Pg 9
111
112
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Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending:116
Colorado Recent Cybersecurity
Spending 20.9 Million
CO Information
Security Office 47
FTE $13 M

$7,800,000
$13,000,000
$67,000

Cybersecurity
Council Staffer 1
FTE $67,000

$35,000

National Cybersecurity Center
Funding Sources

$215,000
Colorado State $7.8 M

$300,000
$7,800,000
$11,000,000

State NCC
Funding $7.8 M

$6,000,000

US- Amry Reserve Training $6M
In-Kind including NCC Facility
@ UCCS $11 M
Philanthropy $300 K
Private Individuals $215 K
Corporate Entities $35 K

Colorado. Office of Information Technology. FY 2018 OIT Performance Plan. July 2017.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ZUv6gW8QZMTDlDNGxEMVBNblU/view.
116
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STATE ANALYSIS: FLORIDA
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
The Florida Center for Cybersecurity (FC2) acts as the state clearinghouse of
cybersecurity resources for business and industry, government, defense, and higher
education. The FC2 was created by the state in 2014. FC2 is a coordinated effort of the
twelve Florida State Universities housed under the authority of the University of South
Florida. The program is a very substantial investment aimed at using cybersecurity as an
economic engine.117
The Agency of State Technology (AST) is home to Florida’s Chief Information Security
Officer (CISO). This office was created the same year as the FC2 after being essentially
abolished, leaving Florida without a state Chief Information Officer or CISO for two
years. In 2014, AST funding was restored and the office was immediately tasked with
creating a comprehensive IT security strategy. The Statewide Strategic Information
Technology Security Plan 2017 focuses on three strategies with 2-3 objectives each.
The plan includes coordination with the FC2. Now in the plan’s third year, the office has
achieved many objectives, some significant milestones are discussed below.118
The strategic IT plan–delivered in just 3 months–has seen success and was nominated
for the 2016 NASCIO awards.119 Despite disruptive events and gaps in leadership,
Florida recently received the award for “largest state improvement” from the NASCIO.120
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
Multi-sector capacity building is mainly executed through the FC2’s research and
development and workforce training coordination departments, and by serving as a

State University System of Florida. Board of Governors. Making Florida the Cyber State A Board of Governors Report Submitted to
the Florida Legislature and Governor .December 2013. http://www.usf.edu/pdfs/final-cybersecurity-report.pdf
See also: Florida Center for Cybersecurity FC2 Homepage http://thefc2.org/about-us/index.aspx
118 Florida. Agency for State Technology. Chief Information Security Office. Statewide Strategic Information Technology Security Plan
2015-2018 (2017 Update).February 2017.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58bd820d86e6c0c5a7193736/t/590a41d2579fb34e49c6e0f0/1493844434713/20152018+IT+Security+Plan+2017.pdf.
119 National Association of State Chief Information Officers. Florida’s Information Technology Security Plan. 2016.
https://www.nascio.org/portals/0/awards/nominations2016/2016/2016FL9NASCIO%202016%20FL%20Cybersecurity%20AST%20Security%20FINAL.pdf.
120 Florida. Agency for State Technology. Chief Information Security Office. Statewide Strategic Information Technology Security Plan
2015-2018 (2017 Update). February 2017. Pg 9.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58bd820d86e6c0c5a7193736/t/590a41d2579fb34e49c6e0f0/1493844434713/20152018+IT+Security+Plan+2017.pdf.
117
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cybersecurity resource for business and industry, government, defense, and higher
education. The FC2’s Collaborative Seed Award Program and Capacity Building
Initiative take a market-based approach to creating new cybersecurity technology and
lab development, curriculum, and community outreach programs. Some funding comes
from industry partners.121
A massive restructuring of the Agency of State Technology (AST) was passed by both
houses the Florida legislature and vetoed by the governor in 2017. The bill would have
severely gutted AST authority, centralized strategic planning, and created the Florida
Cybersecurity Task Force made up of public and private representatives.122 The AST has a
tumultuous history since being completely defunded in 2005 reportedly over
accountability, procurement, and spending issues, then again for two years in 2012. 123
Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
The State’s goals for FC2 focus on aggressively investing in cybersecurity education,
research, and workforce development. This is an effort to use cybersecurity expertise
and commerce as a powerful economic driver for the state by attracting high paying
cybersecurity jobs in financial, healthcare, utility, transportation, and defense to Florida.
Recent investments in higher education totaling over $30 million in the first two years of
the FC2.124 Florida has completed the first year of the New Skills for a New Fight initiative
to provide free cybersecurity training to veterans.125 The first year of the FC2 community
outreach program exceeded the goal of 1,000 participants, reaching 1,642 Floridians
through conferences and events.126
The IT strategic plan helped secured funding for cybersecurity training for 32 agencies’
security personnel. The AST, as part of the IT strategic plan, created the Cybrary

Florida. Center for Cybersecurity. 2017 Capacity Building Program. 2017.
http://thefc2.org/documents/capacity_building_program_rfp.pdf.
122
Florida. The Florida State Senate. House Bill 5301: State Agency Information Technology Reorganization. 2017.
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/5301/ByVersion.
123 Hanson, Wayne. "Update: Florida State Technology Office Loses Funding." Government Technology: State & Local Government
News Articles. June 30, 2005. http://www.govtech.com/e-government/Update-Florida-State-Technology-Office-Loses.html.
124 Florida State Senate. “Laws of Florida Ch.2013-40 (Senate Bill 1500-2013).” Laws of Florida Ch.2013-40 (Senate Bill 1500-2013),
2013. laws.flrules.org/2013/40.
125 Florida, University of South. "Education For Veterans." Florida Center for Cybersecurity. Accessed November 30, 2017.
http://thefc2.org/education/forveterans.aspx.
126 State University System of Florida. Board of Governors. Strategic Progress Update July 2014 – April 2015. April 30, 2015.
http://www.system.usf.edu/board-of-trustees/health-sciences-and-research/research-docs/fc2-ubot-preso-4-30-2015.pdf.
121

Page 36

CHAPTER 1: STATE CYBERSECURITY COMPARATIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS
resource center for state agency guidance complying with the new Florida Cybersecurity
policy.
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Cybercrime Office runs a public
outreach site SecureFlorida.org that provides basic cybersecurity information for small
business, parents, kids, and the general public. The site also houses a community
outreach resource CSAFE (Cybersecurity Awareness for Everyone). CSAFE
representatives will come to your organization and give free presentations on
cybersecurity over many topics ranging from online safety for children, parents, schools,
small business human firewall employee training, and basic incident response
planning.127
Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The CISO is responsible for coordinating with law enforcement, the MS-ISAC, and
others. The CISO is in the initial stages of coordinating with the FC2 to develop an
Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) within the state. The state recently
purchased and installed a security information and event management (SIEM) platform
and is working to improve their cyber incident reporting and information sharing
processes.128 Through SecureFlorida.org businesses can sign up for a cyber threat alert
system (BusinessSafe) run by the state’s law enforcement and DHS fusion center.129
The state has an extensive national defense network, eight of the twelve State
Universities involved in FC2 are DHS/NSA National Centers for Academic Excellence
certified institutions actively engaged in cyber security and cyber defense R&D. 130

Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Cybercrime Office. Secure Florida. Accessed November 30, 2017.
http://www.secureflorida.org/, http://www.secureflorida.org/c_safe.
128 Florida. Agency for State Technology. Chief Information Security Office. Statewide Strategic Information Technology Security Plan
2015-2018 (2017 Update).February 2017. Pg 4.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58bd820d86e6c0c5a7193736/t/590a41d2579fb34e49c6e0f0/1493844434713/20152018+IT+Security+Plan+2017.pdf.
129 Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Cybercrime Office. Secure Florida. Accessed November 30, 2017.
http://businessafe.imarcsgroup.com/member/signup/
130
U.S. National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security. National Centers of Academic Excellence.
https://www.iad.gov/NIETP/reports/cae_designated_institutions.cfm.
127
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Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
Currently, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Computer Crime Center is
the principle cyber incident response authority. They operate a mobile cybercrime
response team. The Strategic IT plan is in the drafting stages of the Cyber Disruption
Plan, and is pursuing the goal of creating an enterprise incident response team.131
Florida has a data breach law, mandatory employee cybersecurity training programs,
and mandatory risk assessments.132 Florida has a spectrum of 14 cybercrime laws
including criminal use of personally identifiable information, cyberstalking, credit card
crimes, and communications fraud.133
Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending:

Recent Cybersecuriy Spending
Industry Certification Programs $30 M (2 years)

$300,000
$750,000

InfoSec training for data center staff $500 K

$50,000

Cybersec training: law enforcement $300 K

$500,000

$30,000,000

Other agency IS training $50 K

Seed Award Grants $ 750 K

Florida. Agency for State Technology. Chief Information Security Office. Statewide Strategic Information Technology Security Plan
2015-2018 (2017 Update). February 2017.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58bd820d86e6c0c5a7193736/t/590a41d2579fb34e49c6e0f0/1493844434713/20152018+IT+Security+Plan+2017.pdf.
132 https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2012/Chapter282/All ??? Florida. Florida State Senate. Chapter 282 - 2012 Florida
Statutes. 2012. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2012/Chapter282/All.
133
"Computer Laws." Secure Florida. Accessed November 30, 2017. http://secureflorida.org/legal/computer_laws/.
131
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STATE ANALYSIS: ILLINOIS
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
The Illinois Department of Innovation and Technology was created by an executive
order in 2016. The order consolidated 29 state agency IT security personnel and
responsibilities under the Chief Information Officer and CISO at the Department of
Innovation and Technology (DoIT). This effectively centralized 1,600 personnel and
$258 million worth of personnel IT operating budget under a single agency and
leadership.134 Together, the DoIT, CIO, and CISO represent the central authority for
cybersecurity matters in the state.135 The first year of this consolidation, the DoIT was
appropriated $900 million and began the initial infrastructure investment and retiring of
old or redundant systems and replacing them with enterprise system components and
applications. For FY 2018 $300 Million has been appropriated.136
The very first Illinois Cybersecurity Strategy (ICS) was published by the DoIT in spring
of 2017. The cybersecurity strategy is designed to address existing vulnerabilities,
increase cybersecurity training, social engineering awareness, build enterprise capacity,
protect critical infrastructure, and align future actions including education and workforce
development.137 Included in the strategy is the goal of expanding Illinois’ cybersecurity
capacity to execute their “Smarter State” initiative that is harnessing cybersecurity,
digital government and the Internet of Things (IoT) to streamline state and city
services.138
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
To create the IT security plan, the DoIT collaborated with the National Governors
Association (NGA), NASCIO, NIST and the Illinois Executive Committee for Cybersecurity.

Illinois. Department of Innovation and Technology. Chief Information Officer. Information Technology Transformation UpdateAppendix D Budget by Agency Source. December 31, 2016.
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Transformation/Documents/DoIT_2016-Report-GA.pdf.
135 Illinois. Office of the Governor. Executive Order Consolidating Multiple Information Technology Functions Into a Single Department
of Innovation and Technology. January 25, 2016. https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/government/execorders/2016_1.aspx.
136 Illinois. Office of Budget and Management. FY17 Final Appropriations and FY18 Enacted Appropriations. August 8, 2017.
https://www.illinois.gov/gov/budget/Documents/Budget Book/FY 2017 Budget Book/FY16 FY17 Enacted Approps Line Item
Detail.xls.
137 Illinois. Department of Innovation and Technology. State of Illinois Cybersecurity Strategy 2017-2019. Spring 2017.
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Cybersecurity/Documents/CyberSecurity-Strategy-2017-2019.pdf.
138 State of Illinois Sponsored White Paper. Smarter and Future-Ready Illinois Continues to Execute on Its Digital Transformation
Strategy: Update. By Ruthbea Yesner Clarke. August 2017. https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Documents/IDCWhitePaperSmarterAndFuture-ReadyIllinois.pdf.
134
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The plan includes forging relationships in academia and pursing public sector
partnerships.
“Crucial strategic guidance was provided by the State of Illinois Executive
Committee for Cybersecurity, which has helped ensure that cybersecurity is
recognized not just as a business issue, but a matter of public safety
concern….”

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Illinois now requires cybersecurity awareness training for all state employees.139 The first
50,000 state employees were trained in 2016. The DoIT estimates this will save the state
over $4.5 million on future cyberattack costs. The first state-wide agency assessment
recommendations based on the NIST cybersecurity framework were completed in 2016,
saving a reported $1 million on incident containment costs. The state also encrypted,
secured, or destroyed over 5 billion records in order to secure personally identifiable
information and consolidate over 200 file cabinets worth of paper records.140 Illinois is
home to eight colleges and universities certified as NSA/DHS Cyber Defense Designated
Institutions. Illinois has partnered with the academic and private sector to design
curricula in analytics, cybersecurity, and IoT. Partners include: GE, Rockwell Automation,
Cisco, University of Illinois, MIT Sloan School of Management, Pearson
The Smarter State partnership between the DoIT and the University of Illinois
will continue to leverage the skills of, and build skills for, the next-generation
workforce.141

Illinois. Illinois General Assembly. Mandatory Cybersecurity Training for State Employees-Full Text of Public Act 100-0040. August 8,
2017. http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=100-0040.
140 Illinois. Department of Innovation and Technology. Chief Information Officer. Information Technology Transformation
Update. December 31, 2016. Pg 4. https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Transformation/Documents/DoIT_2016-ReportGA.pdf.
141 State of Illinois Sponsored White Paper. Smarter and Future-Ready Illinois Continues to Execute on Its Digital Transformation
Strategy: Update. By Ruthbea Yesner Clarke. August 2017. Pg 5-8
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Documents/IDCWhitePaper-SmarterAndFuture-ReadyIllinois.pdf.
139
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Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
Illinois is moving toward formal cybersecurity governance, continuing to assess and
enforce compliance with the recently implemented security requirements guided by the
NIST cybersecurity framework. Technology infrastructure consolidation will result in
wider use of more secure enterprise systems. The cyber security strategy includes
establishing a Security Operations Center (SOC) and working to improve threat
detection capabilities and incident reporting policies and procedures.

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
The DoIT cyber security strategy aims to further develop threat intelligence sharing
capabilities and develop a Statewide Cyber Disruption Strategy alongside the Illinois
Emergency Management Agency and the National Guard.142 Illinois updated its
Personal Information Protection Act in 2016 to expand the definition of personally
identifiable information and the requirements for notification of individuals.143

Costs
RECENT CYBERSECURITY SPENDING- Department of Innovation and Technology
The DoIT technology transformation was
appropriated $900 million dollars the first year of
DoIT Budget
the program FY 2017, $300 million was approved
for FY 2018. The yearly required legislative report
on the project is due December 31, 2017.119,121
NASCIO Recognized Illinois for outstanding
achievement in the field of information
technology for "The State of Illinois Data Center
Server Consolidation and Virtualization Project."

FY 2017
$900 M

$300
$900

Illinois. Department of Innovation and Technology. State of Illinois Cybersecurity Strategy 2017-2019. Spring 2017.
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/doit/Strategy/Cybersecurity/Documents/CyberSecurity-Strategy-2017-2019.pdf.
143 Illinois. State Legislature. Public Act 099-0503- HB 1260 Enrolled- Personal Information Protection Act- Update
2017. http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/99/PDF/099-0503.pdf.
142
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STATE ANALYSIS: MARYLAND
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
Maryland has long led the states as a cybersecurity trailblazer on the national stage.144
Maryland is home to an expansive defense infrastructure, the NSA, the first National
Center for Cybersecurity Excellence, the Defense Information System Agency, and U.S.
Cyber Command. However, recently Maryland has discovered room for improvement
among state and local government cybersecurity policies and systems. In January of
2017, Maryland authorized the Secretary of Information Technology and CISO to
create a Director of Cybersecurity position within the Department of Information
Technology (DoIT). The DoIT will enact and enforce the 2017 Cybersecurity Program
Policy (CPP). The CPP consists of 28 separate state cybersecurity policies and
replaces the State of Maryland Information Security Policy that previously served as the
guiding cybersecurity document. Unlike the Information Security Policy, the CPP is
specific to cybersecurity (not IT in general) and includes the delegation of authority to
the DoIT to enact and enforce the requirements of the legislation. The previous plan
was less comprehensive and less
Maryland Cybersecurity Council
enforceable. 145,146 The DoIT is also
Multi-Sector Representation
undertaking a multi-year process to
Chair: Attorney General -1
consolidate disparate state agency systems
Legislative Reps -4
2%
into a single enterprise system and central
Cybersecurity Companies -6
8%
14%
cybersecurity hub. The DoIT grew from 134
Business Associations -4
12%
4%
FTEs in 2016 to 252 by mid 2017, most are
Higher Ed -9
8%
Crive Victim Representative -1
transferred from a home agency into the
22%
Suseptible Industry (i.e.: Health Care) -5
DoIT. A budget report on the initiatives of
18%
State -11
10% 2%
the cybersecurity projects is due early in
Federal -2
2018.147
Other -7

Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 9. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
145 Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Maryland Cybersecurity Program Policy. Pg 3,14 January 31, 2017.
http://doit.maryland.gov/cybersecurity/Documents/cybersecurity-program-policy-v1.0%20(Updated%20with%20Sigs).pdf.
146 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 9. Pg. 15. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
147 Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Analysis of the FY 2018 Maryland Executive Budget, 2017. 2017. Pg 8-10.
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/pubs/budgetfiscal/2018fy-budget-docs-operating-f50-department-of-information-technology.pdf.
144
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Multi-Sector Capacity Building
The Maryland Cybersecurity Council (MDCSC) is a truly multi-sector advisory
entity. The Council is chaired by the state’s Attorney General and is comprised of 50
members. The members form six subcommittees that guide the state’s cybersecurity
over 6 specific areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Law, Policy and Legislation
Cyber Operations and Incident Response
Critical Infrastructure and Framework
Education and Workforce Development
Economic Development
Public Awareness and Community Outreach

The council is staffed by the University of Maryland University College. Members are
appointed by the Attorney General, President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House.
The Council provides cybersecurity recommendations and reports to the General
Assembly on the implementation progress of those recommendations. The council is
also tasked with coordinating with the DoIT, Maryland Military Department, and
Maryland Emergency Management Agency to create the State of Maryland Cyber
Disruption Plan finalized in 2017.148
“The council’s composition reflects a ‘whole of community’ approach to
addressing cybersecurity issues”- MDCSC

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Maryland is home to the first NIST National Center for Cybersecurity Excellence and
seventeen NSA/DHS certified Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense
Education. However, Maryland does not have a centralized state community cyber
outreach or cyber hygiene and prevention program. The MDCSC is currently curating a
Cyber Resources and Best Practices Portal for critical infrastructure owner and
operators.149 The DoIT maintains a web page with links to basic cybersecurity resources

Maryland. Maryland Cybersecurity Council. Maryland Cybersecurity Council Activities Report. July 1, 2017. Pg 3-4
http://www.umuc.edu/documents/upload/maryland-cybersecurity-council-biennial-report-2015-2017.pdf.
149 Maryland. Maryland Cybersecurity Council. Maryland Cybersecurity Council Activities Report. July 1, 2017. Pg 13
http://www.umuc.edu/documents/upload/maryland-cybersecurity-council-biennial-report-2015-2017.pdf.
148
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like StaySafeOnline.org, the MS-ISAC, and the US-CERT. The Maryland Department of
Commerce partners with CyberMaryland and the Cybersecurity Association of
Maryland, Inc. Both programs are run as public-private partnerships that focus on
providing networking, partnership, and showcase opportunities for Maryland’s business
and industry, students, cybersecurity tech companies and professionals via conferences,
contests, and events. The DoIT is currently devising a new-hire and yearly cyber security
training for Maryland State Employees and Contractors.150 The state reports that 90% of
employees are participating in existing cybersecurity training.151

Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The DoIT runs a 24/7 Security Operations Center (SOC) for enterprise systems and
other state government clients. The Continuous Monitoring policy explicitly details the
SOC responsibilities to detect, identify, and respond to cyber threats. The SOC uses the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, real-time (continuous) event and traffic monitoring,
incident response, and training and awareness. The SOC, at current capacity must
expand to pursue this mission, a Director of Security Operations and SOC manager will
be appointed. A multi-function System Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool
will be purchased. The SOC will operate on updated Incident Response Plan152 and
Security Assessment Policies.153 These are among some of the 28 Cybersecurity Program
Policies to be followed and enforced as part of the 2017 CPP.154 Eighteen Agencies have
undergone vulnerability assessments, penetration testing, or security audits. Three
agencies participate in multi-agency security drills. The MDCSC has strongly
recommended participation in regional Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, as

Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Maryland Auditing and Compliance Policy. June 30, 2017.
http://doit.maryland.gov/cybersecurity/Documents/Auditing-and-Compliance-v1.1.pdf.
151 Maryland. Department of Commerce. Analysis of the FY 2018 Maryland Executive Budget, 2017. 2017. Pg. 3.
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/pubs/budgetfiscal/2018fy-budget-docs-operating-t00-department-of-commerce.pdf.
152 Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Maryland Cybersecurity Incident Response Policy. January 31,
2017.http://doit.maryland.gov/cybersecurity/Documents/Maryland%20DOIT%20Incident%20Response%20Policy%20v1.0.pdf.
153 Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Security Assessment Policy. January 31, 2017.
http://doit.maryland.gov/cybersecurity/Documents/Maryland%20DOIT%20Security%20Assessment%20Policy%20v1.0.pdf.
154 Maryland. Department of Information Technology. Maryland Continuous Monitoring Policy. January 31, 2017.
http://doit.maryland.gov/cybersecurity/Documents/Maryland%20DOIT%20Continuous%20Monitoring%20Policy%20v1.0.pdf.
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well as collaboration with a federal entity like the New Jersey NCCICC, or Arizona’s
InfraGaurd program that collaborates with multiple states and the FBI.155

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
As noted, the SOC is responsible for incident response. Maryland has a Cyber Disruption
Contingency Plan that was approved by the governor in April, 2017. The plan is
considered “sensitive” and not available for public consumption.156 A separate
“Cybersecurity Plan” has been tasked to the Department of Homeland Security and will
be created with input from the DoIT and MDSCS, the final document in due in 2018.157
Maryland improved their Personal Information Protection Act to include the information
stored by state agencies, a wider definition of illegal access, and a more succinctly
defined notification requirement of 45 days to individual victims of compromised
information. The definition of data and personal information was expanded to include
biometric data, mental health and health insurance policy information. The MDCSC is
currently investigating a Cybersecurity First Responders Reserve in coordination with the
Maryland National Guard and Maryland defense force.158

Maryland. Maryland Cybersecurity Council. Maryland Cybersecurity Council Activities Report. July 1, 2017. Pg 22
http://www.umuc.edu/documents/upload/maryland-cybersecurity-council-biennial-report-2015-2017.pdf.
156 Maryland. Maryland Cybersecurity Council. Maryland Cybersecurity Council Activities Report. July 1, 2017. Pg 52
http://www.umuc.edu/documents/upload/maryland-cybersecurity-council-biennial-report-2015-2017.pdf.
157 Maryland, Executive Department. “Executive Order 01.01.2017.22 Maryland Cybersecurity.” Executive Order 01.01.2017.22
Maryland Cybersecurity, 5 Oct. 2017. s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4067727/Hogan-Cyber-Order.pdf.
158 Maryland. Maryland Cybersecurity Council. Maryland Cybersecurity Council Activities Report. July 1, 2017. Pg 10-12.
http://www.umuc.edu/documents/upload/maryland-cybersecurity-council-biennial-report-2015-2017.pdf.
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Costs
RECENT CYBERSECURITY SPENDING

159,160

A comprehensive cybersecurity program is a direct contributor to the State’s
ability to meet its public safety and public service missions” –MDCSC
Cybersecurity Specific Grants 2017

Cybersecurity-Related Programs

Cybersecurity Industry
Support $135 K

$30,000
$50,000
$30,000

$135,000

Cyber Workforce Program
$30 K
National Cyber Center of
Excellence Support $50 K
Cyber Technology
Development Scholarship
Program $30 K

$900,000
$2,000,000
$1,400,000

Cybersecurity
Investment Fund
$900 K
Office of
Cybersecurity and
Aerospace $ 1.4 M

Maryland. Department of Commerce. Analysis of the FY 2018 Maryland Executive Budget, 2017. 2017.
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/pubs/budgetfiscal/2018fy-budget-docs-operating-t00-department-of-commerce.pdf.
160 Maryland. Office of the Governor. Senate Bill 190- Budget Bill (Fiscal Year 2017. 2017. Pg 157-160.
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2016RS/chapters_noln/Ch_143_sb0190E.pdf.
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STATE ANALYSIS: MICHIGAN
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
Michigan has an established cybersecurity culture. The state has pursued a cybersecurity
strategic plan utilizing security controls, coordinating with MS-ISAC, academia, health
care, and defense efforts since 2009.161 The Department of Management and Budget and
the Department of Information Technology, were fused in 2010 in order to increase
government efficiency and centralize state data systems to create the Department of
Technology, Budget, and Management (DTBM). The DTBM, whose department
director is also the Chief Information Officer, are responsible for two strategic plans.
Both plans are multi-agency, multi-sector collaborations. The Michigan Cyber
Initiative162 and the State of Michigan Cyber Disruption and Response Plan are the
centerpieces of cybersecurity authority delegation and strategic planning in Michigan.
The Michigan Cyber Initiative is a public-facing plan that integrates and leverages
cybersecurity among business, academic, and civilian communities. The Michigan Cyber
Disruption and Response Plan163 is an effort undertaken by the DTMB, state CIO,
Michigan State Police, and the National Guard to coordinate more effectively in
response to cyber disruptions.
“The plan provides a framework that enables state emergency management
and information technology to work seamlessly with public and private
partners to rapidly respond to and minimize the impact of cyber disruption
events in Michigan.” - Michigan Cyber Disruption and Response Plan.
“Businesses and citizens have the individual and collective responsibility to
ensure the protection of their information technology systems.” – Michigan
Cyber Initiative

Michigan. Department of Information Technology. Cyber Security Plan. 2009.
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/itstrategicplan/I_Cyber_Security_Web_234559_7.pdf.
162 Michigan. Office of the Governor. Michigan Cyber Initiative. 2015.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/Mich_Cyber_Initiative_11.13_2PM_web_474127_7.pdf.
163 Michigan. Department of Technology, Management, and Budget. State of Michigan Cyber Disruption Response Plan. October
2015.
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/120815_Michigan_Cyber_Disruption_Response_Plan_Online_VersionA_507848_7
.pdf.
161
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Multi-Sector Capacity Building
Multi-sector collaboration has become integrated practice in Michigan, it is built-in to
both strategic plans. A culture of coordinated cybersecurity awareness and almost a
decade of strategic planning places Michigan among the nation’s most cyber prepared
states. The Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC) and the Merit
Network, Inc. are also key facets of the multi-sector cybersecurity capacity in Michigan.
The MEDC actively promotes Michigan as an ideal location for cybersecurity
professionals and business.164 The MEDC has the authority to leverage the Michigan
Strategic Fund to promote economic growth and create jobs through a variety of
means.165,166 Merit Network, Inc. is a non-profit corporation co-owned by the 12 fouryear universities in Michigan. The Merit Network, operational since 1966, manages the
longest-running research and education network connecting the 12 research
universities. This network is one of the pre-cursors to the modern internet that started
with a National Science Foundation grant of $400,000 long ago.167 Merit is also home to
the Michigan Cyber Range, Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps (MiC3), and the K-12
Michigan Statewide Educational Network (MISEN).168
“A truly cyber-resilient ecosystem takes a holistic view of the environment and
ensures it is working by strengthening existing partnerships and bringing all
components of the ecosystem together to create a full Cyber Threat Alert
Network.” – Michigan Cyber Initiative

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Michigan runs an award winning public cybersecurity resource website
(Michigan.gov/cybersecurity), holds cybersecurity conferences every two years, provides
cybersecurity training for all state employees, and offers cyber toolkits for K-12 schools,
individuals, and small businesses. The state employee cyber awareness training costs
"Michigan Economic Development Corporation." Cybersecurity -Why Michigan - Michigan Business | MEDC. Accessed December
2017. https://www.michiganbusiness.org/why-michigan/cybersecurity-industry/.
165 "Michigan Economic Development Corporation." About- MEDC Michigan Strategic Fund. Accessed December 2017.
https://www.michiganbusiness.org/michigan-strategic-fund-msf/.
166 Michigan. Office of the Governor. Michigan Cyber Initiative. 2015. Pg, 14-15
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/Mich_Cyber_Initiative_11.13_2PM_web_474127_7.pdf.
167 Merit Networks, Inc. Merit History- Connecting Organizations, Building Communities. Accessed December 2017.
https://www.merit.edu/about-us/merits-history/.
168 "Merit, Networks." Michigan Statewide Educational Network. Accessed December 16, 2017. https://www.merit.edu/misen/.
164
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less than $200,000 and includes 18 lessons over a three-year period for every state
employee. 50,000 employees have received the training. At approximately 30 cents
per lesson, the return on investment is estimated by the state to be more than 100
to 1.
The state organizes town hall meetings with local school districts to more fully integrate
cybersecurity programs into elementary and high schools state-wide. The state runs a
traveling cybersecurity Breakfast Series and Cyber Awareness Luncheon Series in order
to bring the Michigan Cyber Initiative and coordinated cybersecurity message to the
entire state.169 The Michigan Cyber Safety Initiative and OK2SAY programs are part of the
state’s K-12 education outreach curriculum that focus on online safety and awareness.
Both programs are free to schools, nearly 2 million students through the K-12 system in
Michigan have completed the curriculum.170
The Michigan Cyber Initiative focuses on education and public awareness aligned with
the NIST’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE). Courses and
training are provided through the Merit Network’s Michigan Cyber Range. The Cyber
Range is a virtual training facility accessible from multiple universities on the network
used for cybersecurity instruction, tabletop exercises, and coordinated threat drills. They
also provide a variety of services including vulnerability testing, network security, high
school cybersecurity competitions,171 and other cybersecurity and technology
programs.172 The Cyber Range partners include a wide range of public, private, and
defense entities. “Over $2 million was raised to establish the Cyber Range, with less than
20% coming from government sources.”173

Michigan. Office of the Governor. Michigan Cyber Initiative. 2015. Pg 8-10
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/Mich_Cyber_Initiative_11.13_2PM_web_474127_7.pdf.
170 Michigan. Office of the Attorney General. 2016 OK2SAY Annual Report. 2016.
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ok2say/2016_OK2SAY_Annual_Report_Final__web_reduced_571284_7.pdf.
171 Aderoju, Darlene. "Michigan Aims to Spur Economy through Student Cyber Competition."State Scoop, August 12, 2016.
http://statescoop.com/michigan-aims-to-spur-economy-through-student-cyber-competition.
172 Merit Network, Inc. Cybersecurity Services. Accessed December 15, 2017. https://www.merit.edu/services/cybersecurity-services/
173 NASCIO 2013 Award Nominees. Cyber Training 3.0: New Solutions Addressing Escalating Security Risks. 2013. pg 7.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dtmb/Cyber_Training_New_Solutions_Addressing_Escalating_Security_Risks_461703_7.pdf.
169
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Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The Michigan Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MI-ISAC) was established in
2006 and actively coordinates cyber threat intelligence sharing among all state and local
governments and critical infrastructure. The Michigan Intelligence Operations Center
(MIOC) is the 24/7 central fusion center for state, federal, and local law enforcement
agencies and is run by the State Police. During a cyber event the MIOC coordinates with
the Michigan Cyber Command Center (MC3) and the Chief Security Officer. MIOC
also assists in ongoing investigations with the FBI and DHS.

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
Michigan Cyber Command Center (MC3) coordinates emergency response,
containment, forensic analysis and prosecution of cybersecurity events as the central
command and control center during a cyber disruption. MC3 is a group of military
service personnel and civilian analysts, they have the authority to deploy cyber first
responders.174
The Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps (MiC3) is a group of thoroughly vetted civilian
volunteers. MiC3 was authorized to deploy first responder teams in the event of a
governor declared state of emergency situation. During the first three years, the MiC3
was never used, and in October of 2017 their mission was expanded to include selected
deployment for cyberattacks, data breaches, and assistance to local government, nonprofits, and businesses.175
All of the agencies mentioned in these two sections work together as the Michigan
Cyber Disruption Response Team exercising the Homeland Security Exercise and

Michigan. Department of Technology, Management, and Budget. State of Michigan Cyber Disruption Response Plan. October
2015. Pg.4,27-28
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/120815_Michigan_Cyber_Disruption_Response_Plan_Online_VersionA_507848_7
.pdf.
175 Michigan. Senate Fiscal Agency. Cyber Civilian Corps Program- Bill Summary. September 18, 2017.
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2017-2018/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2017-SFA-4508-F.pdf.
174
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Evaluation Program framework that coordinates seminars, workshops, tabletop exercise,
security drills, and full-scale multi-agency emergency simulations.176

Costs
RECENT CYBERSECURITY SPENDING 177,178,179,180
Recent Cybersecurity Spending
State Employee Training $2K
$200,000
Cybersecurity Goals $7 M
$500,000
$7,000,000
DHS/CS Project 25 FTE $16 M
$7,748,600
$3,700,000
$16,169,300

DHS/CS Project costs $3.7 M
Identity Mgmnt 6 FTE $7.7 M
High School Cyber Challenge
Grants $500 K

Michigan. Department of Technology, Management, and Budget. State of Michigan Cyber Disruption Response Plan. October
2015. Pg. 11-12
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/cybersecurity/120815_Michigan_Cyber_Disruption_Response_Plan_Online_VersionA_507848_7
.pdf.
177 Michigan. Executive Budget Office. State of Michigan FY 2018-2019 Executive Budget. 2017.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/FY18_Exec_Budget_550967_7.pdf.
178 NASCIO 2013 Award Nominees. Cyber Training 3.0: New Solutions Addressing Escalating Security Risks. 2013. pg 7.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dtmb/Cyber_Training_New_Solutions_Addressing_Escalating_Security_Risks_461703_7.pdf.
179 Michigan State Legislature. 99th Legislature Regular Session Of 2017. Public Acts of 2017 Approved by the Governor- Enrolled
House Bill No. 4323. July 14, 2017. Pg. 69, 71, 93, 98-99, 251. http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20172018/publicact/pdf/2017-PA-0107.pdf.
180 Michigan. 99th Legislature Regular Session Of 2017. Public Acts of 2017 Approved by the Governor - Enrolled House Bill No.
4313. July 14, 2017. Accessed December 15, 2017. Pg. 63-64. http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20172018/publicact/pdf/2017-PA-0108.pdf.
176
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STATE ANALYSIS: NEW JERSEY
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
New Jersey operates three primary cybersecurity entities. The New Jersey Office of
Information Technology (NJOIT) creates the IT strategic plan (last published in 2014).181
The office also provides policies and programs for cybersecurity framework, incident
response protocols, and cybersecurity goals for state enterprise systems. 182 NJOIT
houses the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) David Weinstein, the senior technology
authority in the state. The NJOIT coordinates with the New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP). NJOHSP is home to the Director of
Cybersecurity/State Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), Michael Geraghty. The
Director of Cybersecurity/CISO is also the Director of the New Jersey Cybersecurity
Communications and Integration Cell (NJCCIC).
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
Davis Weinstein, the state’s CTO has been advocating for a more centralized approach
to cybersecurity management. While New Jersey has many innovative and effective
programs, there exist disparate systems, policies, aging legacy enterprise systems, and
weak enforcement mechanisms that would benefit from a more unified cybersecurity
culture. The NJCCIC is seen as a step in this direction. The state first started utilizing and
consolidated enterprise systems back in the 80’s and many of these systems are now
outdated. The CTO created the Chief Data Officer position to begin working on the
human element of connecting the 60,000 users and 70 departments’ strategic IT goals
that are heavily focused on security and risk management.183
Over the last two years, there have been cybersecurity bills introduced in New Jersey
that would increase public-facing cybersecurity capability, awareness, and multi-sector
capacity building efforts by creating the NJ Cybersecurity Commission at a cost of
$50,000 per year. The commission would aim to capitalize on economic opportunities of
cybersecurity workforce and education development, while strengthening a culture of

New Jersey. Office of Information Technology. IT Strategic Plan 2014-2016. Accessed December 16, 2017.
http://www.nj.gov/it/about/docs/OIT_2014_Strategic_Plan.pdf.
182 New Jersey. Office of Information Technology. IT Policies and Standards - Information Security Program. 2017.
http://www.state.nj.us/it/services/governance.shtml#policies.
183 McCauley, Ryan. "Unified Cybersecurity Unit Is Necessary to Protect New Jersey Agencies from Threats." Government Technology:
State & Local Government News Articles. May 24, 2017. http://www.govtech.com/security/Unified-Cybersecurity-Unit-Is-Necessaryto-Protect-New-Jersey-Agencies-From-Threats.html.
181
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cyber hygiene within the state. Multi-sector membership would be mandated. The 13
members would include representatives from public, private, and academic sectors
including finance, public safety, education, OIT, NJ Economic Development Authority,
state police, and homeland security.184

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
The NJCCIC provides cybersecurity training and briefings online and in person. Topics
include Sector-Specific Cybersecurity Risk and Best Practices, Ransomware Prevention
Training Program, Intro to the Dark Web, History of Nation-State Hacking, and the
Current State of Cybercrime.185
As part of Cybersecurity Awareness month, the NJCCIC started providing weekly
webinars that focus on the themes including, cybersecurity culture at work, connected
communities: staying protected while always connected, the Internet of Things (IoT)
security, and cyber professional development. The state launched a two-factor
authentication promotional campaign, #2FA4NJ, that included a live twitter chat on
international #2FactorTuesday. The NJCCIC also provides weekly bulletins, cyber alerts,
updated threat profiles and threat analysis, cyber blog, and resource catalogs for
citizens and small businesses. The program includes webinars, cybersecurity training
briefings, vulnerability assessment tools, exploit kit profiles, and more.186
If passed, SB 808 would create and task the NJ Cybersecurity Commission to present
recommendations for STEM education programs for all ages, elementary through
university, in order to: “improve the cybersecurity workforce pipeline…offer strategies to
advance private sector cybersecurity economic development opportunities, including
innovative technologies, research and development, start-up firms, and maximize publicprivate partnerships throughout the State...[and] offer suggestions for promoting
awareness of cyber hygiene among the State’s citizens, businesses, and government
entities…”187

New Jersey. State of New Jersey 217th Legislature 2016 Session. Senate Bill 808- An Act Creating the New Jersey Cybersecurity
Commission. 2016. ftp://www.njleg.state.nj.us/20162017/S1000/808_I1.HTM.
185 "Training and Briefings." NJCCIC. Accessed December 17, 2017. https://www.cyber.nj.gov/cybersecurity-training/briefings/.
186 "Resources- Citizens." NJCCIC. Accessed December 17, 2017. https://www.cyber.nj.gov/citizens/.
187 New Jersey. State of New Jersey 217th Legislature 2016 Session. Senate Bill 808- An Act Creating the New Jersey Cybersecurity
Commission. 2016. ftp://www.njleg.state.nj.us/20162017/S1000/808_I1.HTM.
184

Page 53

CHAPTER 1: STATE CYBERSECURITY COMPARATIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS
Active MONITORING
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The NJCCIC is the state’s Information Sharing and Analysis Organization created in
response to Presidential Executive Order 13691.188 The NJCCIC is less than 2 years old
and explains itself as “a one-stop-shop agency for cybersecurity information sharing,
threat analysis and incident reporting.”189 NJCCIC is located in the Regional Operations
Intelligence Center that also houses the state’s fusion and emergency operations centers
that coordinate with national resources like the MS-ISAC, DHS, and the National Guard.
“The goal is to promote shared and real-time awareness of cyber threat for New
Jersey's citizens, local governments, businesses, and critical infrastructure
owners and operators. The NJCCIC bridges the information divide between
local, state, federal, public, and private sector institutions to reduce New Jersey's
cyber risk and respond to emergent incidents.” - NJCCIC

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
Cyber incidents can be reported through the OIT, NJCCIC Cyber Liaison Offices, or the
State Police Computer Crimes Unit (CCU). All data breaches are required to be reported
to the state police before being disclosed to the customer. The CCU is equipped to
respond to a number to cybercrimes. For cybersecurity specific events, large scale
emergencies, and disasters, the National Guard Cyber Crimes Protection Team may be
deployed. This is a joint venture between the New Jersey and New York National
Guard.190

Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 21. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
189 New Jersey. NJCCIC. Mission. Accessed December 16, 2017. https://www.cyber.nj.gov/mission/.
190 "Cyber Protection Team | NJ Army National Guard." NJ.gov. Accessed December 17, 2017. http://www.nj.gov/military/army/cyberprotection-team/.
188
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Costs
RECENT CYBERSECURITY SPENDING
“The fiscal 2017 budget recommends a $6 million decrease for OIT…The fiscal year 2017
budget for the Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (OHSP) totals $9.9 million,
an increase of $6.0 million over the fiscal 2016 adjusted appropriation of $3.9 million.
This increase is due to the consolidation of the State’s investments in cybersecurity from
the Office of Information Technology to the OHSP”191
Recent Cybersecurity Spending

$193,000

$6,193,00
0

FY 2016

FY 2017
(Establishing
baseline funding
for NJCCIC)

New Jersey. Office of the State Treasurer. Citizens' Guide to the Annual Budget. 2017.
http://www.nj.gov/treasury/omb/publications/17citizensguide/citguide.pdf.
191

Page 55

CHAPTER 1: STATE CYBERSECURITY COMPARATIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS
STATE ANALYSIS: NEW YORK
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
New York operates the Enterprise Information Security Office (EISO) within the Office
of Information Technology Services (NYITS). The NYITS is headed by the state CIO. The
EISO and CIO are responsible for creating, revising, and enforcing the Information
Technology Security Policy192 and all other IT policies.193 These policies are regularly
updated (all in 2017) and exercised. The EISO works with all levels of government and
the private sector to coordinate information security compliance and management,
cyber incident response, monitoring and intelligence sharing, vulnerability and threat
management, penetration testing, security policy and standards development, security
awareness and training. Capacity for each of these areas varies.194,195 The New York
Department of Financial Services has recently launched a secure portal for mandatory
reporting of cybersecurity incidents as part of a larger comprehensive cybersecurity bill
that effects all financial institutions in the state.196
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
In 2013, the governor created the Cybersecurity Advisory Board (CSAB) a publicprivate entity to work with both state leadership and the NYITS. At its inception, the
CSAB, CIO, CISO and Chief Risk Officer197 created a pilot program to investigate how 5
state agencies were managing assets, risk, security policies, and awareness. As a result of
that investigation, all state agencies are required to conduct risk assessments and
cybersecurity awareness training.198 Since its creation the CSAB has provided guidance

New York. Office of Information Technology Services. ITS Security Policies. Accessed December 23, 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/eiso/policies/security.
193 New York. Office of Information Technology Services. ITS Policies. Accessed December 23, 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/tables/technologypolicyindex.
194 New York. Enterprise Information Security Office. Welcome to the NYS Enterprise Information Security Office! July 03, 2015.
Accessed December 23, 2017. https://its.ny.gov/welcome-nys-enterprise-information-security-office.
195 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 24-26 http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
196 New York. Department of Financial Services. DFS Cybersecurity Regulation. August 2017.
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1708281.htm.
197 Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity/Trustees of Columbia University. New York State’s Innovative New Program for Risk
Management Bringing Leading Private Sector Practices to Government. September 2016.
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/326052761-nys-risk-management-program-capi-issuebrief-september-2016_0.pdf.
198 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015, 25. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
192
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on other issues including, voting infrastructure security,199 critical infrastructure,
information sharing,200 and financial services.201 The CSAB is currently part of the
governor’s office. In both the 2017 and 2016 NY legislative sessions, a comprehensive
cybersecurity initiative bill was introduced creating a CSAB permanently within the
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, a New York State Cyber
Security Partnership Program for owners and operators of critical infrastructure,
private sector business, academia, and private citizens, and a New York State Cyber
Security Sharing and Threat Prevention Program. The bill is currently in
committee.202,203
“…to enhance the security, protection and resilience of New York state's
critical infrastructure, and private sector business interests, as well as the
protection of the finances and individual liberties of every citizen, the state
of new York must promote a cyber environment that encourages efficiency,
innovation, and economic prosperity, and that can operate with safety,
security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberty.”- NY Assembly
Bill A3448

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
The ESIO provides some public-facing Cybersecurity awareness toolkits and resources
for small business, private citizens, children, and local government.204,205 The state, in
partnership with academia and the private sector just held it’s 20th annual Cybersecurity

New York. Office of the Governor. Governor Cuomo Directs Cyber Security Advisory Board to Review Cyber Security of Voting
Infrastructure Amidst Reports of Foreign Interference in 2016 Election. June 21, 2017. https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-directs-cyber-security-advisory-board-review-cyber-security-voting.
200 New York. Office of the Governor. Governor Cuomo Announces Cyber Security Advisory Board. September 28, 2014.
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-cyber-security-advisory-board.
201 New York. Office of the Governor. Governor Cuomo Announces New Cyber Security Assessments for Banks. September 28, 2014.
Accessed December 23, 2017. https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-new-cyber-security-assessmentsbanks.
202 New York. NY State Senate. NY State Assembly Bill A3448. November 08, 2017.
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/A3448.
203 New York. NY State Senate. Senate Bill S924- Cybersecurity Advisory Board. November 08, 2017. Accessed December 23, 2017.
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s924/amendment/original.
204 "Awareness/Training/Events." New York State Office of Information Technology Services. November 27, 2017. Accessed December
23, 2017. https://its.ny.gov/awarenesstrainingevents.
205 "Local Government." New York State Office of Information Technology Services. February 11, 2016. Accessed December 23, 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/local-government.
199
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Conference.206 New York state agency employees must complete cybersecurity
awareness training within 30 days of hire. Each agency must have an Information
Security Officer. Annual risk assessments and an incident response plan are also
requirements.207 New York is the first state to create a Chief Risk Officer and state-wide
risk management system. While not cybersecurity specific, the role does include
cybersecurity as a main facet. In 2010, the state launched the MS-ISAC as part of the
Center for Internet Security in coordination with DHS, and US-CERT.

Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
As mentioned, legislation was introduced in 2017 to create a state specific cyber
intelligence sharing entity. All state and third-party systems must be scanned for
vulnerabilities before installation and regularly thereafter. Penetration testing is required
periodically. Security controls such as anti-virus, software integrity checkers, and web
filtering are required for state systems where possible. Systems that are too old (not
patchable or no longer supported) must be replaced. Intrusion detection monitoring
systems are deployed strategically and must be configured to alert incident response
teams.208 The EISO provides cyber advisories about vulnerabilities and critical patches.

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
The NY Office of Homeland Security and Emergency response is in the process of
forming a new Cyber Incident Response Team that will focus on proactive protection of
non-executive agencies, local governments, and public authorities.209,210 Cyber incidents
"NYS Celebrates 20th Annual Cyber Security Conference." New York State Office of Information Technology Services. June 08,
2017. Accessed December 23, 2017. https://its.ny.gov/press-release/nys-celebrates-20th-annual-cyber-security-conference.
207 New York. Enterprise Information Security Office. Information Security Policy. Accessed December 17, 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-p03-002_information_security_0.pdf.
208New York. Office of Information Technology and Technology Services. Information Security Policy. 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-p03-002_information_security_0.pdf.
209New York. Division of the Budget. Homeland Security and Emergency Services-Budget Highlights. 2017.
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/executive/eBudget1718/agencyPresentations/appropData/HomelandSecurityandEmergencyServic
esDivisionof.html.
210 New York. Division of the Budget. FY 2018 Executive Budget Briefing Book. 2017.
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/executive/eBudget1718/fy1718littlebook/PublicSafety.pdf.
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must be reported to the Cyber Command Center (housed in EISO). The Cyber
Command Center responds to incidents in coordination with agency IR teams, first
responders, and external entities such as MS-ISAC, FBI, NYS Intelligence Center, NYS
Police, ISPs, and security solutions vendors. The standard operating procedures for
incident response are the responsibility of the Cyber Command Center and must be
tested via processes like tabletop exercises or cyber threat drills annually at minimum.211
For cybersecurity specific events, large scale emergencies, and disasters the National
Guard Cyber Crimes Protection Team may be deployed. This is a joint venture between
the New Jersey and New York National Guard.212

Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending
In 2017 $4.8 Million was appropriated for cyber security, emergency preparedness, and
emergency response training213
In the 2014-2015 budget cycle New York State spent $15 million in capital resources to
fund initial planning and development costs for a new College of Emergency
Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity.214

New York. Office of Information Technology Services. Cyber Incident Response. 2017.
https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-s13-005_cyber_incident_response_0.pdf.
212 "Cyber Protection Team | NJ Army National Guard." NJ.gov. Accessed December 17, 2017. http://www.nj.gov/military/army/cyberprotection-team/.
213 New York. Division of the Budget. FY 2018 Executive Budget | Agency Appropriations | Homeland Security and Emergency Services,
Division of. Accessed December 26, 2017.
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/executive/eBudget1718/agencyPresentations/appropData/HomelandSecurityandEmergencyServic
esDivisionof.html.
214 New York. Division of the Budget. Additional Highlights from the 2014-15 State Budget Agreement. Accessed December 26, 2017.
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/press/2014/pressRelease14_enactedBudHighlights2.html.
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STATE ANALYSIS: TEXAS
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
The Texas Department of Information Resources (DIR) is large. It includes the
Executive Director/Chief Information Officer, Chief Technology Officer, Statewide Data
Coordinator, Chief Information Security Office, and Information Technology Services. The
DIR also houses five other offices including Chief Operations Office, Chief Procurement
Office, General Counsel, Public Affairs, and Chief Financial Office. 215 The DIR (as of 2015)
was home to 196 full-time employees, and appropriations of $295,243,785.216
“The DIR not only provides various security services to state agencies and
higher education institutions (which allows it to be a completely self-funded
agency), but it also educates agencies about security threats and prevention
strategies, negotiates favorable contracts for security services and tools, and
has developed a standardized, statewide Cybersecurity Framework.” 217
Strategic Planning and Reporting is accomplished through the State Strategic Plan,
Department of Information Resources Agency Strategic Plan (ASP) and Technology
Resources Planning, Information Resources Deployment Review, Corrective Action Plan,
legislative planning, and biennial performance reports.218
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
The Texas Cybersecurity, Education and Economic Development Council (TCEEDC)
was created to (1) Investigate and recommend strategies to improve cybersecurity
infrastructure and partnerships between business, government, and higher education (2)
Specific actions to accelerate the industry of cybersecurity within the state.

Texas. Department of Information Resources. Organization Chart. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://dir.texas.gov/View-AboutDIR/Pages/Content.aspx?id=16.
216
Texas. Department of Information Technology. Salary Supplement Reporting. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://dir.texas.gov/View-About-DIR/Pages/Content.aspx?id=18.
217 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, November
2015. Pg 29. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
218 Texas. Department of Information Resources. Strategic Planning & Reporting. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://dir.texas.gov/View-Resources/Pages/Content.aspx?id=20
215
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The council has 16 members, and a “broad and open participation group defined as
Council Partners.” The Texas
Legislature created the TCEEDC in
Multi-Sector Capacity TECEEDC
2011, and renewed it to operate
through 2015.219
2, 13%

State Employees

The initial TCEEDC report
2, 12%
Academia
identified 10 key
8, 50%
Private Industry
recommendations including an
4, 25%
Defense
overall statewide, communitycentered approach to cybersecurity.
The recommendations made by the
council are appropriate for many
states and include many recommendations similar to what other councils throughout
the country have found.
“Texas must establish a statewide focus for its cyber environment. This focus
would include Texas business and public leaders in collaborative efforts to
identify and mitigate risks and threats to Texas citizens and to spur innovation
in the cyber environment”

13. Establishing a Texas Coordinator of Cybersecurity within the Office of the
Governor
Provides: strategic direction for forming public/private partnerships to secure
state’s infrastructures and promote the cybersecurity industry within the
state.
14. Establishing the Business Executives for Texas Security (BETS) partnership
to bring public and private sector leaders and cybersecurity practitioners
together to form a framework for knowledge sharing and collaboration,
making non-proprietary and industry-recognized best practices and solutions
readily available for the collective improvement of cybersecurity across the
state.
15. Establishing a “Cyber Star” program to foster improvement of cyber resiliency
in both private and public infrastructures across the state and to increase
public trust by establishing a baseline for responsible cyber operations.
Texas. Texas Cybersecurity, Education, And Economic Development Council. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://dir.texas.gov/View-About-DIR/Pages/Content.aspx?id=23
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16. Adopting the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model
(http://cias.utsa.edu/the-ccsmm.html) as a statewide guide for developing
a viable and sustainable cybersecurity program and fostering a culture of
cybersecurity throughout the state.
17. Increasing the number of cybersecurity practitioners in Texas
18. Providing a consistent voice for industry regarding cybersecurity policies in
order to facilitate communication between the state and industry.
19. Continuing investment in higher education cybersecurity programs in
order to: attract students, spur research and development, and encourage
institutions of higher education to become leaders in cybersecurity within
their own communities.
20. Promoting collaboration, innovation, and entrepreneurship in
cybersecurity to facilitate the commercialization of university research and
development and encourage the development of new businesses with
innovative products and services in cybersecurity.
21. Developing a comprehensive cybersecurity education pipeline through the
BETS partnership to introduce cybersecurity initiatives from K–PhD.
22. Reviewing and sharpening the leadership role of the Texas Department of
Information Resources (DIR) in establishing a sustainable Cybersecurity
Awareness Program for all Texans.
“What the Council found missing is the framework necessary to
collaboratively tie these cybersecurity strengths together. Texas is not alone
in this regard. States throughout the nation are struggling to identify
successful strategies for addressing cybersecurity concerns” - TCEEDC initial
report220
The Cyber Security Council is a cybersecurity specific version of the TCEEDC 221 The
CyberTexas Foundation is a public-private partnership that emphasizes workforce

Texas. Texas Cybersecurity, Education, And Economic Development Council. Building a More Secure and Prosperous
Texas. December 2012. Pg 1-2, 27
http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/resources/DocumentLibrary/Building%20a%20More%20Secure%20and%20Prosper
ous%20Texas.pdf.
221 Texas. Department of Information Resources. Texas Cybersecurity Council - Building a More Secure and Prosperous
Texas. December 15, 2016.
http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/resources/DocumentLibrary/Texas%20Cybersecurity%20Council%20Charter%202.0.
pdf.
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development, economic development, and preparedness including community
awareness.222
*Note: Texas did not entirely meet our capacity building comparator according to the
criteria presented in the public health framework simply because Texas does not go
beyond the public-private and academic triad. However, Texas’ cybersecurity
collaboration efforts are robust and have received national recognition for many of their
efforts.223 The majority of publically available information is slightly outdated and may
not reflect the current capacity.
Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
As mentioned in the TCEEDC report, Texas is working toward a state-wide cyber
awareness culture. To that end, the state is part of many forward-thinking initiatives. One
of the most unique and immediately impactful programs is the WeTeachCS program
(weteachcs.org). WeTeachCS is an academic partnership run through the University
of Texas that provides computer science certifications to K-12 teachers free of
charge. Since 2015, the program has provided over 2,000 K-12 teachers in Texas
with a certificate in computer science.224
The Indiana-Texas Civic Hackathon Challenge is a hacking competition organized by the
two states’ IT departments. Participants are tasked with creating the best application
using open data, code, and technology.225 San Antonio received the FBI director’s
Community Leadership Award after becoming the 2nd city to certify a CyberPatriot
Center of Excellence program emphasizing K-12 cybersecurity education and having the
most CyberPatriot teams at the National Youth Cyber Defense Competition.226, 227
The Texas CISO Council is a volunteer body that helps to support stronger security
practices throughout the state. They have recently provided a common public-facing
"CyberTexas Foundation." CyberTexas Foundation. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.cybertexas.org/.
"CyberTexas Foundation to Be Awarded FBI Director’s 2015 Community Leadership Award." FBI. April 01, 2016. Accessed
December 22, 2017. https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/sanantonio/news/press-releases/cybertexas-foundation-to-beawarded-fbi-directors-2015-community-leadership-award.
224 WeTeach_CS. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.weteachcs.org/.
225 "Groundbreaking Indiana-Texas Civic Hackathon Challenge Declares Grand Champion." Indy Chamber. March 27, 2015.
http://indychamber.com/news/indy-chamber-news/groundbreaking-indiana-texas-civic-hackathon-challenge-declares-grandchampion/.
226 "CyberTexas Foundation to Be Awarded FBI Director’s 2015 Community Leadership Award." FBI. April 01, 2016. Accessed
December 22, 2017. https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/sanantonio/news/press-releases/cybertexas-foundation-to-beawarded-fbi-directors-2015-community-leadership-award.
227 United States. CyberPatriot. AFA CyberPatriot Website. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://www.uscyberpatriot.org/.
222
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guide for institutions looking for basic guidance for how to create an information
security program.228
Active monItoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The Texas DIR develops the security policies and strategic planning for the state and
runs the Network Security Operations Center. DIR also runs the enterprise security
program, provides vulnerability assessments, runs a 24/7 security alert system, and
provides cybersecurity training, conferences, briefings, and forums to promote security
awareness.229
The Statewide Portal for Enterprise Cybersecurity Threat, Risk and Incident
Management (SPECTRIM) Incident Management Portal is a cybersecurity tool that
centralizes risk assessment, emergency and non-emergency incident reporting
management, incident response planning, and coordination with the Network Security
Operations Center.230
Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
The DIR serves as the Internet Service Provider for 150 of Texas’ state agencies. It
operates a 24/7 incident response phone line, Security Operations Center, as well as the
online SPECTRIM portal.231
The Network Security Operations Center was established in 2005 and provides, 24/7
network monitoring and mitigation, penetration testing, cyber threat recon, and also

Texas. CISO Council. Texasciso. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://www.texascisocouncil.org/resources.
Texas. Department of Information Resources. DIR Agency Strategic Plan. 2016. Pg. 45http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/resources/DocumentLibrary/DIR%20Agency%20Strategic%20Plan%2020172021.pdf.
230 Texas. Department of Information Resources. The SPECTRIM Portal -Statewide Portal for Enterprise Cybersecurity Threat, Risk and
Incident Management. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://dir.texas.gov/View-About-DIR/InformationSecurity/Pages/Content.aspx?id=136.
231 Texas. Department of Information Resources. The SPECTRIM Portal -Statewide Portal for Enterprise Cybersecurity Threat, Risk and
Incident Management. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://dir.texas.gov/View-About-DIR/InformationSecurity/Pages/Content.aspx?id=136.
228
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serves as the cyber intelligence sharing hub. They serve state agencies, higher education
institutions and other public-sector customers.232, 233
Texas has a range of cyber legislation. They have criminalized cybercrime, require state
agency security plans and reporting, bolstered personal information confidentiality,
agency tech contracting, procurement, and monitoring of major information resources
projects.234
Costs
RECENT CYBERSECURITY SPENDING235
Texas transparently track of where cybersecurity resources are allocated throughout the
state, including over 22 million dollars in state funds from FY 2018-2019. Texas was
recently awarded an 11-million-dollar contract from DHS to develop standards and
guidelines for Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) nation-wide.236

Texas - Recent Cybersecurity Spending
$2,152,981
$2,500,000

$155,000
$650,606
$155,000

Cybersecurity Improvements

$830,998

$11,000,000

$235,000
$10,000,000

Cybersecurity Advancement for Health and
Human Services enterprise systems
Student and Teacher Data Privacy and
Cybersecurity
Technology Acquisition: Cybersecurity
Improvements
Juvenile Justice Department:

$400,000

Higher Ed Coordinating Board: Cybersecurity
Improvements
Dept of State Health Services
Dept of Housing and Community Affairs
Dept of Motor Vehicles
Dept of Transportation
DHS ISAC Guidelines

Texas. Department of Information Resources. 2016 Threat Report Network Security Operations Center. 2016.
http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/about-dir/informationsecurity/ImageLibrary/2016%20NSOC%20Threat%20Report.pdf.
233 Texas. Department of Information Resources. DIR Basics Series-Cybersecurity. 2016.
http://publishingext.dir.texas.gov/portal/internal/resources/DocumentLibrary/DIR Basics Series-Cybersecurity.pptx.
234 Texas. Department of Information Resources. Technology Legislation. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://dir.texas.gov/ViewResources/Pages/Content.aspx?id=31.
235 Texas. Eighty-fifth Legislature. S.B. No. 1 General Appropriations Act. 2017.
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/85R/billtext/pdf/SB00001F.pdf#navpanes=0.
232

236

Ibid., Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity."
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TEXAS CYBERSECURITY
APPROPRIATIONS

FY 2018

FY 2019

Health and Human Services: Cybersecurity
Improvements

$2,152,981

$ 1,729,692

Student and Teacher Data Privacy and
Cybersecurity

$ 2,500,000

$ 2,500,000

Technology Acquisition: Cybersecurity
Improvements

$ 155,000

$ 70,000

Juvenile Justice Dept: Cybersecurity
Improvements

$ 650,606

$ 65,000

Higher Ed Coordinating Board: Cybersecurity
Improvements

$155,000

$70,000

Dept of State Health Services

$ 830,998

$ 830,998

Dept of Housing and Community Affairs

$ 235,000

$ 100,000

Dept of Motor Vehicles

$ 400,000

$0

Dept of Transportation

$10,000,000

DHS ISAC guideline creation federal funding

$11,000,000
(FY2016)
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STATE ANALYSIS: VIRGINIA
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
The Commonwealth of Virginia’s Chief Information Officer is the principal authority for
cybersecurity as head of the Virginia Information Technologies Agency (VITA). VITA
provides cybersecurity, IT infrastructure services, IT governance, compliance and
strategic planning.237,238 The current Governor took Virginia’s cybersecurity expertise to
the national stage. The Governor partnered with the National Governor’s Association (he
was the chair of NGA at the time) to create the Meet the Threat website and initiative
(https://ci.nga.org/cms/MeetTheThreat#) as a tool and resource library for states to
utilize when strengthening their cybersecurity planning and culture. Virginia boasts one
of the most integrated and collaborative cybersecurity industries in the country.239
Virginia embraces a community approach to cybersecurity integrating education to work
pipeline, business, and government. Virginia is deeply rooted in the defense industry,
housing over 650 cybersecurity companies, the National Science Foundation, National
Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center, and Army National Guard
Readiness Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and National
Counterterrorism Center are among many national security organizations in the state.
The state reports more than $44.6 billion in defense contracts, number one for DoD
investment nation-wide.
“It is estimated, because of this new demand [for cloud services], that 70
percent of the world’s internet traffic passes through Virginia largely due to
the 60 data centers throughout the Commonwealth” Virginia’s Cyber
Security Approach: Leadership through Diversity
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
In 2015 the governor created the Virginia Cybersecurity Commission (VCC) and the
CyberVirginia initiatives by executive order. CyberViginia is a public-facing
cybersecurity resource for citizens, business, and government
(http://cyberva.virginia.gov/). The VCC meets three times a year and submits an annual
Virginia. VITA. About - VITA. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://www.vita.virginia.gov/about/.
Virginia. VITA. IT Strategic Plan - 2017 Update - VITA. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.vita.virginia.gov/itgovernance/cov-strategic-plan-for-it/itsp---2017-update/.
239 Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." The Pell Center. February 01, 2015.Pg 32. Accessed September 05,
2017. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
237
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report. The Commission's responsibilities include providing recommendations on the
following 7 areas: 240
1. Identify high risk cyber security issues facing VA
2. Securing Virginia's state networks, systems, and data, including
interoperability, standardized plans and procedures, and evolving threats and
best practices to prevent the unauthorized access, theft, alteration, and
destruction of data
3. Provide suggestions for the addition of cyber security to Virginia's Emergency
Management and Disaster Response capabilities, including testing cyber
security incident response scenarios, recovery and restoration plans, and
coordination with the federal government
4. Offer suggestions for promoting awareness of cyber hygiene among citizens,
businesses and government
5. Present recommendations for cutting edge science, technology, engineering
and math (STEM) educational and training programs for all ages, including K12, community colleges, universities, in
VCC Multi-Sector Representation
order to foster an improved cyber security
State
2, 13%
workforce pipeline and create cyber security
4, 25%
Private
1, 6%
professionals with a wide range of expertise.
Academic
2, 12%
6. Offer strategies to advance private sector
Legal
cyber security economic development
7, 44%
Defense
opportunities, including innovative
technologies, research and development,
and start-up firms, and maximize public-private partnerships throughout the
Commonwealth.
7. Provide suggestions for coordinating the review of and assessing
opportunities for cyber security private sector growth as it relates to military
facilities and defense activities in Virginia.

Virginia. Office of the Governor. Executive Order Number Thirty-Nine (2015) - Launching "Cyber Virginia" and The Virginia Cyber
Security Commission. 2015. https://governor.virginia.gov/media/3627/eo39-launching-cyber-virginia-and-the-virginia-cybersecurity-commissionada.pdf.
240
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“This collaborative and cooperative model of shared security and resilience has only
been developed and adopted by a few leading states; Virginia among the first.”241
Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Virginia is home to thirteen NSA/DHS Centers of Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance and Cyber Defense. The Virginia Cyber Range is a cloud-based cybersecurity
exercise arena, lab area, and course repository. The program is led by a committee
representing 11 NSA/DHS certified Centers of Academic Excellence. Students from
Virginia high schools, colleges, and universities can access the Cyber Range through an
internet connection and conventional web browser at no cost. This means each local
school does not have to bear the financial burden of building the infrastructure or
teaching resources required for cybersecurity education and training.242
The MACH37 Cyber Accelerator is a market-centric cybersecurity incubator run by the
non-profit government corporation the Center for Innovative Technology. The
accelerator focuses on research, seed funding, product development, and
commercialization.243
In addition to the CyberViginia public resource guide, VITA also provides awareness
toolkits for citizens, executives, and agencies.244 The Virginia Cybersecurity Partnership is
a 220-member public-private partnership whose goals include providing opportunities
for skills enhancement, outreach and pipeline development, collaboration in cyberrelated activities.245 The Virginia Economic Development Partnership actively markets
Virginia’s cybersecurity industry as a pro-business and asset rich environment in order to
attract more cybersecurity industry.246 Virginia offers incentives including a number of
grants, loans, investments, and business development tax credits for job creation,

Virginia. CyberVa. Virginia’s Cyber Security Approach: Leadership through Diversity. Pg 4 .
https://cyberva.virginia.gov/media/9245/virginiacybersecurity_printfinal-4.pdf.
242 Virginia. Virginia Cyber Range. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://virginiacyberrange.org/about.
243 Virginia. Virginia.gov. MACH37 Cyber Accelerator. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.virginia.gov/services/mach37-cyberaccelerator/.
244 Virginia. VITA. Citizen Awareness. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.vita.virginia.gov/commonwealth-security/awarenesstoolkit/citizen-awareness/.
245 Virginia. CyberVA. Virginia’s Cyber Security Approach: Leadership through
Diversity.https://cyberva.virginia.gov/media/9245/virginiacybersecurity_printfinal-4.pdf.
246 Virginia. Virginia Economic Development Partnership. Unlock Virginia's Cybersecurity Advantage. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://www.yesvirginia.org/cybersecurity.
241
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research and development, research commercialization, worker retraining, and more.247
Virginia also participates in the National Veterans Retraining Initiative.248
Virginia also has a Secretary of Technology office that oversees the Innovation and
Entrepreneurship Investment Authority, Center for Innovative Technology (home of the
MACH37 accelerator), and coordinates with VITA.249

Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
Virginia’s Security Threat and Vulnerability Assessment Service within VITA
provides cyber intelligence gathering using the Commonwealth Security and Risk
Management (CSRM) as the go-between for coordination with state agencies, the FBI,
and other law enforcement. They provide a monthly vulnerability scan, security
advisories, and month information sharing meetings.
VITA provides centralized information security officer services for strategic planning and
required annual updates. They provide IT security audit services, and security outreach
and information sharing that works with the MS-ISAC, VA Fusion center,250 FBI, and other
security groups.251

Response and Recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
All executive government agencies and higher education institutions are required to
report information security events to VITA. 252 VITA offers security incident management
through the CRSM and can deploy a team of first responders from the Commonwealth
Virginia. CyberVa. Virginia’s Cyber Security Approach: Leadership through Diversity. Pg 22-33 .
https://cyberva.virginia.gov/media/9245/virginiacybersecurity_printfinal-4.pdf.
248 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies. Veterans: Launch a
New Cybersecurity Career | National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://niccs.uscert.gov/training/veterans.
249 Virginia. Secretary of Technology. Technology. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://technology.virginia.gov/.
250 Virginia. Virginia Fusion Center. Virginia Fusion Center. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://www.vsp.state.va.us/FusionCenter/.
251 Virginia. VITA. Security Services Catalog. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.vita.virginia.gov/services/servicecatalog/security-services/.
252 Virginia. VITA. Incident Reporting. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.vita.virginia.gov/commonwealth-security/incidentreporting/.
247

Page 70

CHAPTER 1: STATE CYBERSECURITY COMPARATIVE POLICY
ANALYSIS
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT).253,254 Additionally, the Virginia State Police
runs a High Tech Crimes Unit that can participate in investigations.255

Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending

256,257

Recent Cybersecurity Spending
$1,000,000

Cyber Range
Veterans Retraining

$500,000
$800,000
$4,000,000

MACH37
Accelorator
Cyber Camps for
Students

Virginia. VITA. Security Services Full Incident Management. Accessed December 22, 2017.
https://www.vita.virginia.gov/services/service-catalog/security-services/security-incident-management-full-service.html.
254 Virginia. VITA. Security Services. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://www.vita.virginia.gov/services/service-catalog/securityservices/security-threat-and-vulnerability-assessment-service.html.
255 Virginia State Police – High Tech Crimes Unit. Iacpcybercenter.org. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://www.iacpcybercenter.org/labs/virginia-state-police-high-tech-crimes-unit-2/.
256 "Gov. McAuliffe’s Final Budget Focuses on Education, Medicaid." WTVR.com. December 18, 2017. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://wtvr.com/2017/12/18/gov-mcauliffes-final-budget-focuses-on-education-medicaid/.
257 Virginia. VITA. 2016 Commonwealth of Virginia Information Security Report. 2016.
https://www.vita.virginia.gov/media/vitavirginiagov/commonwealth-security/pdf/2016COVSecurityAnnualReport.pdf.
253
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STATE ANALYSIS: WASHINGTON
Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
Washington has gone through a rapid transformation over the last two years. The state
began strategic cybersecurity planning as an addition to the state’s emergency
management plan in 2015– the Washington Significant Cyber Incident Annex (WSCIA).
Cybersecurity measures were largely defense based and the Emergency Management
Division258 In that same year the Washington Office of Cybersecurity (WA-OCS) was
established as part of the Washington Technology Solutions department. The WA-OCS
goes far beyond emergency management generating a much greater emphasis on
public-facing cybersecurity with the WA-OCS. Washington’s chart reflects the fact that
reporting on the initial years of the WA-OCS does not include the Office of
Cybersecurity.
The WA-OCS is led by the Chief Information Security Officer tending to the following
priorities,
•
•
•

•
•

Protecting individual privacy by securing personal information stored by state
agencies.
Securing the state’s networks and digital infrastructure from attack.
Engaging with regional and national public and private sector organizations to
form deeper partnerships and build more unified response capabilities against
cyber threats.
Partnering with policy, budget and organizational leaders to ensure a modern
and coordinated approach to cyber security.
Ensuring the continuity of commerce for our state and our region in the event of
a cyberattack on critical infrastructure. 259,260

The WA-OCS is the primary entity responsible for cybersecurity strategic planning,
technology, policy, private sector relationship building, public outreach, research and
analysis, publication, and coordination between the different levels of government. The
WA-OCS consists of six departments:

Spidalieri, Francesca. "State of the States on Cybersecurity." The Pell Center. February 01, 2015. Pg 36-39 Accessed September 05,
2017. http://pellcenter.org/eight-states-lead-the-rest-in-cybersecurity/.
259 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Cybersecurity.wa.gov. Accessed December 22, 2017. https://cybersecurity.wa.gov/.
260 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. About Us. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/about-us.
258
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (WA-CERT)
Forensic Services (WA-FS)
Information Security Program (WA-SISP)
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (WA-ISAC)
Security Operations Center (WA-SOC)
Security Policy and Compliance (WA-SPC)

Multi-Sector Capacity Building
Multi-sector capacity building in Washington started with an emergency response plan
and the Unified Cyber Coordination Group (UCG). The Cyber UCG is coordinated by the
authority of the Homeland Security Advisor. The Group consists of representatives from
state, federal, and local government, academia, critical infrastructure owners and
operators, and private industry.261
`

Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
The WA-OCS provides cybersecurity resources for awareness and training of the
workplace, citizens, and parents. Technical guides benefit technology professionals and
organizations through a resource consolidation of industry standard techniques and
processes for creating your own security policy. 262, 263
For the last three years, the state has run Hacktober. Hacktober is a cybersecurity game
for all 65,000 state employees that raises awareness about cyber hygiene and
cybersecurity practices.264 The WA-OCS provides newsletters, scam alerts and security
advisories linked to MS-ISAC, StaySafeOnline.org, and US-CERT.265,266

Washington. Washington Military Department. Washington State Significant Cyber Incident Annex To the Washington State
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan Annex D.By Washington Military Department. March 2015. Pg. 7-8.
https://mil.wa.gov/uploads/pdf/PLANS/wastatesignificantcyberincidentannex20150324.pdf.
262 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Resources. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/resources.
263 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Information Security Program (WA-SISP). Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://soc.wa.gov/node/483.
264 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Hacktober. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/node/490.
265 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Cybersecurity Newsletters. Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://soc.wa.gov/resources/newsletters.
266 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Recent Scams. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/security-news/recent-scams.
261
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Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
The Washington-Security Operations Center (WA-SOC) is responsible for real-time
threat detection and monitoring, alerting and intelligence gathering267
Agencies are required to submit certification of compliance with security policy and
standards each year. Agencies are required to provide cybersecurity training to all
employees responsible for performing security procedures. Additionally, agencies must
perform a Technology Security Policy and Standards Compliance Audit once every three
years. 268
Specific policies are available to help agencies comply with security planning and
compliance. All employees must receive annual cybersecurity awareness training.
Periodic security testing is required in the form of penetration testing, vulnerability
assessments, and system code analysis.269 The Washington state chief information officer
has created an online library of more than 80 technology policies, procedures, and
guides. 270
WA-OCS also runs the Washington Information Sharing and Analysis Center, WAISAC.271

Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
WA-OCS operates the Washington Computer Emergency Readiness Team (WA-CERT).
WA-CERT is responsible for incident validation and response, forensics, advisories,
recovery. WA-CERT does security and risk assessments in the time between emergency

Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Security Operations Center. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/node/481.
Washington. Office of the Chief Information Officer. Securing Information Technology Assets. Accessed December 22, 2017.
https://ocio.wa.gov/policy/securing-information-technology-assets.
269 Washington. Office of the Chief Information Officer. Securing Information Technology Assets. Accessed December 22, 2017.
https://ocio.wa.gov/policy/securing-information-technology-assets-standards.
270 Washington. Office of the Chief Information Officer. OCIO- Policies, Procedures and Guidelines. Accessed December 22, 2017.
https://ocio.wa.gov/policies.
271 Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Information Sharing And Analysis Center (WA-ISAC). Accessed December 22, 2017.
http://soc.wa.gov/node/484.
267
268
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response. 272 The state has clear security reporting communication procedures that each
agency must follow.273
In September of 2017, the state entered into a federal partnership with DHS, MS-ISAC,
and the Washington Elections Office to execute a 3-month long pilot program focusing
on improved cybersecurity threat prevention, protection, response and recovery of
election systems. This project surfaces in the wake of the 2016 election system
breaches.274 Washington partnered with DHS the year previous to start the Office of
Privacy and Data Protection run by the state’s Chief Privacy Officer. The office is
responsible for training state agencies on privacy, and to serve the public through
consumer outreach and education initiatives. 275

Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending
FY 2017 $9,443,000 – consolidating technology services into the Office of Cyber
Security.276

Washington. Office of Cybersecurity. Http://soc.wa.gov/node/478. Accessed December 22, 2017. http://soc.wa.gov/node/478.
Washington. Office of the State Chief Information Officer. IT Security Incident Communication. Accessed December 22, 2017.
https://ocio.wa.gov/policy/it-security-incident-communication.
274 Douglas, Theo. "Washington State Reveals Upcoming Federal Cybersecurity Pilot, After DHS Confirms Attempted Election
Breaches." Government Technology: State & Local Government News Articles, September 25, 2017.
http://www.govtech.com/security/Washington-State-Reveals-Upcoming-Federal-Cybersecurity-Pilot-After-DHS-ConfirmsAttempted-Election-Breaches.html.
275 "Washington State Announces Federal Cybersecurity Partnership, Office of Privacy and Data Protection." Government Technology:
State & Local Government News Articles, January 6, 2016. http://www.govtech.com/security/Washington-State-Announces-FederalCybersecurity-Partnership-Office-of-Privacy-and-Data-Protection.html.
276 Washington. Office of Financial Management. Governors Supplemental Appropriations Bill.2016. pg. 54
https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/budget/statebudget/18supp/bills/OperatingZ-0730.3.pdf.
272
273
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General Conclusions
Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia conduct cybersecurity in a manner that
includes the most initiatives and processes identified by the cybersecurity-as-a-publicgood literature and our resulting public health framework of evaluative comparators.
These states have made significant investments in cybersecurity planning, research,
coordination, execution, awareness, education, and public outreach.
Consideration must be paid to the fact that CO, MI, MD, and VA are home to some of
our nation’s most critical defense institutions and organizations. Between the 4 states
there exist no less than 43 colleges and universities designated as DHS/NSA
Certified Academic Centers of Excellence in Cyber Defense. The defense industry
provides an ideal economic scaffolding to support strong school-to-work pipelines,
access to federal funding, and a thriving cybersecurity industry.

1. Leadership
Competent Authority & Resources, Central Hub, Strategic Planning
Washington state’s Office of Cybersecurity provides a simple and effective model for
centralizing cybersecurity authoring, planning, and initiatives into a central hub and
coordinating cybersecurity Prevention, Active Monitoring and Incident Response &
Recovery. Michigan, Maryland, and Virginia adopt a similar structure. Colorado is
working toward this structure as well.
While some states may not have a specific cybersecurity strategic plan, most states
included in this analysis do have some type of comprehensive information security plan
or policy and nearly all are working toward a more comprehensive and diverse
approach. This is discussed further at the end of the report.
Multi-Sector Capacity Building
Our public health framework helped to identify the best practices a state would expect
to find in a Cybersecurity Center of Excellence geared toward cybersecurity-as-a-publicgood. A community approach to cybersecurity is growing in popularity among states. To
embark on this process, a strong and diverse multi-sector advisory entity is essential to
guiding cybersecurity policies aimed at providing for the public good. Simple publicprivate partnerships, while important, are falling behind the demand for a more holistic
and community centered approach to cybersecurity and cyber health. Boards that
include state, federal, and local government, academia, health, financial, business,
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industry, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and cybersecurity entities are
affecting innovative change. Diverse guiding bodies are best fit to research and advise
on solutions aimed at bolstering the cybersecurity posture of the state as a whole. This
multi-sector advisory approach has been executed by states like Colorado, Michigan,
Maryland, and California. This structure allows for a large advisory body that can
delegate amongst themselves to provide a deeper focus when investigating specific
cybersecurity policy areas via subcommittees. The structure provides for a more wellrounded and informed approach to cybersecurity than simple public-private
partnerships.

2. Prevention
Cyber Hygiene, Immunization, Education & Workforce Training
Mandatory state employee cybersecurity training is becoming indispensable as the
sophistication and proliferation of end-user attacks, and social engineering are rapidly
becoming the most damaging and frequent class of cyber threats. These individual
programs are relatively low-cost initiatives that can be accomplished almost
immediately by a CCoE. Michigan’s employee cyber awareness training costs less than
$200,000 and includes 18 lessons over a three-year period for every state employee,
50,000 of which have received the training. At approximately 30 cents per lesson, the
return on investment is estimated by the state to be more than 100 to 1.
The lack of cybersecurity professionals and rapidly growing demand place constraints
on the ability of states to attract and maintain a qualified cybersecurity workforce,
especially at public sector prices. The school-to-work pipeline is becoming more
integral in staffing processes. Capitalizing on this fact and using cybersecurity as an
economic driver by integrating academic and industry goals, and incentives are
becoming popular ideas among leading states. This idea extends beyond university
programs and certifications to the K-12 system in order to begin creating the next
generation of cybersecurity professionals and increase cybersecurity awareness among
communities. Michigan is the prime example in this area, Virginia also. Michigan has a
K-12 cyber curriculum and each year the state gives $500,000 of $1,500 dollar individual
grants to students participating in the High School Cyber Challenge. Virginia offers a
variety of cybersecurity scholarships. Texas’ WeTeachCS program and the CyberPatriot
youth program are also standout initiatives.
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3. Active Monitoring
Early Detection, Real-time Info Sharing & Threat Monitoring, Federal
Collaboration
Eight states examined are monitoring all of their Enterprise systems in near-real time. Six
states have early detection mechanisms. Some are requiring periodic risk assessments
and penetration testing while building up to a real-time monitoring capacity. All states
examined are collaborating with the federal government in some information sharing
and incident reporting or response capacity. MS-ISAC, US-CERT, DHS, National Guard,
StaySafeOnline.org, NetSmartKids.org and NIST coordination are some of the most
common federal collaborations.

4. Response and recovery
Coordinated Incident Response, Outbreak Containment, Cyber Laws
All states examined are pursuing cyber laws and regulations beyond existing federal
requirements. About half the states have a dedicated Security Operations Center
coordinated with some kind of Computer Emergency Response Team. Washington is an
example of a state that recently consolidated all cybersecurity monitoring and
response activities into the single Office of Cybersecurity. Michigan, Maryland,
Virginia, Washington, and Colorado are all working to have the complete set of in-house
services that work in coordination with each other to combine active monitoring and
incident response and recovery.

5. Costs
Recent Cybersecurity Spending
State cybersecurity expenditure patterns are very diverse. Transparency and
accountability are important when large investments and appropriations are sought.
Often, cybersecurity policy and spending originate in the executive branch by executive
order. This means that congressional interference is possible if the legislature is not
shown results or transparency. This can be particularly problematic because the results
are hard to show in a sector whose purpose is primarily preventative. Gaining
permanency from an executive order to a sustained center can be difficult for these
reasons. Pointing again to the Secure Colorado initiative, the development of
evaluation metrics as an activity of Colorado’s initiative have been particularly helpful to
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the state CISO communicating progress and value to the legislature in order to justify
continued funding. Florida had to experience this process and is still in the process of
recovering and organizing cybersecurity capacity.

Discussion of Cybersecurity Strategy
While some states may not have a specific cybersecurity strategic plan, most states
included in our sample do have some type of comprehensive information security plan
or policy, and nearly all are working toward a more comprehensive and diverse
approach. It is important to pay attention to why a state may or may not have a
cybersecurity-specific strategic plan, and where they are in the consolidation process.
Some states are starting from the ground up and must build a culture of cybersecurity.
These states are concurrently beginning to centralize their state technology systems,
organizational structures, and policies in order to become more secure. States like
Colorado, Florida, and Illinois identified a pressing need for a cybersecurity strategy in a
technology landscape that was already robust and flush with defense industry and
academic resources, but lacking comprehensive coordination. These states are working
to consolidate disparate state legacy and third-party systems into more centralized
enterprise systems in an effort to save money and decrease risk of cyber incidents. Other
states that were leading the way nationally, having already employed enterprise systems
and information security policies, are working to re-evaluate and integrate communitycentered cybersecurity, and not just IT security, more thoroughly among state agencies,
multi-sector entities, and the general public. Many of the states on this side of the
equation have been exemplary and very active on the national cybersecurity stage, while
unfortunately not giving enough attention to state, local, and public cybersecurity. The
defense industry has known for some time that investment in university programs is
necessary to keep up with cybersecurity workforce demand. As we are facing a worldwide shortage of cybersecurity professionals, states are beginning to reach deeper into
the K-12 systems, community colleges, university systems, and tapping civilian resources
like volunteer cyber corps and the National Guard veterans retraining programs.
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Oregon-Specific Conclusions
Many efforts exist that are comparable to what the Oregon CCoE intends to pursue, but
very few states actually include every essential characteristic and activity of a public
health approach to cybersecurity. Bits and pieces from multiple states should be
considered when compiling the proposal for the Oregon CCoE. The Secure
Colorado model, as implemented from the beginning of the program, best fits
Oregon’s capacity and goals. Colorado started with a $6,000 cybersecurity budget and
no strategic plan. The first strategic plan included simply applying the first 5 CIS
controls. Within 3 years, 98% of the state’s systems are actively monitored using
security tools in near-real time. Colorado claims a better security rating than most
banks, executes an exemplary incident response protocol, and requires mandatory
employee cybersecurity training. Colorado also employs very specific monitoring and
evaluation of their efforts, goals, and progress that provides accountability and
legitimacy for the significant investments being provided by the state legislature.
Washington state’s Office of Cybersecurity provides a simple and effective model for
centralizing cybersecurity authoring, planning, and initiatives into a central hub and
coordinating cybersecurity active monitoring and incident response.
However, there are specific initiatives from other states that could also lend well to
Oregon’s goals and can be undertaken almost immediately by a CCoE.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Michigan’s Civilian Cyber Corps
Florida’s New Skills for a New Fight veterans re-training program, the
SecureFloria.org public-facing website
Michigan’s traveling cybersecurity breakfast and luncheon series’ and K-12 town
hall meetings
California’s Cyber Mentor program.
Mandatory state employee cybersecurity training
Michigan’s employee cybersecurity training (100 to 1 ROI)
Texas’ WeTeachCS free computer science certification program for K-12 teachers
CyberPatriot and NICE participation
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Chapter 2: Oregon Cybersecurity Survey
A key aspect of embracing a public health approach to cybersecurity policy-making is
necessarily engaging the public. Sedenberg & Mulligan277 specifically call out the
creation of opportunities for input from the community, with special emphasis on
traditionally disenfranchised groups, as a key principle for creating public cybersecurity
policies, programs, and priorities. As the drafting of the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence (CCoE) proposal both creates a policy-making body and is itself a policymaking exercise, it is appropriate to refrain from delegating cybersecurity policy to
experts278 and instead directly engage members of key beneficiary groups279 to consider
their perspectives. This also acknowledges that the lack of understanding and salience of
emerging technologies make traditional proxies especially incapable of adequately
representing the public’s values, preferences, and beliefs280. In short, public participation
in information and communication policy making is valuable and adds legitimacy to the
outcomes281.
To reflect the importance of diverse perspectives in the CCoE drafting development
process, the CPS Oregon Cybersecurity Needs Assessment project uses two distinct
methods to get public input on statewide cybersecurity initiatives: an online survey
(discussed in this chapter), and focus groups (discussed in Chapter 3). The role of the
survey in the broader research project is to reach representatives of a wide variety of
Oregon organizations and efficiently and effectively assess the cybersecurity needs and
concerns that are potentially addressable through the CCoE. The survey collects
quantitative data using a single instrument to allow for comparisons across industries,
geographies, and organization sizes. This allows for the identification of broader trends
in Oregon, as well as differences based on geography and industry that may warrant
more attention. Additionally, when paired with qualitative and comparative data in a

Elaine M. Sedenberg & Deirdre K. Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Berkeley Technology
Law Journal 30, no. 3 (2015): 1738.
277

Peter Shane, “Cybersecurity Policy as if ‘Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making,” I/S:
A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 8, no. 2 (2012): 433-462.
278

“Key beneficiary groups” are defined as local governments, educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, small businesses, law
enforcement, and critical infrastructure.
279

Albert Lin, “Technology Assessment 2.0: Revamping Our Approach to Emerging Technologies,” Brooklyn Law Review 76, no. 4
(2011): 1309-1370.
280

Kristen Osenga, “The Internet is Not a Super Highway: Using Metaphors to Communicate Information and Communications
Policy,” Journal of Information Policy 30, no. 3 (2013): 30-54.
281
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mixed methods analysis approach282, survey results contribute to a robust set of
triangulated evidence to inform policy-making activities and provide legitimacy to
outcomes. Because of this, the survey is intended to be used in conjunction with these
other data sources to provide a comprehensive view of the current state of cybersecurity
in Oregon as seen through the eyes of Oregon organizations.

SURVEY PURPOSE
The purpose of this survey is to quantitatively analyze the cybersecurity needs,
resources, and concerns of organizations of all sizes, sectors, and types. Specifically, the
survey systematically inventories current needs, capabilities, and resources of
respondent organizations to allow for comparison, and assesses perceptions of
cybersecurity-related trends at the level of both organizations and sectors. The research
questions that the survey seeks to answer are:
•
•

What are the needs, capabilities, and resources related to cybersecurity within the
key beneficiary groups in Oregon?
What expectations regarding service usage, advisory engagement, and overall
cybersecurity salience can be expected from these groups going forward?

The first research question is addressed by the data gathered from Part 2 and Part 4 as
described below, while the second is addressed by the questions contained in Part 3.
Neither of these research questions, nor the questions in the survey itself, are specific to
the Oregon CCoE as proposed in SB 90. This is to allow respondents to focus on their
own cybersecurity needs and resources, and not require them to decipher a new piece
of legislation with which they may not be familiar. Instead, the survey is intended to be a
useful assessment of the state of cybersecurity across Oregon for all parties interested in
addressing this issue, whether they are involved in this specific policy-making activity or
not. However, the survey does provide a vehicle by which to raise awareness about SB90
and the CCoE proposal process. While not a part of the survey questions themselves,
information about the CCoE and the ability to participate in a focus group to discuss
possible CCoE activities were presented to respondents upon completion of the survey.
The survey also updates previous quantitative evaluations of Oregon’s cybersecurity
needs and concerns. The most relevant such evaluation, and therefore most heavily
referenced, is the cybersecurity survey conducted by the Technology Association of
John Creswell & Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications,
2011).
282
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Oregon (TAO)in 2013 and published in 2014283. The impetus of TAO’s survey (proposing
cybersecurity education initiatives in Oregon) is not as expansive as the current CCoE
effort. However, its 19 questions serve as a template for this survey because of their
validation by the technology industry through both the Technology Association of
Oregon and the Oregon Engineering Technology Industry Council, and the ability to
conduct trend analysis if necessary. Question text and response choices were updated to
reflect the specific context of SB90 and its proscribed tasks for the CCoE, as well as the
current cybersecurity environment. All question and response choice texts were
reviewed and approved by Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council members and
Oregon Office of the State Chief Information Officer staff at the September 27, 2017
Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council meeting.

SURVEY DISTRIBUTION AND RESPONDENTS
To recruit survey respondents, a landing page with a description of the project and
survey, as well as a direct link to the survey interface, was set up on the pdx.edu/cps
subdomain. The link to this landing page was then emailed to a wide variety of
professional organizations, with a special emphasis on contacting organizations that
count key beneficiary groups among their membership. Targeted groups included the
League of Oregon Cities, the Association of Oregon Counties, Non-Profit Association of
Oregon, Technology Association of Oregon, Oregon Association of Government IT
Managers, Special Districts Association of Oregon, Oregon City/County Management
Association, Nonprofit Technology Network, Oregon Health Information Management
Association, Coordinated Care Organizations of Oregon, Oregon School Board
Association, Oregon Library Association, Oregon Small Business Association, Oregon
Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, Oregon State Sheriffs' Association, and
Oregon Association Chiefs of Police; in all, leadership of at least 20 organizations were
emailed by team members. The research team also distributed the landing page link and
research description through both personal and Center for Public Service social media
postings (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, and various Slack channels). Several organizations
posted, shared, or retweeted the survey link as well, including Portland Business Alliance,
PDX Women in Tech, and the Oregon Library Association. Additionally, Oregon

Technology Association of Oregon. A Cyber-Studies Strategy for Oregon. May 5, 2014. Accessed 16 June 2017.
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/55023
283
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Cybersecurity Advisory Council members distributed links through their organizational
affiliations and social networks as well.
Despite this widespread effort and respondent recruitment that took place throughout
the survey window, the research goal of 500 responses was not reached. In all, 205
substantive responses (those that answered any question beyond the respondent and
organization descriptive questions in Part 1 as described below) were received. A
recruitment strategy that so heavily relied on the willingness of third parties to share
and distribute the landing page link amongst their membership undoubtedly
contributed to the lower-than-expected response rate.

METHODS
The survey was administered in an online format using the Qualtrics survey platform. To
collect data on cybersecurity issues across Oregon, the survey relies primarily closed
multiple choice questions with responses in the form of modified Likert question
structures284. Typical 5- or 7-choice responses have an added “don’t know” response to
account for generally low understanding and salience of cybersecurity issues and
prevent the recording of insincerely held opinions and beliefs regarding organizational
positions285. In cases where applied, this allows respondents that may be truly unfamiliar
with the question topics posed to give an accurate response, while also allowing those
that are familiar but genuinely neutral in opinion to provide a different, but also
meaningful, response as well. A potential downside of including “don’t’ know” responses
is the likelihood of “false negatives”, or respondents that do not express an opinion
despite actually having one286; these are addressed through the triangulation of survey
data with focus group data. Several other multiple-choice questions are described as
“select all that apply”, which allows respondents to represent the breadth and depth of
their connection to the topic instead of picking a single “best fit” or “most desirable”
option. Open-ended questions are intentionally limited, and questions grouped into

284

Rensis Likert, “A technique for the measurement of attitudes.” Archives of Psychology, 22, no. 140 (1932): 5-55.

Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter, (New York: Free Press,
1964), 206-261
285

Mikael Gilljam. & Donald Granberg, “Should We Take Don’t Know for an Answer?” Public Opinion Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1993): 348357.
286
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categories for segmented display in order to counter the cognitive taxation of a long
34-question survey287.
The analysis of survey questions is conducted using basic statistical depiction of
responses for each question. Percentages and averages of responses are constructed
where applicable. The organization and respondent characteristics are also calculated
for each survey question and discussed here (the cross tabulations, or crosstabs, are
available in a separate document entitled Appendix A). This type of descriptive analysis
is appropriate when the research questions are exploratory in nature and do not call for
hypothesis testing to assess causal claims288.

Survey Questions
Four general categories of questions are included in the survey:
•

Part 1: General Organization and Respondent Information
These questions ask for basic descriptive facts about both the respondent and
their organization, including “How many total employees does your
organization have?” and “How long have you been in your current position?”
Questions in this section are used to construct the crosstabs to investigate
differences among characteristic groups’ responses to the substantive
cybersecurity questions in the rest of the survey.

•

Part 2: Organization Cybersecurity Needs, Capabilities, and Resources
These questions (20 total) form the most substantial portion of the survey and
ask for information on the respondents’ organizations’ cybersecurity
processes and practices. This includes items like “How frequently are your
organization’s systems, technologies, and processes assessed for cybersecurity
risks?”, “In the next five years, how easy do you expect it to be for your
organization to staff [cyber-related] positions?”, and “Does your organization
participate in any cybersecurity information sharing arrangements with other
organizations?” This section contains a total of twenty questions presented to
respondents over four pages.

Mirta Galesic & Michael Bosnjak, “Effects of Questionnaire Length on Participation and Indicators of Response Quality in a Web
Survey,” Public Opinion Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2009): 349-360.
287

288

David De Veus, Surveys in Social Research (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013): 206-209.
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•

Part 3: Cybersecurity Resources for Your Organization
Perhaps the most important for the CCoE development process, this section
asks whether the respondents’ organization would use any of several
programs or services that either prevent cybersecurity issues, provide
monitoring for cybersecurity issues, or respond when cybersecurity events
occur. This section contains a total of three questions presented to
respondents on a single page.

•

Part 4: Final Summative Questions
A final section allows respondents to describe their cybersecurity perspectives
and pain points in response to the prompts: “Right now, what are the biggest
cybersecurity concerns for your organization?” and “Do you have any additional
comments, concerns, or issues about cybersecurity in your organization that you
wish to share?” This section contains a total of two questions on a single page.

Parts 2, 3, and 4 are considered the “substantive” portions of the survey, as they ask
questions that pertain to the cybersecurity subject matter. Therefore, to be included in
the final survey data, respondents needed to answer at least one substantive question.
Responses to each question are considered below, with special attention paid to any
results that are either unexpected or that differ significantly by the characteristic groups
from Part 1. There were no mandatory questions that required answers in order to
continue in the survey, so response rates across questions can and do differ. A full
accounting of each question by all characteristic groups is available in supplementary
document Appendix A.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION AND RESPONDENT INFORMATION
Part 1 of the survey asked respondents to answer five questions about their
organization, and three about themselves and their position within the organization. The
responses to these questions are organized in the two tables below. To be included in
the final survey data, respondents had to answer at least one question beyond those
posed in Part 1.
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Organization Characteristics
To assess the types of organizations represented by survey respondents, questions
regarding the legal structure, industry, total number of employees, primary Oregon
location, and headquarters location were asked. The table below summarizes these
responses. Primary location had the lowest response rate in this category; locations have
been grouped by county districts (as used by the Association of Oregon Counties) to aid
in analysis. There was limited variation in responses to the headquarters location
question, so this question was eliminated as a characteristic group.

ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS
Legal Structure
(n=201)
Local Government (Municipalities & Special Districts)
Other Public Entity (State and Federal Agencies)
Nonprofit
Private
Semi-Public or Public-Private Partnership
Association
Primary Industry290 (n=202)
Advanced Manufacturing (Non-IT)
AMTUC (Agriculture, Mining, Transportation, Utilities,
Construction)
Education
Environment or Energy Technology
Financial, Banking, Insurance
Government (Federal, State, Local)
Healthcare and Medical
Hospitality/Food and Beverage
Information Technology (IT) or Telecommunications
Life Sciences
Media, Publishing and Entertainment
Professional Services (Non-IT)
Retail and Wholesale
Total Employees291 (n=202)
Less than 10
10 to 19
20 to 49

N

PERCENT

289

289

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 9

290

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 6

291

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 12
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74
37
24
63
3
0

36.8
18.4
11.9
31.3
1.5
0

8
13

4.0
6.4

20
1
15
71
20
3
32
1
3
8
7

9.9
0.5
7.4
35.1
9.9
1.5
15.8
0.5
1.5
4.0
3.5

29
11
23

14.4
5.4
11.4
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ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS
50 to 99
100 to 499
500 to 999
1,000 or More Employees
Primary Oregon Location292 (n=197)
District 1 (Baker, Grant, Malheur, Umatilla, Union & Wallowa
Counties)
District 2 (Crook, Deschutes, Harney, Jefferson, Klamath & Lake
Counties)
District 3 (Gilliam, Hood River, Morrow, Sherman, Wasco &
Wheeler Counties)
District 4 (Coos, Curry, Douglas, Jackson & Josephine Counties)
District 5 (Benton, Lane & Linn Counties)
District 6 (Marion, Polk & Yamhill Counties)
District 7 (Clatsop, Columbia, Lincoln & Tillamook Counties)
District 8 (Clackamas, Multnomah & Washington Counties)
Legal Structure (n=202)
Yes, headquartered elsewhere in the US
Yes, headquartered elsewhere internationally
No

N

PERCENT
22
47
19
51

10.9
23.3
9.4
25.2

10

5.1

22

11.2

2

1.0

13
14
25
6
105

6.6
7.1
12.7
3.0
53.3

21
2
182

10.2
1.0
88.8

Individual Respondent Characteristics
To assess the cybersecurity experience and role of the respondents within their
organizations, three questions regarding the respondent’s position type, tenure in that
position, and cybersecurity education and training were posed. Position type and time in
current position received the highest response rates of any question in the entire survey
(n=205).

292

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 14
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RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

N

PERCENT

Position Type293 (n=205)
Senior Executive (CEO, President, Owner, Executive Director,
Elected Official, etc.)
Executive – IT Function (CIO, CTO, VP or Equivalent)
Executive – Business Function (CFO, CMO, COO, VP or
Equivalent)
Management – IT Function (Director, Manager, Team Leader,
etc.)
Management – Business Function (Director, Manager, Team
Leader, etc.)
Staff Level – IT Function
Staff Level – Business Function
IT Consultant
Business Consultant
Time in Current Position294 (n=205)
Less than 1 Year
1 to 3 Years
3 to 5 Years
5 to 10 Years
10 to 15 Years
15 to 20 Years
20 Years or Longer
Cybersecurity-Specific Training or Education295 (n=201)
Yes
No

25

12.2

29
11

14.2
5.4

65

31.7

20

9.8

40
10

19.5
4.9

5
0

2.4
0

27
54
37

13.2
26.3
18.0

40
27
10
10

19.5
13.2
4.9
4.9

113

56.2

88

43.8

A majority of respondents identified their organizations as government entities (55.2% either local governments or other public entities); similarly, Government was the most
common industry selected (35.1%). More than half of respondents represented
organizations in the Portland Metro area (53.3%), and the vast majority of all
organizations are headquartered in Oregon (88.7%). In terms of individual respondents,
the most common job type is IT manager (31.9%), and more than half have received
some kind of cybersecurity-specific training or education (56.2%).

293

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 19

294

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 22

295

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 24
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A couple of limitations indicated by this data are worthy of note. First, while the
response rate for government entities essentially reached the targeted number, the
responses received from private and non-profit entities are much lower than expected. It
is therefore difficult to attribute true generalizability to this data in terms of these
groups. However, there is still value to considering the data presented from the
perspective of Oregon as a whole given the wide variety of organizations that
responded. The research team believes that this is the most comprehensive cross-sector
cybersecurity evaluation attempt within Oregon at the time of publication. Second, the
same caveat applies for many of the geographical areas of Oregon. Several counties are
not represented in the data at all, and 2 of the 8 county districts have less than 10 total
responses. These responses are therefore not likely generalizable to these populations
as whole. However, relative confidence can be given to the Portland Metro area
responses (District 8, n=105) because the high number of responses is in line with the
original targeted response rate. These concerns make triangulation of this data with
other data types and sources, such as the qualitative data attained through the focus
groups, an essential part of the research process.

ORGANIZATIONS’ CYBERSECURITY NEEDS, CAPABILITIES, AND
RESOURCES
The substantive portion of the survey is discussed below. These questions assess various
aspects of organizations’ cybersecurity policies, staffing, and views of the future. By
asking these questions consistently across geographies and industries, it becomes easier
to see where meaningful differences in cybersecurity capabilities and needs may lie. The
following sections discuss the data that resulted from groups of questions with similar
themes; emphasis is placed on any deviations of characteristic groups (as determined by
the organization and respondent characteristic questions in Part 1) from the overall
average responses. A full set of crosstabs for each question’s responses given by
organization and respondent characteristics is available in Appendix A.
Current Role of Cybersecurity in the Organization
The first group of questions assesses the interaction of the organization as a whole with
general cybersecurity principles and practices. While the focus is mainly on data
compliance standards, risk assessment frequency, and the role of cybersecurity in typical
organizational operations, questions about the perceived importance of cybersecurity to
the future of both respondents’ organizations and industries are also posed.
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Importance of Cybersecurity to Organization’s and Industry’s Purpose
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of cyber expertise, including security,
encryption, and data privacy knowledge and skills, to typical organization operations296
using a five-category Likert response structure. Of the 203 responses received, nearly
three-quarters said that cyber expertise is either critical (90, or approximately 44%) or
very important (60, or approximately 30%). This response rate holds across all
characteristic groups included in the data, including across industries, organization sizes,
geographical areas, and respondent position types. In all, only 20 respondents rated
cyber expertise as either somewhat important (15, or approximately 7%) or not
important (5, or approximately 2%). This demonstrates that respondents believe cyber
skills and abilities are necessary and needed in their organizations, regardless of the
organization’s purpose or primary industry.

Respondents were also asked how likely an increase in cybersecurity goods and services
would be in both their organization297 and across their industry298 in the next five years.
These questions had very similar results, with approximately 90% of respondents
indicating that both their organizations and industries were likely or very likely to
experience increased cybersecurity needs. Of the small number of respondents that
indicated that cybersecurity needs were either unlikely (5 for the respondents’
organizations, 4 for respondents’ industries) or extremely unlikely (4 for respondents’
296

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 26

297

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 29

298

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 31
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organizations, 2 for respondents’ industries) to increase, the majority were from
respondents that identified their industry as local government. However, these
responses make up less than 5% of the responses for each of these questions, and
represent less than 8% of the total government group. Therefore, it appears that across
all characteristic groups, most respondents think it likely that cybersecurity goods and
services needs will increase for their organizations and industries in the next five years.

Organization’s Risk Assessment Frequency
A key component of any organization’s cybersecurity posture and strategy is the
systemic assessment of risks. The frequency of these assessments can be indicative of an
organization’s cybersecurity posture overall. Respondents were first asked how recently
their organization’s systems, technologies, and processes were last assessed for
cybersecurity risks299. A majority (147, or approximately 74%) of respondents indicated
that their organization’s most recent risk assessment was conducted within the last year;
the most common response (73, or 37%) to this question was that systems had been
assessed within the last three months.
A couple of specific characteristic groups’ responses to this question are of interest.
First, nearly half of the 16 respondents that either indicated that their organizations have
299

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 33
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never conducted a risk assessment, or that they were unsure if their organizations
conducted risk assessments, identified their organizations’ legal structures as local
government. This accounts for approximately 23% of the local government responses to
this question. Second, respondents that indicated they had not received cybersecurityspecific training or education were more likely to indicate that their organization has
never conducted risk assessments (14, or 16%, as compared to 5, or 5% of those with
training or education), or that they were unsure if their organization conducts these
assessments (11, or 13%, as compared to 3, or 3% of those with training or education).
This means that nearly 30% of the organizations these respondents belong to may not
be assessing their cybersecurity risks in a systematic way. These deviations from the
average rates indicate that cybersecurity assessments are less likely to have recently
occurred in local governments than in other settings, and those without cybersecurity
training are less likely to work in organizations that have recently conducted
cybersecurity risk assessments than those with relevant cyber training.

As a follow up to the last assessment question, respondents were also asked to indicate
the overall frequency of their organizations’ cybersecurity risk assessments300. Here, 70
respondents (or 35%) indicated that cybersecurity risk assessments are performed
multiple times over the course of a year – either daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly.
These respondents were more likely to represent organizations with 100 or more
employees, as 42% (47 respondents) of larger organizations assess cybersecurity risks

300

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 36
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more frequently than once per year, while only 26% (22 respondents) of organizations
with less than 100 employees report the same. The most common answer given is that
cybersecurity risk assessments are conducted annually. Probably of most concern,
however, is that approximately 20% of organizations infrequently perform risk
assessments, and more than 10% of respondents were not aware of assessment
frequency. This was a relatively frequent answer choice for governments (33, or 35% of
government respondents) and organizations with less than 100 employees (36, or 43%
of small organization respondents). Respondents with no cybersecurity-specific training
or education were also more likely to choose one of these two responses (38, or 44%)
than their trained counterparts (24, or 22%). Together, these questions show that a
majority of organizations are conducting risk assessments on at least an annual basis,
but that this is less likely for some specific organization types than others.

Federal/Industry Data Compliance Standards
Respondents were asked to indicate their organization’s obligations to federal and
industry data compliance standards301. Most respondents are subject to at least one
standard, with the average respondent selecting 1.4 standards from the provided list.
HIPAA and PCI-DSS were the most commonly chosen responses, with 46% (or 91
respondents) and 35% (or 68 respondents) respectively; FERPA was also indicated by

301

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 39
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13% of respondents. Respondents could also select “other” and indicate additional
compliance standards that were not explicit response choices; of the 50 that did so, the
most commonly provided additional compliance standard was CJIS, or the Criminal
Justice Information Services standards held by the FBI for (primarily public)
organizations accessing and sharing law enforcement data and systems. 10% of
respondents (19) indicated that their organizations are subject to CJIS standards.
Approximately 13% of respondents (25) selected the “Don’t Know” option in response to
this question. This choice was more likely to be selected by respondents in senior
executive positions (9 of 24, or 38% of these respondents) or those without
cybersecurity-specific training and education (20 of 85, or 24% of these respondents).
Most other characteristic groups provided “Don’t Know” responses at or near the 13%
average response rate.

Organization Staff and Cybersecurity
The longest portion of the survey focused on organizations’ cybersecurity leadership,
staffing decisions, and roles for non-technical employees. 12 questions addressed these
issues, and asked respondents to consider the overall state of Oregon’s cybersecurity
workforce given their organization’s experiences.

Page 96

CHAPTER 2: OREGON CYBERSECURITY SURVEY

Cybersecurity Leadership in Organization
When asked what position provides leadership for cybersecurity in their organizations,
including approving spending, determining cybersecurity strategy, and any necessary
oversight, the most common response (from 69, or 36% of, respondents) was that a
management-level employee with IT responsibilities302 provides this leadership303. This is
also the most frequent response across characteristic groups with a few notable
exceptions. First, respondents from organizations with less than 100 employees were
more likely to indicate that the senior executive position304 in their organization
provides cybersecurity leadership (32%), while only 13% of organizations with 100
employees or more answered similarly. The most marked deviation from the average is
among organizations with less than 10 employees, where 57% of respondents (or 16 out
of 28) indicated that the senior executive oversees cybersecurity decision-making.
Organizations with 100 or more employees were more likely to indicate that an IT
executive305 provides cybersecurity leadership (32% or 34 of 107 respondents), while
only 11% of smaller organizations selected this answer choice (11%, or 9 of 82
respondents).

302

The full text of the answer choice was: “Management – IT function (Director, Manager, Team Leader, etc.)”.

303

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 42

The full text of the answer choice was: “Senior Executive (CEO, President, Owner, Executive Director, Elected Official, City Manager,
etc.)”.
304

305

The full text of the answer choice was: “Executive – IT Function (CIO, CTO, VP or equivalent)”.
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Another important data observation is that respondents were more likely to choose
their own position level as providing cybersecurity leadership in their organizations. 64%
of respondents that indicated their position is a senior executive also said that the same
position provides cybersecurity leadership for their organization; 78% of IT executives
said that their position type provides cybersecurity leadership; and 72% of
management-level IT professionals said that cybersecurity leadership is an IT
management task. There are many possible reasons for this correlation between stated
position and perceptions of cybersecurity leadership, but at the very least it indicates
that executive- and management-level respondents across organizations and industries
feel that they themselves are responsible for cybersecurity strategies and oversight.

Staffing for Cybersecurity Positions and General Workforce Impressions
Several questions asked respondents to indicate how organizations currently staff for
cybersecurity positions, including the types of positions that are important to
organizations and the ease with which organizations have been able to fill these
positions. First, respondents were asked to indicate which cyber-centric positions from a
list of 20 are important to their organization306. Every position was selected by some
respondents; only “Network Security Engineer” was chosen by more than half of
respondents (94 of 181, or 52%). Most positions were chosen by a variety of
respondents crossing all organizational and respondent characteristics, with the average
respondent (excluding those that selected “None of the Above”) choosing 4.2 positions
as important to their organizations. A higher proportion of state and federal agencies
indicated that positions were important than any other legal structure; nonprofit
organizations were less likely to indicate that multiple position types are important.
Additionally, across all position types, respondents that have cybersecurity-specific
education or training were more likely to indicate that a cyber-centric position is
important to their organization.
Despite the variety of positions selected by most respondents, 40 respondents (of 181,
or 22%) selected “None of the Above”. These organizations were more likely to be local
governments or have less than 100 employees. Respondents choosing “None of the
Above” were more likely to have a “business” position at any level, or not have any
cybersecurity-specific education or training. In general, responses to this question

306

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 45
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indicate that organizations of all types need to fill cybersecurity positions and that these
needs are as diverse as the organizations themselves.

When organizations hire for these positions, the priority placed on industry certifications
(including CISSP, CompTIA, SCP, and GIAC certifications) varies across all organization
characteristics307. Overall, approximately 37% (or 68 of 186) of total respondents
indicated that their organizations place a high or moderate priority on these
certifications when hiring for cyber-centric positions, while 18% (or 34 of 186) of
respondents said these certifications were not a priority. Organizations located in the
Portland-Metro area (Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas counties) are more likely
to indicate that they prioritize these certifications than average, while governments and
small organizations were more likely to indicate that these certifications are not a
priority. 31 of 186 respondents (or approximately 17%) answered that they were unsure
of the role that these certifications play in hiring decisions - the same number of
307

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 57
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respondents that indicated these certifications receive a high priority. These respondents
were more likely to be from public organizations that have less than 100 employees, and
have business-oriented positions or have less than 5 years’ tenure in their current
position.
Organizations generally expect that they will require more experienced cybersecurity
staff in the next five years308. 105 respondents (of 190, or 55%) expect their staffing
levels for technical positions requiring cyber expertise or experience to increase,
compared to 34% (or 64 of 190) that expect staffing levels to remain the same and only
5 respondents, representing approximately 3% of respondents, that expect a decrease.
Organizations that expect increases to cyber staffing levels are mostly nonprofit and
private organizations, with a higher percentage of respondents that selected
information technology and telecommunications as their primary industry
(approximately 87%) choosing this response than every other characteristic group with
multiple respondents309. Three characteristic groups also differed from the average in
terms of expecting staffing needs to remain the same. Governments indicated that they
expected cyber staffing levels to remain the same over the next five years at a higher
rate than average (53%). Senior executives also were more likely to indicate that they
expected no change to cybersecurity staffing levels (13 of 25, or 52%), as were those
that have been in their position between 15 and 20 years (8 of 10, or 80%). In general,
however, the data indicates that Oregon organizations expect their staffing needs to at
least remain at current levels, if not increase, in the next five years.

308

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 66

309

Two subgroups, the Environment and Energy Technology industry group and the Life Sciences industry group, had higher
response rates (100%), indicating that the sole respondent in these groups selected “Increase” in response to this question.
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Respondents do not find cybersecurity staffing to be an easy task, with approximately
59% reporting that staffing these positions has either been difficult (53 of 177, or 30%)
or very difficult (51 of 177, or 29%) over the past five years310. However, the most
popular answer choice was “neutral”, with 67 of 177 respondents (or 38% of
respondents) choosing this option311. Expectations for the future are roughly the same,
with 114 of 188 respondents (61%) believing that their organization will have a difficult
or very difficult time with cybersecurity staffing312. Government respondents deviated
from the overall trend, with “Don’t Know” being the most popular response for those
who identified their organization’s legal structure as local government (24 of 69, or
35%); those without cybersecurity education or training also selected “Don’t Know” at a
higher rate than those with training (31% of untrained respondents versus 9% of trained
respondents). In general, the data from these questions show that respondents currently
have difficulty staffing cybersecurity positions, and expect this difficulty to continue.

The final question in this section asked for the organization’s perspective on the
quantity and quality of cybersecurity talent in Oregon313. Here, 24% of respondents
310

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 55

An important methodological note for this question pair: due to an error when inputting survey questions and response choices,
“Don’t Know” was only available for respondents to select when considering staffing ease for the next five years, and not when
considering the previous five years. While it is possible that those who selected “Neutral” may have selected “Don’t Know” instead if
it were available, it is impossible to know without resurveying with a full selection of answer choices. We assume, however, that a
portion of the neutral choices (67 of 177, or approximately 38% of responses) in the question regarding the previous five years are
from respondents whose perspectives would be more accurately captured by a “Don’t Know” response.
311

312

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 63

313

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 60
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indicated that they believe there is a significant shortage of qualified workers for
important positions, while 33% believe there is at least a moderate shortage. 32% of
respondents felt they could not assess the quantity and quality of talent in Oregon, and
responded “Don’t Know”.

Private organizations, and those in the Information Technology or Telecommunications
industry, were more likely to find Oregon’s technology talent lacking: approximately
62% of private organizations (38 of 61) and 77% of information technology respondents
(23 of 30) indicated that there is a moderate to significant shortage from their
perspective. Organizations with more than 100 employees were also more likely to
choose one of these responses (69%, or 74 of 107, did so). Public organizations and
organizations with less than 50 employees, as well as respondents that are senior
executives or that do not have cybersecurity-specific training, were more likely to select
the “Don’t Know” response than other subgroups. The results to this question show that,
of those who feel qualified to provide an answer to the question, the dominant
perception is that Oregon has a shortage of both the quantity and quality of
cybersecurity talent.
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Role of Cybersecurity in Organization’s Non-Technical Positions
A majority of respondents indicated that non-technical positions in their organizations
do not require cybersecurity experience314. Of the 37 respondents (20%) that indicated
that at least some positions require cybersecurity experience, most identified their
industry as either government (13 of 37, or 35%) or Information Technology and
Telecommunications (10 of 37, or 27%), and have 100 or more employees (26 of 37, or
70%). Of 184 total respondents, 33% (61) expected that their organization would have
more non-technical positions that required cyber expertise or experience within the next
five years, while 47% (86) did not expect any changes in the quantity of types of
positions315. Only the Information Technology and Telecommunications industry and
organizations with 1,000 or more employees were more likely to indicate that they
expect an increase versus expecting these staffing levels to remain the same. In general,
then, while it seems that most organizations neither have nor expect to have nontechnical positions that require cyber experience or expertise in their organizations,
there is a substantial minority that may find it necessary to staff these types of positions
in the future.
Respondents were also asked to indicate the minimum education or training level that
would be required for non-technical positions that require cyber experience or
expertise316; the most common response was that no cyber-specific education or
training would be required (58 or 185, or 31% of respondents). This was the only
response chosen by more than 20% of respondents, aside from the 25% of respondents
that indicated that their organization did not have or expect to have these kinds of
positions. The most common training or education response level chosen was technical
or vendor training, with approximately 14% of respondents (or 25 of 185) selecting this
option.

314

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 74

315

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 76

316

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 78
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These results indicate that non-technical positions requiring cyber expertise or
experience are not common in Oregon organizations, and that there is no majority
opinion on the suitable level of education or training that should be required for these
types of positions.

Training for Non-Technical Employees
While approximately 34% of respondents reported that all of their organization’s nontechnical staff receive cybersecurity training, 26% reported that none of these types of
positions receive cybersecurity training, with another 21% noting that very few do 317.
Nonprofits were more likely to report that all or most non-technical staff receive training
(17 of 30 respondents, or 57%, compared to the average of 41%), while government
organizations were more likely to report that very few or none of their non-technical
staff receive this training (44 of 69, or 64%, as compared to the average of 47%).
Organizations with less than 10 employees deviated most strikingly from the averages,
with only 14% reporting that all non-tech positions receive cybersecurity training, and
61% reporting that none of these positions receive training.

317

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 68
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Most respondents that indicated that they provide training for non-technical employees
also described the contents of this training in a follow-up question. These responses
were coded and grouped to provide frequency statistics using a process similar to the
analysis methods for focus groups described in the next chapter. The most commonlymentioned training item was phishing (67% of respondents)318. This was followed by
general awareness and web safety, a group that included generic phrases like “safe
browsing”, “cybersecurity awareness”, and any social media references. Topics on
password security were mentioned by 24% of respondents, and general data security
and data sharing were also included in 20% of the responses. The average respondent
listed approximately 2.4 distinct training topics when describing their cybersecurity
training program.

318

For full analysis of this question, see Appendix A, p. 70
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Social engineering, mentioned by 14% of respondents, is almost exclusively included in
non-technical training programs for organizations with 100 or more employees (14 of
15 responses came from this characteristic group, or 93%). Most social engineering
responses also came from respondents with cybersecurity-specific education or training
(13 of 15, or 87%). While it was expected that training for compliance purposes would
be more prevalent in healthcare and education, this seems to actually be a common
theme across industries, with respondents in professional services, retail and wholesale,
and government industries also mentioning this is a critical component of their nontechnical cybersecurity training programs.

It is important to juxtapose the results of these questions with the 74% of organizations
that indicated that cyber expertise is either critical or very important to typical
operations, and the 89% of respondents that expect cybersecurity goods and services
needs to grow for their organizations in the next five years. While these data points
indicate that cybersecurity is important and its role in organizations is growing, training
of staff has not necessarily kept up. Whether this is a result of prioritization, lack of
resources, or both is a matter both brought up by focus group participants and
addressed through qualitative data collection in the next chapter.
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Organization Cybersecurity Information Sharing
When asked about information-sharing arrangements their organizations participate in,
the most common response was that organizations have neither formal nor informal
arrangements to share information (75 of 185, or 41%)319. This response was more
prevalent for private sector organizations (32 of 60, or 53%) and organizations with less
than 100 employees (44 of 80, or 55%). Organizations that do share information most
commonly do so within their industry, with 28% of overall respondents indicating they
participate in an informal industry information sharing arrangement, and 26% indicating
they participate in a formal arrangement. Sharing cybersecurity information with others
in the same geographical proximity seems to be relatively uncommon. In general,
respondents in IT executive, IT management, and IT staff positions were more likely to
report that their organizations participated in information sharing arrangements of all
types.

Information-Sharing Arrangements (n=185)
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41

Informal Industry

51

Formal Geographic

25

Formal Industry

48

Do Not Share

75

Don’t Know

16
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Organizations get cybersecurity information from sources beyond these informationsharing arrangements, too – these are more commonly information sources from which
organizations consume information, but do not necessarily provide it reciprocally. The
182 respondents for this question indicated that they consult 3.8 different types of
information sources on average320. The most common sources for cybersecurity
information consumption are professional associations or organizations for
319
320

For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 81
For full crosstabs of this question, see Appendix A, p. 84
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cybersecurity (54% of respondents), online forums (47%), and industry-specific
professional associations or organizations (45%).

The biggest characteristic group differences for this question are in the responses that
indicate that internal cybersecurity staff is a source of cybersecurity information. While
43% of overall respondents indicated they get information from internal cybersecurity
staff, 55% of respondents in the Information Technology and Telecommunications
industry consult internal cybersecurity staff, as do 57% of organizations with 100 or
more employees, and 76% of organizations with 1,000 or more employees. This is most
likely because large organizations and organizations in the IT industry have internal
cybersecurity staff, while other organizations may not have the resources or perceive a
need to hire internal staff of this type. The data also shows that larger organizations
consult a wider variety of information sources as well: organizations with 1,000 or more
employees indicated they use 5.6 information sources on average, while those with less
than 10 employees only averaged about 2.4 sources. Whether this difference is a
function of a shortage of time to consult these information sources, knowledge of
available information sources, or industry preferences (though no similar differentiation
was noted across industries) should be assessed in future survey work.
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CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
The most important survey questions for the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
development process are likely those from Part 3 regarding organizations’ interests in
using particular prevention, monitoring, and response programs and services. Each
resource type received its own question with a list of possible programs and services
from which respondents could select; each question received a different total number of
responses (175 respondents answered the prevention resources question, 174 answered
the monitoring resources question, and 172 answered the response resources
question)321. The combined answers to these questions are shown in the figure below,
with prevention resources represented in blue, monitoring resources represented in
orange, and response resources represented in green. Respondents were also able to
choose as many resources as they wanted from each list.

For full crosstabs of these three questions, see Appendix A, p. 91 for prevention resources, p. 94 for monitoring resources, and p.
97 for response resources.
321
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By far, the most popular service choice was a state-wide cyber event warning system,
with 135 respondents (or 78%) indicating that their organization would use this service;
a majority of almost every characteristic group chose this option. Notable exceptions are
the Retail and Wholesale industry subgroup, with only two of five respondents, and the
District 4 counties with only three of eight respondents, though with less than 10
respondents each these subgroups may not be truly representative. Other choices that
received support from a majority of respondents include fully online continuing
education and certification programs (114 of 175 respondents, or 65%), cybersecurity
information sharing events (110 of 175 respondents, or 63%), low-cost reviews of
cybersecurity systems (110 of 174 respondents, or 63%), cybersecurity training for nontechnical employees (104 of 175 respondents, or 59%), and an information and threat
sharing center for all Oregon organizations (103 of 174 respondents, or 59%). No major
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distinctions between characteristic groups exist for these options, as they seem to be
equally supported across all descriptive categories for both organizations and individual
respondents. On average, respondents chose a total of 4.7 prevention resources from
the given options, 2.6 monitoring resources, and 2.2 response resources.
Respondents were also presented with a “My organization would not use these
resources” option in the answer selections for each question. 13 respondents, or 7%,
indicated they would not use any prevention resources; 18 respondents, or 10%, would
not use any monitoring resources; and 15 respondents, or 9%, said they would not use
any response resources. In all three questions, these responses were equally likely to
come from local government or private organizations; organizations with less than 10
employees responded that they would not use these resources much more frequently
than average (24% would not use prevention resources, 32% would not use monitoring
resources, and 13% would not use response resources).
These results show that organizations of all sectors, sizes, and geographical locations
perceive at least some of the included resources as being of use to their organizations.
Additionally, the selection of resources across the three types of programs and services
indicates that organizations are both interested in improving their cybersecurity
postures, and also recognize the potential value in these specific types of offerings for
their organizations.

FINAL SUMMATIVE QUESTIONS
The survey concluded with two open-ended questions that asked participants to name
the biggest cybersecurity concerns for their organization right now, and for any
additional comments, concerns, or issues about cybersecurity that they might want to
share. The response rate for the second question was low (53 total answers were
received, representing only 26% of the total respondents), some of which were simply a
variation of “none” or “thank you” (12 of 53 answers, or 23%). Substantive answers
received typically closely resembled those given by the respondent to the first question
in this section. As a result, we did not code these responses beyond confirming these
two facts.
126 respondents (approximately 62% of total respondents) provided answers to the
question: “Right now, what are the biggest cybersecurity concerns for your
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organization?”322 Each discrete idea in these responses was given a descriptive code
(meaning each response could result in multiple codes), and those codes were then
grouped into overarching themes that accurately represent the whole code set. For
example, the “Specific Threats and Hacking” theme includes the codes of ransomware,
“nonstop threats”, denial of service attacks, external hackers, general malware, phishing,
and industrial espionage; each of these ideas is included in the theme, and this theme is
included in 44% of responses received for this question. The average response invoked
2 of the identified themes below.

The most common themes in responses were the Specific Threats theme as described
above, and Preventing Staff and/or End User Issues (mentioned by 56 of 126
respondents, or 44%). Codes grouped under this theme include preventing human
errors, issues with internal actors, educating end users, controlling user access,
preventing compromised accounts, and social engineering. These responses were
equally likely to be given by all characteristic groups, though respondents from
nonprofit organizations were slightly more likely to mention Preventing Staff and/or End
User Issues than the average respondent (13 of 23 respondents, or approximately 57%).
Privacy and Compliance was the third most common theme; this theme includes
322

For full analysis of this question, see Appendix A, p. 99
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responses that mentioned any sort of compliance with federal or industry standards. It
also includes general privacy issues that may or may not be directly related to
cybersecurity, such as concerns about “keeping information safe”. Responses that
mentioned issues with hiring and staffing cybersecurity-related positions were a fourth
theme that was mentioned by 28 respondents (22%); this further echoes some of the
earlier survey questions regarding ease of staffing and importance of cybersecurity
talent to the respondents’ organizations.
Based on these responses, the biggest concerns for Oregon organizations vary
considerably. Both of the most common themes seem oriented toward perceived
threats, however, with respondents considering both internal threats (in the Preventing
Staff and/or End User Issues theme) and external threats (in the Specific Threats and
Hacking theme) some of the biggest concerns they face today. The fact that these
themes cut across all analyzed subgroups relatively equally shows that no particular
organization size or type is perceived to be exempt from these concerns. The answers
for this open-ended question also reflect many of the answers given in previous survey
questions, showing that the identified issues or options that these questions are
designed to analyze are important to potential Oregon Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence participants and users as well.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Data from this survey provides valuable insight into the cybersecurity needs and
capabilities of Oregon organizations, and shows the extent to which organizations are
looking for new cybersecurity resources. Overall, it is clear that survey respondents
understand cybersecurity is an important part of organizations’ operations today, and
will become increasingly important in the future.
An important outcome of the survey analysis is the finding that there is significantly less
variety among respondent organizations in terms of needs and resources than expected.
Organizations of different industries, sizes, and in different locations had similar
response rates to most questions, with a few notable exceptions among government
organizations and small organizations. While it is difficult to generalize from the data
because of the limitations noted in the analysis of response rates among specific
organizational demographics and respondent characteristics, trends should be
triangulated with the qualitative focus group data in the next chapter. Further surveying
that attempts to rectify the small response sizes could lend additional credibility to the
generalizability of these results.
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A surprising outcome of the survey is the indication that most respondents’
organizations are willing to utilize at least one potential resource or program that might
be part of the CCoE. Additionally, there is fairly widespread agreement that respondents
about several of these options, spanning the prevention, monitoring, and response
resources that fit the full scope of the public health framework for cybersecurity policies.
This shows that Oregon organizations of all kinds are looking for resources to help
increase their cybersecurity capabilities, and that the kinds of resources that are of
interest may not be as specific to industries or geographical locations as initially
thought. The ability to serve diverse organizations through similar programs and
activities should be encouraging to CCoE decision makers.
Finally, this data provides quantitative evidence that supports efforts to increase the
Oregon cybersecurity workforce. Most organizations expect to increase their
cybersecurity staffing, as well as their goods and services needs, over the course of the
next five years. Embracing the opportunity to assist in the development of a workforce
equipped to meet these needs for Oregon organizations is a potential opportunity for
meaningful CCoE programming. This is further echoed by the indication that a majority
of respondents’ organizations are interested in cybersecurity training programs for both
technical and non-technical positions. Further investigation regarding workforce
development expectations through focus group data can help flesh out the exact needs
and expectations that Oregon organizations may have for a statewide cybersecurity
workforce development initiative undertaken by a CCoE.
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Chapter 3: Cybersecurity Focus Groups
Consistent with a public health approach to cybersecurity policy making and
implementation, “public cybersecurity programs and policies should incorporate a
variety of approaches” and “ensure an opportunity for input from community
members.”323 Accordingly, multiple methods of data collection are employed to
ascertain Oregon organizations’ perspectives on cybersecurity and a potential Oregon
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE). To complement the quantitative data
collected through the online survey discussed in the previous chapter, qualitative data
collected through eight focus groups conducted around Oregon is also analyzed. Focus
groups are often used to fill in the quantitative and qualitative data gaps left by typical
survey methodologies.324 The role of the focus groups in the broader research project is
to follow up on, and dive further into, the cybersecurity needs indicated in the survey325,
and to provide insight into the kinds of priorities that key beneficiary groups326
throughout Oregon may agree upon for the CCoE’s initial formation. This research also
puts a narrative context into the data set, allowing representatives of key beneficiary
groups to truly “speak for themselves” in a more authentic way than typically achievable
through a survey with mostly closed-ended questions. The ability to consider this
qualitative data along with the survey’s quantitative data in a comprehensive analytical
process is a vital aspect of this mixed methods approach to research327.

FOCUS GROUP PURPOSE
The purpose of the focus groups is to qualitatively analyze the cybersecurity needs and
concerns of organizations of all sizes, sectors, and types in Oregon; in this way, the
groups directly correspond to the quantitative data collection efforts of the survey.
However, an equally important purpose for these groups is the introduction of a
potential policy intervention (in this case, the CCoE), and the ability to observe how
Sedenberg, Elaine M., and Deirdre Mulligan. “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing.” Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 30, no. 2 (2015): 1687-1739, pg. 1737-1738. Accessed September 05, 2017. doi:
https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PZ61.
323

Jenny Kitzinger, “The methodology of Focus Groups: the importance of interaction between research participants.” Sociology of
Health & Illness 16, no. 1 (1994): 103-121. Pg. 116.
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David Morgan,. Focus Groups as Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc, 1997), chpt 3 pg. 11.

“Key beneficiary groups” are defined as local governments, educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, small businesses, law
enforcement, and critical infrastructure.
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Creswell, J. & Plano Clark, V. Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc,
2011).
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participants collectively and collaboratively respond to this intervention and its ability to
address previously identified needs and issues328. This is uniquely achievable through
focus groups, where the data is generated through interaction among the participants
themselves329330, revealing insights that may not be accessible (to either participants or
researchers) outside of this social context331. This allows the following research
questions to be addressed through focus group data collection and analysis:
•
•

How do members of [key beneficiary] groups understand and prioritize the tasks
for the Cybersecurity Center of Excellence as stated in SB 90?
How should these differing needs and priorities be balanced in a single
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence that serves all groups?

Both research questions are primarily answered by the data gathered in the second half
of the focus group protocol, which presents participants with basic information about
the CCoE as outlined in SB90 and provides a set of guiding questions for participants to
consider as they discuss possible directions a CCoE proposal could take. This allows for
the participants to have a shared understanding offered by the facilitators from which to
start their discussions; participants could ask clarifying and substantive questions of the
facilitator332 instead of reading and interpreting a piece of legislation that they may not
be familiar with on their own. This information-sharing process also provided a vehicle
to achieve a tertiary purpose of the primary data collection tasks: spreading awareness
about SB90 and the CCoE proposal process and providing opportunities for informed
public participation333. In this way, the focus groups meet the imperative to inform
communities that features prominently in public health approach to cybersecurity.334

RECRUITMENT AND PARTICIPANTS
Eight one-hour focus groups were conducted between November 1 and November 14,
2017. Six groups were conducted as in-person sessions, and two were conducted using
webinar technology that allowed participants to speak with and hear the facilitator and
each other while visually seeing guiding questions on their computer screens. The six in-

328
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Liamputtong, Pranee, Focus Group Methodology: Principles and Practice (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011), chpt 2, pg 5.

The same facilitator conducted all eight focus groups, in part to ensure that answers given to any questions from participants
about the CCoE (and SB90 more generally) were consistent between groups.
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Peter Shane, “Cybersecurity as if ‘Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making,” I/S: A
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person groups met in Portland (2 groups), Salem, Bend, Medford, and Pendleton. A
coastal focus group was never scheduled due to lack of local responses.
Recruitment Process
To recruit focus group participants, a landing page with a description of the project and
focus groups, as well as a direct link to the Google form by which volunteers could
submit their contact information to indicate their interest, was set up on the
pdx.edu/cps subdomain. The link to this landing page was emailed to a wide variety of
professional organizations, which a special emphasis on contacting organizations that
count key beneficiary groups among their membership. Targeted groups included the
League of Oregon Cities, the Association of Oregon Counties, Non-Profit Association of
Oregon, Technology Association of Oregon, Oregon Association of Government IT
Managers, Special Districts Association of Oregon, Oregon City/County Management
Association, Nonprofit Technology Network, Oregon Health Information Management
Association, Coordinated Care Organizations of Oregon, Oregon School Board
Association, Oregon Library Association, Oregon Small Business Association, Oregon
Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, Oregon State Sheriffs' Association, and
Oregon Association Chiefs of Police. The research team also conducted direct outreach
to select Chambers of Commerce and local governments near focus group locations.
The research team also distributed the landing page link and research description
through both personal and Center for Public Service social media accounts (LinkedIn,
Facebook, Twitter, and various Slack channels); Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council
members also distributed links through their organizational affiliations and social
networks as well.
In addition, every online survey respondent was given the opportunity to sign up for a
focus group at the end of their survey via a direct link to the Google form. Focus group
sign-ups and survey responses were kept separate, and it was not possible to know
whether survey respondents were focus group volunteers or vice versa. The only
qualifications for participating in the focus groups were the participants be part of an
organization that operates in the state of Oregon, and either use or have decisionmaking power over their organization’s information and technology systems and
processes as part of their job duties. Overall, 59 individuals volunteered to participate in
a focus group by completing the online form.
From the volunteers, focus group participants were selected for each session to
maximize the number of different key beneficiary groups represented in each session
and achieve the target of 5-7 participants per session. This selection process allowed
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researchers to verify that volunteers met the qualification requirements. Diversity across
age, gender, race, and national origin was limited in this case by the small response
group and demographics in the profession. Of the 59 individuals that initially
volunteered, 46 signed up for a specific focus group, and 39 of the 46 attended a focus
group session.
Description of Participants
The 39 focus group participants represented 7 industry categories335: AMTUC
(agriculture, mining, transportation, utilities, and construction), Education,
Finance/Banking/Insurance, Government (federal, state, and local), Healthcare and
Medical, Information Technology and Telecommunications, and Professional Services
(Non-IT). Over 25% of participants were from government organizations, predominantly
at the local and state levels; the smallest group is the Professional Services category,
making up 7.7% of the total participants. A representative of an 8th industry group
(Hospitality/Food and Beverage industry) signed up for a focus group but was unable to
attend.

While 39 participants is slightly above the stated goal of 15 to 35 participants, more
than the initially proposed 3-5 focus groups were required to accommodate this
number of participants. Due to unforeseen cancellations, scheduling conflicts, weather335

Participants were identified by the same list of 13 primary industries used in the online survey (see pg. 88 of this report).
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related travel issues, and recruitment issues in areas outside of the Portland-Salem I5
corridor, four focus groups had less than the intended 5-7 participants: two focus
groups had four participants (Portland 1 and Rural Webinar), and two focus groups had
only 3 participants (Medford and Pendleton). While this was initially a cause for concern,
there are in fact widely varying recommendations regarding focus group size, with
indications in the literature that groups with as small as two participants to as many as
twelve can produce valuable data.336337338 The research team is therefore unconcerned
with the inability to meet the targeted minimum of five participants for these focus
group sessions. The size and represented industries in each focus group are represented
in the graph below.

336

Liamputtong, chpt. 4.
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Rosaline Barbour, Doing Focus Groups, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc, 2007), chpt 5.

Page 119

CHAPTER 3: CYBERSECURITY FOCUS GROUPS

FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL
Focus groups were facilitated with a semi-structured protocol in order to ensure
consistency across groups, but also to allow for conversations to naturally develop
among participants. This protocol was piloted in a session with key stakeholders and
experts on August 25, 2017, following the 3rd Oregon Cybersecurity Policy Summit in
Portland, Oregon. That session was transcribed and scrutinized by the research team,
and several adjustments to the protocol were made based on the outcome of the pilot
and feedback from participants.
To maintain the organization-level focus of the overall research project, questions
primarily concerned participants’ organizations and industries rather than their personal
opinions, feelings, and perspectives. Participants were first asked to discuss their
organizations’ general approaches to cybersecurity. The purpose of these questions was
two-fold: first, these questions allowed participants to become somewhat familiar with
each other by discussing issues they are well versed in before being asked to
collaboratively consider the Oregon CCoE. Second, these questions mirror some of the
questions used in the online survey administered as part of this project (see previous
chapter); this allows qualitative data collected from the focus groups to be used as a
means of triangulation for the previously collected quantitative data339. This is especially
true for survey respondent subgroups with smaller numbers of responses, including
those geographically located in southern and eastern Oregon. Discussion in this portion
of the focus groups generally lasted around 20-25 minutes, or about a third of the total
allotted time for each group. Questions in this section included:
1. How would you describe your organization’s general approach to
cybersecurity?
2. Where do you go to learn about cybersecurity threats and trends?
3. What keeps your organization from making [cybersecurity] improvements?
Following this portion of the discussion, a handout was provided to each participant
that introduced the CCoE proposed by SB90 and the general concept of a center of
excellence. Included were “center of excellence” definitions from Frost et al340 and
Stricker341, and brief summaries of the functions of the CCoE as identified in SB90 as
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shown in the table below. While SB90 includes six specific functions for the CCoE,
following the pilot stakeholders recommended that four of the five functions attributed
to the Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council in SB90 also be included in the handout
for discussion by focus group participants, bringing the total number of functions
presented to participants to 10. The location in SB90 of each item is footnoted for
reference.
Coordinating information sharing regarding
cybersecurity risks and incidents across all
types of organizations.342

Drafting the State of Oregon Cybersecurity
Strategy, as well as the Oregon Cyber
Disruption Response Plan.343

Supporting cybersecurity incident responses
and investigations.344

Providing a statewide forum for discussing
cybersecurity issues.345

Severing as an Information Sharing and
Analysis Organization that officially liaises with
the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center.346

Recommending best practices for cybersecurity
to all types of organizations.347

Participating in federal, multi-state and private
sector organizations that are relevant to the
mission and activities of the CCoE.348

Promoting cybersecurity real-time situational
awareness for all types of organizations.349

Receiving and disseminating cybersecurity
threat information from a wide range of
sources.350

Encouraging cybersecurity workforce
development.351

Based on this information, participants were then asked to consider the Oregon CCoE
from the perspective of the needs of their organization, as well as those of other
participants in the group and Oregon as a whole. These experiential questions,352
designed to extract similarities in participants’ perspectives and gage agreement on

342
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344
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potential programs and activities for the Oregon CCoE, formed the bulk of the
predetermined questions included in the protocol and were given the most discussion
time (typically 35-40 minutes). The functions ascribed to the CCoE by SB90, and
potential programs and activities that could fulfill these functions, were collaboratively
considered by participants with an emphasis on collective prioritization and consensusbuilding. In this way, the focus group structure more closely aligns with a consensus
conference model353 than a traditional “group interview” model354 . This collaborative
discussion occurred through discussion of the following questions:
4. What benefits do you see in the Center of Excellence approach to
cybersecurity?
5. Which of the [SB90] functions are most important to your organization?
6. What activities or programs can you think of that a Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence could undertake to be most beneficial to an organization like
yours?
7. Is there anything specific that is essential to the success of an Oregon
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence?
8. Do you think your organization would use the services offered by an Oregon
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence?
Questions in the second portion of the protocol were less likely to be asked verbatim by
the facilitator, as conversations tended to transition between topics naturally and
without the need for prompting with specific questions. However, by following a semistructured protocol, the research team ensured that each focus group considered all
questions at some point during the focus group session. Following the conclusion of the
focus group, participants were reminded to take the online survey if they had not done
so already, and asked to encourage anyone they knew that might have valuable input to
participate in the research process as well.

DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS METHODS
Each focus group session was audio-recorded, and extensive field notes were taken by a
notetaker (separate from the facilitator) in each session. Field notes were augmented by
the note taker following each session by listening to the audio recording again and
focusing on recording key points and ideas verbatim; the facilitator also constructed
353
354
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field notes through recollection of key topics and by listening to each session again.
Field notes were then compiled to form a robust data set for analysis355.
Though transcription is the most common method of constructing data from focus
groups for analysis, the research team did not create full transcripts of each focus group
session. This decision was made for several reasons. First, the extent of transcription
necessary for analysis depends on the level of analysis required to answer the research
questions.356 The research questions for this portion of the project are intended to
explore general themes and patterns of interactions and collaboration; field notes that
accurately capture these interactions, without necessarily including every spoken word,
can fulfill this purpose.357 Using field notes is also recommended when there is an
abbreviated timeframe for analysis.358 The research team only had approximately one
month from the conclusion of the focus groups to complete and present the analysis,
which certainly qualifies as an abbreviated timeframe. Finally, the extensive field notes
created by researchers are considered transcription under some definitions within the
wide variety that exist in the literature359. Thus, while verbatim transcripts of focus group
sessions were not created in this research process, the data set created from augmented
field notes is sufficient for the purposes of answering the previously discussed research
questions and supported by the literature.
To process and analyze the data, four analysis groups were formed from the 8 focus
groups:
•
•
•
•

355

Portland Metro Area (2 in-person groups, 1 webinar): 18 participants total
Salem (1 in-person group): 6 participants
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Rural Group (2 in-person groups - Medford and Pendleton, 1 webinar): 10
participants total
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Portland and Salem were kept separate due to the high participation rate in Portland
and prevalence in Salem of state agency representation. Bend was kept separate from
other non-Portland Metro area locations because of the potential influencing effects of
the Bend Cybersecurity Summit, which four of the five participants attended
immediately before the group. No other participants save one Rural Webinar attendee
were present at the Bend Cybersecurity Summit.
The analysis method used in this part of the research generally follows the
recommendations put forth by Nili et al,360 combining this framework with the more
traditional qualitative analysis procedure of coding, categorization, and theme
construction as described by Yin361. This process consisted first of open coding, in which
a researcher assigns a code, or “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a
summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute,”362 to the data; the
research team focused on using participants’ own words verbatim as these initial codes
(a technique called “in vivo coding”) where possible. The codes are then reassembled by
grouping similar codes into categories; once categorized, themes are then identified
that exist across the newly organized data set in an interpretive process363. To improve
the reliability and validity of this qualitative data analysis method (which can be
especially susceptible to researcher bias), an abbreviated version of an intercoder
reliability process364 was conducted by two researchers that included independent
coding and collaboration on the development of categories and themes. The output of
this qualitative analysis process is the creation of a list of themes that represent the
most important and prevalent conceptual ideas in the dataset365. These themes are
presented and explained in the context of the focus groups in this chapter, and inform
the recommendations in the next chapter.

Alireza Nili, Mary Tate, & David Johnstone, “A Framework and Approach for Analysis of Focus Group Data in Information Systems
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360

361
362

Yin, pg. 187-189.

Johnny Saldana, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2013), pg. 3.

363

Yin, chpt. 9.

Karen Kurasaki, “Intercoder Reliability for Validating Conclusions Drawn from Open-Ended Interview Data,” Field Methods 12, no. 3
(2000): 179-194.
364

365

Saldana, pg. 14.

Page 124

CHAPTER 3: CYBERSECURITY FOCUS GROUPS

THEMES FROM FOCUS GROUPS
Through the coding, categorization, and the final identification of overarching themes as
described above, the focus group data set contained more than 200 identifiable codes
that were reorganized into 68 different categories that correspond to 18 distinct themes.
While this number of themes is higher than the typical qualitative research project, there
is no standardized number of codes, categories, or themes to identify and assign.366
Additionally, the purpose of these focus groups exceeds the scope of typical qualitative
research projects by including a collaborative component, and prioritizing diversity
rather than homogeneity when selecting participants. The graph below shows the
number of distinct categories in each theme, indicating the breadth and differences in
ideas from all focus group sessions that make up that overarching theme. The
“Characteristics of Successful CCoE Programs” theme is associated with the most distinct
categories (10), while several categories did not fit well in broader themes, and thus
became a single-category theme (see especially the bottom of the graph for these
themes).

366
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The graph also indicates the frequency of each theme across focus group sessions.
These frequencies were determined by giving each category within the theme a score of
high, medium, or low (corresponding to a frequency of 5, 3, or 1) for each analysis
group. These scores are based on the number of codes in each category for that analysis
group, the time spent on conversations relevant to that category, and the number of
participants included in those conversations. Researchers involved in the coding process
agreed on these frequency assignments as part of the intercoder reliability process.
Both the breadth and depth of these themes are of interpretive value. Those themes
with low numbers of distinct categories but high frequency generally indicate greater
consensus within those themes. For example, the Alignment with Organization’s
Leadership theme encompasses participants concerns regarding their organizations’
executive-level leadership understanding, prioritizing, and providing resources for
cybersecurity. These concerns were similar across all discussions, and therefore fit into a
single category that ultimately became its own theme. These concerns also occurred
relatively frequently, resulting in a higher frequency value for this theme than other onecategory themes in the dataset. This indicates a greater degree of agreement among
focus group participants regarding this theme than some other themes with more wideranging discussion that encompasses more categories. The Considerations for State
Involvement theme illustrates this, as this theme has more distinct categories (5), but
was also less frequently discussed over the course of the focus groups. It can be
concluded that Alignment with Organization’s Leadership has more cross-participant
agreement than the Considerations for State Involvement theme.
The meanings, categories, and frequencies of each theme are presented and analyzed
below. Key quotes from focus group participants that exemplify the meanings and
categories of each theme are also included at the end of each theme’s discussion.

Organizational Culture
Organizational Culture was one of the two most frequent themes in focus group
sessions, with a frequency “score” of 44. This theme was discussed in all analysis groups,
though it was a less frequent and less wide-ranging discussion in Portland-area sessions.
The number of distinct categories and frequencies in each analysis group are shown in
the graph below.
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Seven total categories are represented within this theme. The “human firewall” category
was initially an in vivo code from the focus group data set, meaning that this exact
phrase was used by participants to describe an idea; interestingly, this phrase was used
in different focus groups and by participants from different industries, showing that this
phrase has meaning across a variety of geographical and industry contexts. This
category encompasses ideas about organizations’ staff and human resources serving as
a metaphorical firewall or gatekeeper for the organizations’ technologies, systems, and
data. Participants also positively used this category, with most either describing their
organization’s human firewall as a point of pride, or talking about creating and
supporting programs or systems that would allow their organization’s end users to
function in this capacity. This category overlapped with the “culture of security” category,
which more generally indicates that conversations included participants’ assessments of
their organization’s orientation toward security more broadly. This category was most
often invoked as part of participants’ responses to the first question of the focus group
protocol. Those who felt their organization could improve cybersecurity tended to speak
of the “culture of security” negatively, while those that felt their organizations have a
positive security culture tended to talk more about the importance of maintaining that
culture.
Cybersecurity was also considered relative to other organizational or cultural values in
the themes of “tradeoff between security and flexibility” and “tradeoff between security
and other organization priorities.” Cybersecurity in organizations is seen as a zero-sum
tradeoff with flexibility according to focus group participants; organizations weigh their
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preferences for flexibility directly against any cybersecurity programs, technologies, or
other kinds of improvements. Participants also mentioned that many organizations
consider cybersecurity in the same way that they consider priorities like equity, diversity,
accessibility, and other values that are not necessarily related directly to the mission and
purpose of the organization. These categories both attest to the importance of an
organization’s prioritization of cybersecurity within a broader set of values as
determinative of cybersecurity posture.
Other categories in this theme included: reactive posture for cybersecurity (or
cybersecurity playing a limited role in organizational culture until a focusing event
occurs), internal trust (meaning trust between organizations’ end users and
cybersecurity staff), and generational gap is a challenge. This final category was brought
up by participants of different ages, genders, and from different industries; all
commented that there were particular considerations regarding cybersecurity that
needed to be made for older workers, and especially those nearing retirement. Two key
quotes from participants sum up the key aspects of this theme nicely:
“The problem is the user.” – Salem, Government industry participant
“Everyone is on the security team, whether you think you are or not.” –
Portland, Government industry participant

Alignment with Organization’s Goals
Focus group participants were especially concerned with the alignment between their
organizations’ overall goals and cybersecurity. This theme was closely related to both
the Organizational Culture theme discussed above and the Resources are a Challenge
theme discussed next; as indicated by the data collected from focus group participants,
these themes when taken together effectively encapsulate the majority of the negative,
distressing, and problematic aspects of organizations’ relationships to effective
cybersecurity.
Categories in this theme included Awareness is a Challenge (participants expressed that
their organizations’ decision makers may not be aware of the role cybersecurity plays in
achieving or derailing the organizations’ goals), Partnering with Business (participants
stated that requests for cybersecurity resources were more likely to be successful when
partnering with existing business initiatives), and Making the Business Case
(cybersecurity efforts that could be expressed and justified in typical business
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terminology found more success and received better reactions from decision makers
and executives in participants’ organizations).

The Salem focus group is the outlier in terms of this theme, and the only analysis group
(and focus group session) that did not discuss cybersecurity alignment with goals.
Though a definitive explanation for this difference is not possible without further study,
one hypothesis for consideration is the high proportion of government participants in
this group, and a potential for differences in goal alignment that is a result of industry
characteristics. This may also account for some of the overlap between categories in this
theme and categories in the Compliance and Audit Performance as Drivers theme, which
did feature prominently in the Salem focus group session’s discussion. Especially where
compliance and audit performance are foundational parts of the organization’s goals,
the categorization of these concepts depends heavily on the way this idea is expressed
in the focus group session. This overlap was observed and categorized under both
themes in the Portland Groups analysis group and the Bend analysis group, but was not
in the Salem analysis group, indicating a possible difference in language that could be
further probed in follow-up research.
Key quotes from the data show the difficulty of aligning cybersecurity with
organizational goals, but also indicate that participants are hopeful for the future in this
regard:
“What makes cybersecurity unique is you see everything in the business.
You’re uniquely positioned to help the business.” – Portland, Information
Technology and Telecommunications industry
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“Not a lot of effort at every level, not everyone is working in the same
direction.” – Bend, Professional Services industry
“[A barrier is] the basic understanding and knowledge of how cyber events
can hurt an organization.” – Rural Groups, Government industry

Resources are a Challenge
The vast majority of participants identified resources as a challenge for cybersecurity in
their organizations, which accounts for this theme being a frequent part of
conversations in all analysis groups. However, this theme was especially prevalent in the
Bend focus group, which saw both the greatest diversity in resource topics covered, as
well the highest frequency of discussion around resource challenges relative to other
topics.

This theme includes the broad category of “resource challenges,” to which non-specific
lamentations by participants regarding the availability of resources for addressing
cybersecurity were attributed. There are other more specific categories in this theme,
including: creating training programs is burdensome on cybersecurity staff,
cybersecurity and data insurance is cost prohibitive, and difficulty finding appropriate
vendors and programs. Several participants noted that specific types of organizations
are especially resource challenged, whether those participants were actually part of
those organizations or not; the categories “public-sector-specific pay level issue” and
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“smaller organizations need more help” show wide recognition among participants that
small organizations and public organizations have more difficulty with resource issues
than many others. Finally, the category “lack of local resources” was especially
prominent in the Bend and Rural Groups analysis groups, as participants in both of
these settings recognized that resource issues may be partially due to the difficulty of
accessing resources (talent and expertise in particular) outside of the Portland-metro
area. Three key quotes exemplify this theme in the focus group discussions:
“It’s expensive to do this right.” – Bend, Healthcare and Medical industry
“A big barrier [to improving cybersecurity] is expertise.” - Rural Groups,
Education industry
“It’s hard to articulate [resource need] when you’re making stuff go away
behind the scenes.” – Portland, Finance/Banking/Insurance industry

Workforce Development
Workforce development as a theme featured pervasively in most conversations
regarding potential CCoE activities and programs; Salem was the sole exception to this
observation. Surprisingly, much of the conversation around workforce development
focused on the importance of K-12 education programs and other methods to
introduce school-aged children to the cybersecurity field. The category of “Cybersecurity
in K-12 Education” was the most prevalent within this theme. Other important
categories within this theme included curriculum development (for both K-12 and
higher-ed programs, as well as incorporating cybersecurity principles into non-technical
degree programs), “Workforce Pipeline” and “Incentivizing Talent to Stay in Oregon” (or
finding ways to maximize the number of Oregon graduates transitioning in to
cybersecurity jobs in Oregon), and “Barriers to Becoming Cybersecurity Instructors” (the
perception of some participants that teaching credential requirements keep
cybersecurity experts from being able to educate in formal settings).
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Another category that was particularly important in the Rural Groups analysis group was
the “Incentivize Talent to Non-Metro Areas” category. Here, participants expressed
concern that it is difficult to attract cybersecurity talent of any experience level to areas
of Oregon outside of the Portland-metro area. This was usually paired with suggestions
or requests for resources that could create or sustain such incentives.
It is important to note that Workforce Development was included in the facilitatorprovided handout on CCoE functions that the facilitator in each group distributed to all
participants as part of the focus group protocol, and this may contribute to this theme’s
prevalence in focus group discussion. While workforce development was a theme of
early conversations in some focus groups, it became a more dominant part of
conversations following the distribution of this handout. Unfortunately, the effects of the
distribution of this handout on the presence of Workforce Development as a theme in
focus group conversations cannot be fully established. Even with this potential caveat to
the Workforce Development frequency findings, the breadth of the conversation and its
perceived importance to participants can be gaged by three participant quotes:
“If [the CCoE] only delivered workforce development, that would be an
enormous leap forward.” – Portland, Information Technology and
Telecommunications industry
“If [the CCoE] can incentivize those people not to leave the state, business will
come here to get that talent.” – Bend, Healthcare and Medical industry
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“The other piece is people that are already in the field, helping them continue
their learning and growth.” – Rural Groups, Government industry

Compliance and Audit Performance as Drivers
Across all analysis groups, participants indicated that their organizations predominantly
make investments and improvements to cybersecurity technologies, systems, and
processes in response to either industry or legal requirements and standards, or in
response to audit performance or experiencing a cybersecurity incident. Categories in
this theme include: compliance as a cybersecurity driver; audit performance as a
cybersecurity driver; and security event as a driver.

A Healthcare and Medical industry participant also indicated that the standards
themselves pose a challenge to cybersecurity implementation; this sentiment seemed to
be unique to the healthcare industry and was only mentioned in a single focus group
session. Additionally, several Education industry participants brought up privacy as a
related driver of cybersecurity action that is not quite synonymous with cybersecurity
itself, leading to the category of “Privacy as Related by Separate.” Based on the overall
body of focus group data, these categories seem to be somewhat isolated to these
specific industries.
Three key quotes from focus group participants embody the broader issues represented
by this theme:
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“We have to pay for people to show our weak points so that we can show our
upper management that we need to remediate.” – Bend, Healthcare and
Medical industry
“Without audits, the city would not have invested [in cybersecurity upgrades].”
– Rural Groups, Local Government
“[Cybersecurity is a] really difficult cost to justify outside of ‘we have to do
that.’” – Portland, AMTUC industry

Characteristics of Successful CCoE Programs
The “Characteristics of Successful CCoE Programs” theme differs from others because of
its direct relationship to a question in the focus group protocol. Participants were asked
to respond to the prompt: “Is there anything specific that is essential to the success of
an Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence?” Many of the responses to this question
related to other topics that came up in course of each focus group conversations; those
topics have been categorized and applied to themes elsewhere. This theme incorporates
the remaining key characteristics for success that arose from the conversations.
The following categories, each of which encompasses a characteristic of a successful
CCoE according to participants, are associated with this theme:
•
•

•

•

•
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Actionable Programs: Participants stressed that any CCoE activities needed to
involve taking a tangible action rather than just providing information.
Addressing Resource Challenges through State Buying Power: Participants that
indicated their organizations had limited resources for cybersecurity investments
were especially interested in the possibility of state-wide IT goods and services
agreements.
Clear and Transparent Leadership of CCoE: Knowing who is making decisions for
the CCoE (as well as how and why) was brought up by several participants in
response to the prompt.
Entertaining Initiatives: Two participants specifically mentioned that CCoE
activities should include an entertainment factor, such as humorous instructive
videos or collaborations with artists for inforgraphics.
Executive Engagement with CCoE: Many participants said that the success of the
CCoE depends on its ability to effectively engage executive-level leadership in
organizations.
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•

•

•

Narrow Initial Focus to Show Success: Included in this category were codes
regarding “proof of concept” and “initial victories”, with a caution that CCoE
success depends on following through on initial plans and initiatives.
Need for Bipartisan Support at All Levels: Concerns about the CCoE becoming too
political an endeavor were mentioned by a couple of focus group participants, as
was the need for widespread support across all political persuasions to ensure
ongoing funding.
Vendor/Technology Agnostic: Participants were concerned that the CCoE would
either become a sales pitch and/or tool, or that dependencies on specific
technologies would lead to premature obsolescence; ensuring
vendor/technology agnosticism was the participant-provided method to prevent
this and ensure CCoE success.

The diversity of the categories in this theme indicates the breadth of conversations that
took place in response to the facilitator’s question, which also likely accounts for the
frequency levels of this theme in each analysis group. The prevalence of this theme is
not necessarily indicative of consensus among participants regarding the categories and
ideas that are included within this theme.

A key participant quote that exemplifies the sentiments of this theme as expressed in
the focus groups comes from a Finance/Banking/Insurance industry participant in the
Salem:
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“…if I’m going to be involved – [I won’t be] if it’s a meeting, vote on this
measure, elect this person. I want to come, contribute to something that will
help other people, and bring something back to my business that is moving
us all forward.”

Diverse Involvement
The Diverse Involvement theme captures participants’ statements regarding the need
for statewide cybersecurity initiatives to take a broad and inclusive approach. Diversity in
this theme primarily refers to organization size, industry, and location. The Smaller
Organizations Benefit the Most category includes observations made by participants
from both small and large organizations that those with limited resources and staff
stand to benefit the most from a statewide cybersecurity initiative. The Geographic
Diversity and Access Limitations Outside I-5 Corridor categories indicate that
participants were especially concerned that activities either take place in, or otherwise
reach, areas outside of Portland and Salem. Participants also noted that a statewide
cybersecurity initiative needs multi-industry events, programs, and activities; this
sentiment broadly makes up the Need for Sector Diversity category in this theme.

Of greatest interest to the research team is the geographical location of this theme. It is
surprising that the biggest population center in Oregon was also equally as vocal about
providing services outside of the Portland-Metro area. This shows a level of selfawareness about the kinds of opportunities that the CCoE might be able to provide, as
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well as a willingness of those who may not directly benefit from those opportunities to
support them in the interest of serving the broader public. Further probing of this
sentiment may be value for decision makers as planning for the CCoE moves forward.
Some reflections from focus group participants on the kinds of diversity that might be
beneficial for the CCoE, as well as cybersecurity in Oregon more broadly:
“Small businesses are really where
Financial/Banking/Insurance industry

the

impact

is.”

–

Portland,

“Has to be outside the population centers.” – Portland, Information
Technology and Telecommunications industry
“It seems like everything is in Portland or Salem. We need something that’s
more centrally located.” – Rural Groups, Government industry
“From our perspective, having a good broad group… making sure there are
people from different sectors, not just State and education. All levels, state,
local, public, private, educational, etc. Different expertise, too.” – Rural Groups,
Government industry

Medium of Information Sharing is Important
A variety of participants expressed concern that any statewide initiatives focus not just
on the content of the information being shared, but the method by which that
information is shared. However, the concerns were markedly different in regard to the
role of creating websites and online forums for information sharing. Three categories
make up this theme. First, participants of all three analysis groups that discussed topics
related to this theme agreed that Face-to-Face Sharing is Important. One of the
Portland-based groups was so enthusiastic about multi-sector meet-ups to discuss
cybersecurity that a majority of the participants stayed after the scheduled conclusion of
the group to continue the discussion and exchange business cards amongst themselves.
Rural groups were also enthusiastic about any and all opportunities to meet in person
with other cybersecurity professionals regardless of the context; several participants
mentioned how grateful they were that researchers were willing to travel to talk to them,
and asked about any similar upcoming events. Related to this first category is an
important second: Information Sharing Through Conversations and Conferences. There
was widespread interest among participants in educational and information-sharing
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events that cover content that is applicable across industries; Portland participants
noted that events that did not involve sales pitches from vendors are especially of
interest to them. These two categories together make up the bulk of the Medium of
Information Sharing is Important theme.

The third category that had less agreement across analysis groups is Online Information
Sharing is Done Already. Portland participants generally noted that online information
sources are already sufficient for their needs and they were not interested in “another
website”; as one participant stated, there are “lots of places for information already…
most of us are geeks, we know how to internet.” Rural Group participants, in contrast,
were keen on increasing the availability of online content from trustworthy sources. In
particular, the ability to access information remotely without needing to access a
population center was an expressed need and/or desire. It seems, then, that the utility of
creating online information resources for cybersecurity in Oregon is higher for those in
locations outside of the I5 corridor, but significantly lower for those in the Portlandmetro area.
Participants’ thoughts on this theme are best summarized by the following statements:
“I’d like to see more of a peer meetup. Those types of lessons, it would take
me a year to write it up on LinkedIn and people would get bored. IN a peer
services group, those things could have a lot of value.” – Portland, Healthcare
and Medical industry
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“It would be nice if there were more [events] in Bend, Central Oregon… like a
yearly kind of thing, or twice a year.” – Rural Groups, Healthcare and Medical
industry
“Having a centralized point of information would be huge. I have to go out
and scour and see how to mitigate these threats. If it weren’t for the internet
there would be no way to know. I was really excited to hear [other
participants] talking about a centralized portal.” – Rural Groups, Government
industry

Trusting Information Sharing Partners
The Trusting Information Sharing Partners theme reflects a concern that often came up
in conjunction with the Medium of Information Sharing is Important theme discussed
previously and the Considerations for State Involvement theme discussed later in this
chpater. Before participating in any statewide initiative that involves sharing information
or experiences, participants in most analysis groups expressed a need for assurances of
the trustworthiness of those with whom they’d be expected to share. Many expressed a
desire for formalized arrangements to ensure a certain level of care with potentially
sensitive disclosures before taking part. These concerns were categorized as Trust
through Formal Arrangements. A related category, Legitimacy of Information
Sharers/Sources, reflects a complementary need for some attestation to the knowledge
and expertise of those involved in information sharing arrangements; one participant
from the Rural Groups analysis group suggested an application process monitored by
experts on the Cybersecurity Advisory Council to ensure that participants have relevant
experience and/or credentials.
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Focus group participants were also concerned that state involvement would necessitate
state action in any sort of information sharing arrangement. One participant expressed
trepidation about asking for or sharing information if it could lead to punitive action
against them. However, with formalized confidentiality processes and procedures, that
participant expressed confidence that a CCoE could facilitate effective information
sharing that they would be comfortable participating in. A final category that only
received mention in the Rural Groups was Information Sharing Among Legacy Systems
Operators. These participants expressed a desire to have information sharing facilitated
among verified operators and maintainers of legacy systems that may require
specialized expertise, and indicated that it can be difficult to find trustworthy
information on these kinds of systems.
Several participants’ own words provide greater insight into this theme:
“One of the things that makes ISAC work is the confidentiality.” – Salem,
Education industry
“I don’t think this center should be open to the public. I think you should have
to apply. That gets rid of the junk, spamming, trivial fighting… it can be hard
to get relevant information.” – Rural Groups, Government industry
“[Any website] needs to be a credentialed site.” – Rural Groups, Healthcare
and Medical industry
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“Stance needs to be partnering, not punitive. If it becomes too ‘state-y’, that
would be a deterrent.” – Salem, Government industry

Alignment with Organizational Leadership
Alignment with Organizational Leadership represents a theme with a single category but
a fair amount of agreement among participants; this theme therefore plays a substantial
role in the data of three of the four analysis groups, and a lesser role in the Salem focus
group session. This theme also shows the importance of considering both the number
of categories and frequency of the theme’s occurrence in the data, as only looking at
the breadth of categories contained in this theme would make it seem deceptively
unimportant.

This theme contains all mentions of conflict or indifference between executive-level
leadership and cybersecurity needs, staff, and initiatives. Several participants did report
that their organization’s leadership was supportive or even proactive regarding
cybersecurity; there was no discernable pattern in terms of industries or geographies in
which these participants work. However, the majority of participants indicated that
executive-level leadership is an ongoing pain point for cybersecurity staff in their
organizations. Most did not attribute this to any malicious intent on the part of
executives, instead pointing to either a lack of knowledge and understanding, or a
prioritization of other business goals and initiatives over cybersecurity. Many also
reported that cybersecurity, and often IT in general, is not represented by a position at
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the executive level, unlike other administrative or supporting operational units (finance,
human resources, etc.).
These concerns are best reflected in these examples from participants:
“Until [upper management/executives] see someone get their finger stuck in
the light socket, they don’t understand.” – Bend, Healthcare and Medical
industry
“[I] need a way to reach the decision makers so they understand how
important [cybersecurity] is.” – Bend, Government industry
“If you want security to move forward, you need a voice at the big table to
share the resources required… if you want good cybersecurity, have to start
from the board down.” – Rural Groups, Healthcare and Medical industry
“You can’t talk to C-level as security, but as business leaders.” – Portland,
Finance/Banking/Insurance industry

Considerations for State Involvement
Potential ramifications of the role of state government in a CCoE were of particular
concern for several participants across all analysis groups, though this particular theme
was not very frequently discussed overall. These concerns were both positive and
negative, with some participants skeptical of the ability of state government to
contribute positively to a broad cybersecurity effort like the CCoE, and others firmly in
favor of state involvement.
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Those participants that were concerned about state involvement made statements that
were best organized into categories of Concerns about State Acting Efficiently and
Removing Cybersecurity from Political Context. The code “red tape” was identified as
part of the first category, while politicization and elections were mentioned in the latter.
Other participants thought the state could lend credibility to a broad CCoE effort,
leading to categories of State Can Require Compliance and State Can Consolidate
Information in a Trusted Way. These participants essentially invoked the unique ability of
the state to act as a convener for information sources, and the ability of the state to
potentially create an environment that mandates cybersecurity efforts, as valuable
contributions to this effort. Finally, a participant noted that state involvement would
require decision makers to consider effective ways to Reconcile Conflict Between Public
Initiatives and Private Industry (a fifth category in this theme), though this was discussed
only as something to consider, and not necessarily a positive or negative aspect of state
involvement.
Quotes that exhibit the breadth of the categories in the general theme of
Considerations for State Involvement are:
“I don’t want to be negative, but if it’s state employees doing this, no. It’ll be
too much red tape.” – Portland, Education industry
“The problem I see: the business sector is going to complain, you’re taking
away from my profit. Anytime government tries to give something to the
citizens, business complains.” – Salem, Government industry
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“It’d be good if the health of the state was involved, if it were mandated that
a certain level of [cybersecurity] was part of organizations.” – Bend,
Government industry

Technology Rate of Change is a Challenge
Several participants indicated that the rate of change in the information technology
industry, and more specifically the cybersecurity industry, makes it difficult for their
organizations to keep technologies, systems, and processes up-to-date. This theme was
often mentioned concurrently with the Resources are a Challenge theme, as those who
felt they lacked sufficient resources often indicated that this lead to an inability to
research and remain sufficiently informed. This theme was discussed most in Bend and
the Rural Groups, but was also mentioned in Portland Groups to a lesser extent.

Two key quotes from participants that capture the essence of this theme include:
“In this business, if you don’t stay up for 6 months, you’re irrelevant.” – Rural
Groups, Government industry
“It’s hard with how fast cybersecurity is booming to have local resources.” –
Rural Groups, Government industry
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Low-Frequency Themes
The remaining themes are considered low-frequency themes, in that they had both a
low number of distinct categories and were infrequently discussed by groups. Often
these categories and themes were only mentioned by a single participant in a single
focus group, but did not completely fit in any of the other themes already discussed.
Each is briefly considered below.
Synthesizing Reporting Requirements for Communication
Three participants were enthusiastic about a potential synthesis of information and
reporting requirements for organizations that are subject to multiple standards and
regulations. One Salem participant told a story about a situation arising in a previous
work situation in which leadership and staff couldn’t decipher the correct course of
action; this was followed by the suggestion that “a guide that simplifies your obligations
for your sector and place… including crossover between HIPAA and FERPA” would be a
useful tool. A Rural Group participant mentioned that they simply do not have time to
monitor the changing laws and regulations, and that communicating any changes would
be a desired activity for a CCoE to undertake.
Do Not Understand CCoE’s Value or Purpose
Two participants specifically raised questions about the CCoE’s purpose, saying they
were both unsure of what the goals and objectives of the CCoE would be, and that they
didn’t understand why a state-level CCoE was desirable (as compared to a local- or
federal-level CCoE). Questions were also raised about how a CCoE would differ from a
Fusion center, or other such programs that participants had experience with at primarily
the federal level. As one participant stated, “I've been tracking SB90 for a while, there's
been no explanation from the State Chief Information Officer of what exactly the entity
is supposed to do.” The clear implication of this theme is that goals and objectives of
the CCoE need to be clearly defined and communicated through a collaborative process.
Cybersecurity as Part of Disaster Preparedness/Recovery
One participant in the Rural Groups mentioned concerns about cybersecurity and the
resilience of critical infrastructure in the face of either natural or man-made disasters;
another participant mentioned that the IT department is involved in drills and disaster
simulations. This was the only brief conversation in the entire focus group dataset in
which focus group participants considered cybersecurity from an emergency
management point of view.
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Developing Performance Metrics
A Salem focus group participant from the Education industry expressed interest in the
development of “metrics that give you an idea for how your organization is doing
overall… if there’s additional stuff specific to Oregon, that would be great.” Other
participants in that same group mentioned that auditing organizations and compliance
requirements essentially provide this service; the discussion of metrics for gaging
cybersecurity performance never arose in other focus groups.
BYOD in Higher Ed and BYOD in Libraries/Community Centers
Two focus group participants wanted to discuss bring-your-own-device (or BYOD)
policies, but the issues they described were more specific to their particular industries
and didn’t gain much traction with the rest of the focus group participants in their
sessions. This is one particular instance where there seem to be marked differences
between industries, and even within industries when considering the unique needs of
institutions of higher education (with residential, educational, and medical components).
While this topic was clearly of importance to the focus group participants that brought it
up, it remained a low-frequency theme with limited discussion overall.

SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR CCOE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES FROM FOCUS
GROUP PARTICIPANTS
Beyond the codes, categories, and themes identified in the analysis process, the
research team also compiled the long list of ideas for programs and activities
brainstormed by focus group participants. This brainstorming happened as a direct
result of the prompt: “What activities or programs can you think of that a Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence could undertake to be most beneficial to an organization like
yours?” In total, participants across all focus groups generated 52 unique ideas (5
suggestions were received twice in different focus groups; these are denoted with an
asterisk) for ways that the CCoE could positively impact their organizations. Due to the
brevity of the focus group sessions, these ideas are not fully developed into actionable
plans, but they do provide some insight into the kinds of activities, programs, and
services that participants think would benefit their organizations given the broad
parameters of the CCoE’s functions outlined in SB90. These suggestions are grouped
into eight categories in the table below:
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Non-Technical Employees and End User
Training
– Employee training with testing and validation of
completion*
– General cybersecurity education for
middle/executive management
– Sector-specific cybersecurity education for C-level
executives
– Ready-made educational materials and programs for
non-IT employee training
– Mandatory cyber hygiene training for employees in
non-technical positions
– Cybersecurity content for vulnerable end-user
populations

Cybersecurity Services
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Weekly/monthly external security checks
Tools for PEN testing (by users)
Free PEN tests (by CCoE)
National-Guard-type cybersecurity service program
(1 weekend per month)
Attorney General/legal ‘hotline’ for advice regarding
mandatory reporting and notification requirements
Cybersecurity social engineering exercises
Forensic teams for incident response
Cybersecurity SWAT team or deployable incident
response team
Subscription-based cybersecurity services and
strategy consulting

Procurement and Purchasing Assistance
–
–
–
–

State-based pricing for vendor contracts
Approved product list
Collective procurement for small organizations
Co-op/partnership pricing on goods and services

Awareness
– General cybersecurity outreach
– PR/public service announcements regarding major
cybersecurity events and imminent threats
– Cybersecurity alerts on social media
– Recognizing CCoE-participating organizations publicly
– Reward/incentive program for cybersecurity
performance
– Cybersecurity as part of disaster response and
recovery simulations
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Best Practices and Resource Documentation
– Easy-to-follow cybersecurity templates
– Standardized metrics for cybersecurity performance
measurement
– Guide to incident reporting and response obligations
– Checklist of cybersecurity tools based on
organization type
– Central information-sharing hub
– Central best practices hub*
– Oregon-specific information library
– Unified cybersecurity requirements at the state level

Events and Inter-Personal Collaboration
– Mentoring program (pairing large organizations with
smaller organizations)
– Informal peer exchange events (‘every two weeks
over beers’)
– Learning webinars on specific topics
– Yearly or twice-yearly conference for Oregon CS
professionals
– In-person events focused on specific cybersecurity
issues
– Best practices sharing through roundtables
– Online forum for issue solutions
– Connecting legacy system operators for information
sharing

K-12 Education
– Cybersecurity in K-12 curriculum*
– Cyber hygiene in K-12 curriculum
– Afterschool cybersecurity clubs (similar to robotics
teams)

Workforce Development
– Cybersecurity as mandatory part of CS and IT degree
programs*
– Post-degree or post-certification workforce training
and internships
– Create access to cybersecurity professionals without
teaching credentials in classrooms at all levels*
– Online/virtual classrooms for students and current
workforce
– Mandatory cyber hygiene training for all Oregon
higher-education students (regardless of degree
type)
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– Bring national trainings and certification programs to
Oregon
– Scholarships for CyberCorps program
– Credentialing program for Oregon cybersecurity
practitioners

This list shows that focus group participants were generally enthusiastic about the
possibility of a statewide initiative that could tackle some (or all) of these activities.
Additionally, participants saw these activities as fulfilling the broad functions outlined for
the CCoE in SB90. Together, this indicates that there are myriad ways to create a CCoE
that adds value to Oregon’s cybersecurity landscape and that, given a chance,
participants in collaborative discussions like these focus groups can generate lists of
innovative and wide-ranging programming that CCoE decision makers can consider.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The focus group data provides an interesting look in the perspectives of IT and
cybersecurity professionals in all sizes and types of Oregon organizations, located
throughout the state. While all of this data is valuable to consider as the CCoE proposal
process moves forward, there were several key aspects of these focus group discussions
that warrant consideration for future interactions through these types of collaborative
processes.
First, conversations around themes of organizational culture, goals, leadership, and
resources are often intertwined. The coding of these ideas and concepts was a difficult
analytical task, as participants often responded to prompts (and each other) with
thoughts that covered all of these categories to some extent. The data indicates that
many participants equate issues with one of these themes with all of them; a resource
problem is also an organizational culture and leadership problem, and vice versa.
Participants should not be expected to make distinctions between these concepts in the
short timeframe of a focus group or brainstorming session. However, these themes also
dominated the focus groups, so internal aspects of organizations can be expected to
come to forefront of any public discussion regarding cybersecurity needs.
Additionally, the expected differences between industries and geographies were for the
most part not observed in the data. There are generally similar concerns for
organizations across all focus groups, with a few exceptions as noted in the analysis
above. Even more surprising, participants were able to anticipate and appreciate the
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concerns that might be different between them. This is especially true of Portland
sessions, with participants who were cognizant of the needs of organizations located
outside of the Portland-metro area and seemingly anxious to help create a CCoE that
might serve those needs. Decision makers seeking to create a CCoE that serves all
Oregonians can rest assured that focus group participants are aware of the difficulties in
this goal, yet remain interested in pursuing the greater good.
While it was not necessarily surprising that workforce development was a frequent
theme in the focus group discussions, it was surprising that many respondents focused
on K-12 education in the context of workforce development. K-12 education was also a
point of emphasis in the brainstorming of possible CCoE activities and tasks. Finding
ways to embrace K-12 educators and students in cybersecurity initiatives is a high
priority for focus group respondents, and should be considered in the initial CCoE
proposal design.
Finally, researchers met and interacted with a lot of engaged and motivated individuals
in the process of scheduling and conducting focus groups. Many participants asked to
be informed of research outcomes and future opportunities to contribute to the CCoE
process. Maintaining and effectively harnessing this enthusiasm as the proposal is
drafted and finalized can organically generate buy-in and legitimacy for the end result.
Overall, Oregonians are ready and willing to contribute to a successful CCoE proposal
process.
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Chapter 4: Recommendations for Oregon’s CCoE
The process of creating a proposal for a multi-sector Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
(CCoE) for Oregon as outlined in SB90 is a daunting task. Drafting this proposal requires
gathering input from multiple stakeholder groups and communities, analysis of the
needs and resources of key beneficiary groups, and an understanding of what has and
has not worked in the past for other entities undertaking similar initiatives. The
preceding three chapters have preliminarily addressed each of these aspects by
conducting document and literature reviews, surveying representatives of Oregon
organizations, and holding focus groups of cybersecurity practitioners throughout
Oregon. The data from each of these efforts has been presented and analyzed in those
respective chapters; these analyses are now considered together to formulate concrete
recommendations for the structure, initiatives, and programming for the Oregon CCoE.
In total, three specific recommendations for the structure and activities of the CCoE are
presented below: the inclusion of workforce development initiatives, the creation or
curation of cyber hygiene materials and/or training services, and the expansion of
leadership to include multi-sector representation. Some additional observations that
warrant further consideration due to their importance in one, but not all, research
activities are also included.

RECOMMENDATION: WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
Workforce development consistently rises to the top of the potential programs and
initiatives that might be offered by an Oregon CCoE. Survey data indicates that there is
broad consensus across industries that cybersecurity staffing needs will increase over
the next five years, and that staffing these positions will become more difficult; a
majority of respondents also indicated that there is a moderate-to-significant shortage
in the Oregon workforce for these types of positions. Focus groups confirmed this
perspective, and nearly every session focused a substantial portion of its CCoE activities
brainstorming discussion on workforce initiatives. This interest in these kinds of activities
for the CCoE is mirrored by the support expressed for continuing education and
certification programs (both online and in-person) in the survey data, as more than 50%
of respondents expressed that their organizations would use these kinds of services if
they were offered. Additionally, support for workforce development activities was not
limited to higher education or continuing education; most focus groups spent a
considerable amount of time talking about K-12 education possibilities in this context.
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Both the quantitative and qualitative data collected from Oregonians through the
preceding research efforts support the development of workforce initiatives at all levels.
Other states have also chosen to spend their limited cybersecurity resources to
emphasize workforce development. Nearly every state examined in the comparative
policy analysis engages in some program or activity designed to increase the quantity
and quality of its cybersecurity workforce. These programs vary from the California
Mentors program that focuses on nurturing young IT professionals in one-on-one
mentoring relationships, to New York’s newly created College of Emergency
Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity (hosted by SUNY-Albany), to Texas’
WeTeachCS program that provides training for K-12 educations to receive computer
science teaching certifications. Michigan’s nurturing of young cybersecurity talent
through the provision of scholarships to participate in the High School Cyber Challenge
is an especially strong program that directly reaches young students and encourages
them to enter the cybersecurity field. Retraining initiatives, particularly for veterans, are
also included in many states’ approaches to cybersecurity: Florida recently piloted a
veterans retraining program that it is considering continuing, while Virginia is an active
participant in the National Veterans retraining initiative. In short, many program
templates have found success in other states, any of which could be used in Oregon to
begin to meet this widely recognized need.
The consensus between these three pieces of analysis is clear: workforce development is
a priority, and is a key factor in successful cybersecurity initiatives. An initial focus on K12 initiatives in Oregon could later expand to all levels of education and professional
development. As one focus group participant emphatically said, “If [the CCoE] only
delivered workforce development, that would be an enormous leap forward.”

RECOMMENDATION: CYBER HYGIENE TRAINING
Cyber hygiene programs, and general cybersecurity training for non-technical
employees of Oregon organizations, are both a priority and concern for Oregon survey
respondents and focus group participants. These efforts emphasize “healthy” practices
and habits when using information technology and communications systems; survey
respondents that provide this kind of training to non-technical employees most
commonly indicated that phishing and general web safety topics are covered. However,
nearly 50% of respondents indicated that either very few or none of their employees
receive this type of training. This result is further confirmed by focus group data, in
which many participants lamented the inability of their organizations to prioritize or
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provide resources for this type of training despite the desire of the technical staff to
provide it. Participants in multiple focus group sessions talked excitedly about the
possibility of creating a “human firewall” if increased numbers of non-technical
employees could receive and absorb training on basic cyber hygiene topics. Several also
noted the need for this type of training to begin before employees enter the workforce,
and were generally supportive of including cyber hygiene content in K-12 settings.
Leading states included in the comparative analysis include cyber hygiene courses and
training among their programming and initiatives. Most provide these types of training
materials for government employees. Some states (Colorado, Illinois, New York) go onestep further and make such training mandatory for those in non-technical public sector
positions; California extends this requirement to contractors as well. Some states have
also taken the step of creating and providing materials and programming for audiences
beyond state employees: the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s Cybercrime
Office runs a public-facing website with hygiene information for the public, Michigan
makes toolkits for small businesses and individuals available, and New Jersey conducts
informative weekly webinars on cyber hygiene topics. States have also brought cyber
hygiene programming to K-12 institutions: Colorado has a cyber-hygiene outreach
program for 6th- to 8th-graders, while Michigan provides curriculum materials for schools
to use that focus on online safety and awareness. The prevalence of these types of
initiatives shows that other states have identified the provision of cyber hygiene training
and informational materials as a priority with a high potential return on investment.
An Oregon CCoE can meet the need identified by a variety of survey respondents and
focus group participants by either creating or curating a collection of informative cyber
hygiene materials that can provide basic cyber hygiene information to organizations of
all sizes and sectors. Focus group respondents that work in cybersecurity described the
difficulty they face in locating or creating suitable materials for their organizations’ nontechnical employees; while some mentioned that time to administer training sessions
and materials is also difficult to find, this was a lesser concern than simply having
credible information to present in compelling ways. Materials that cover the basics of
cyber hygiene, as well as any Oregon-specific cybersecurity laws and requirements, were
of great interest to Oregonians, and these types of initiatives fit well with the example
set by other states.

Page 152

CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OREGON’S CCOE

RECOMMENDATION: MULTI-SECTOR ENGAGEMENT
Creating truly multi-sector engagement, in terms of both leadership and participation in
programs and services, is a high priority for successful cybersecurity initiatives. This
means both providing opportunities for interested cybersecurity representatives in all
sectors, and across all industries, to participate in agenda setting and decision making,
as well as providing opportunities for collaborative learning and education across
sectors. These ideas both received widespread support in the focus groups conducted
across Oregon as indicated by the prevalence of the Diverse Involvement theme.
Anecdotally, participants also expressed ready interest in cross-industry events and
sharing opportunities. Several noted that this is a particular type of sharing that is not
facilitated by existing professional organizations (and especially ISACs), which tend to be
fragmented by industry membership. Many participants also explicitly asked how they
could become a part of the advisory and/or decision-making bodies for the CCoE; these
participants spanned all represented industries in the focus groups. This, coupled with
the volume of ideas generated in the brainstorming portion of the focus groups, shows
that there is a potential for valuable leadership if the number of participants and the
represented industries expands to become more inclusive of a truly multi-sector
approach.
States that have embraced this approach, and can be looked to for practical
implementation methods, include Colorado, Michigan, Maryland, and California.
Maryland has the most diverse leadership entity, with 50 members spanning a variety of
industries, including government, business, education, critical infrastructure, and
cybersecurity more specifically. A key aspect of incorporating this many leaders is the
creation of subcommittees with specific policy responsibilities; both Maryland and
California provide templates for what these subcommittee structures might eventually
look like. These bodies are equipped to serve in an advisory capacity that is inclusive of
a variety of perspectives and viewpoints, arguably providing more context and insight
into the cybersecurity needs of the state as a whole.
Creating opportunities for engagement across sectors seems vital to the success of an
initiative that aims to reach as far and do as much as the Oregon CCoE. These
opportunities need to be available for both potential leaders and those simply seeking
services and resources. Following the lead of other successful initiatives, an expanded
leadership structure and specific multi-sector events seem to be promising
opportunities to foster this type of engagement.
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OTHER NOTES FOR CONSIDERATION
Two final observations are important when considering the insights that the compiled
data provides for CCoE structures and activities. First, centralization and unification of
state cybersecurity activities often precedes the successful implementation of
cybersecurity expanded cybersecurity initiatives in most of the studied states. This has
the dual functions of increasing the transparency and accountability of actors
representing state government, and also increases the legitimacy of state leadership in
multi-sector cybersecurity initiatives. While not specifically related to the Oregon CCoE,
consolidation of cybersecurity activities in Oregon government is included in other
sections of SB90, showing at least some acknowledgement of the relationship between
these two efforts. Ensuring that the implementations of other aspects of SB90 are
moving forward concurrently with the CCoE proposal drafting process may ultimately
make the proposal more successful with the legislature and a more legitimate and
representative venture in the eyes of the Oregon public.
A second observation is the need for activities and programs that target executive-level
leadership of organizations. Though not featured in any of the state analyses included in
the first chapter, content geared toward educating C-level leadership was an especially
vibrant topic in the focus group discussions. Cybersecurity professionals across
industries, geographies, and regardless of organization size expressed difficulties in
conveying the importance of cybersecurity to executives; attempts to involve executives
in cybersecurity education and information sessions were often unsuccessful if
originating from within the organization. Participants also requested both general
cybersecurity education and sector-specific cybersecurity education programs for
executives as part of the CCoE activities brainstorming sessions, with broad agreement
among participants when these suggestions made. Incorporating programming specific
to the highest levels of management for Oregon organizations should be another item
considered in an initial agenda for the CCoE.
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Chapter 5: Funding Opportunities and Challenges
An important part of new initiative is securing the financial means to put plans into
action and make goals into realities. The funding catalog included in Appendix B aims to
gather current funding opportunities for cybersecurity efforts that could be pursued to
accomplish the mandates and goals of the Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory Council
(OCAC) and the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE)367. The catalog
includes both private and government sources. “Private sources” in this case refers to
private foundations, and not monetary or in-kind donations from private companies
that may become a part of Council and CCoE programming through sponsorship or
targeted donations. “Government sources” focuses on federal grants as opposed to
federal contracting. In an effort to be inclusive, and because funder priorities may
fluctuate, this report also references past federal grant funds awarded to Oregon entities
when that information is available and relevant to these efforts. This information
contributes to the overarching research goal of arriving at Oregon-specific
recommendations from a variety of data collection and analysis approaches.
As the catalog demonstrates, the most fundable activities relate to workforce
development. While cybersecurity specific funding is limited, a wealth of public and
private STEM funding can also be relevant to cybersecurity efforts. Finally, both types of
opportunities require attention to the type of entity seeking funding. Several federal
opportunities specify universities as the awardee, and private funders generally require
recipients be tax-exempt and, in some cases, to qualify for 501(c)(3) designation.
Cultivating relationships in the public and foundation spheres can also contribute to the
overall success of funding efforts by increasing the likelihood of appropriations from
block grants, discretionary funds, and sponsorship of specific programs and initiatives.

METHODS
The search for funding sources was intended to be informed by reviewing funding
sources for cybersecurity efforts in other states as part of the comparative policy analysis
included earlier in this report. These states’ cybersecurity activities were often nested in
the overall information technology budget, or funded by one-off grants, appropriations
or sponsorships, most of which are not included in the scope of the funding sources.
Funding sources and grants that fit within the scope noted in the statement of work
367

These 11 mandates and goals can be found in SB 90, Sections 3 and 4.
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were still assessed, but with the understanding that funding from similar initiatives may
not be found through these means. First, city, county, non-profit, foundation, and grant
funding opportunities were assessed. This was followed by a search for funding
opportunities through federal grant structures.

FOUNDATION OPPORTUNITIES
One efficient and effective tool for reviewing private foundation opportunities is the
Foundation Directory Online (FDO), a subscription service of the Foundation Center that
offers searchable information on more than 140,000 grant makers and 500,000+
recipients.368 While the service charges $88-200/month depending on the plan chosen,
access to the database is available free in over 400 locations nationwide through
Funding Information Centers; as of this publication date, Multnomah County’s Central
Library (801 SW 10th Avenue, Portland) is the only entity in Oregon offering this free
access.369
The research team used FDO to search for foundations that fund projects in Oregon and
appeared to have either general interests or specific funding opportunities relevant to
CCoE programming. The following information, where available, is noted for the funders
located in this initial search:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Funding Entity
Funding Opportunity/Foundation Interests (depends on specificity of
organization information)
Connected SB 90 function
Website/contacts
Funding Range in $ and deadlines
IRS/Nonprofit restrictions

Websites are not available for some foundations because, as the Foundation Center
notes, approximately 90% of U.S. foundations do not maintain a website.370

Foundation Center “Foundation Directory Online Professional.” https://fconline.foundationcenter.org. Accessed December 20,
2017.
368

369

Foundation Center. “Find Us.” Accessed December 20, 2017. http://foundationcenter.org/ask-us/find-us.

Foundation Center “Foundation Directory Online Professional”. Accessed December 20, 2017.
https://fconline.foundationcenter.org
370
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FEDERAL FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES
The research team reviewed funding opportunities from several federal sources,
including the following departments, institutes, and foundations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Department of Defense (DOD)
Department of Education (DOE)
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Department of Commerce (DOC)
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
National Science Foundation (NSF)

The primary source for federal grants opportunities is the government website
Grants.gov. The team performed searches on this website using keywords including
“cybersecurity,” “cyber,” and “information technology,” as well as several other variations
of these terms. More general keyword searches on terms such as “training” and
“workforce” were also used to sort through currently active, closed, and archived
funding opportunities. Each federal organization’s website was also consulted for any
notices and press releases regarding grant funding updates and forecasted proposals.
Information about past and current federal funding opportunities is organized in a
similar manner as the private sources, with some modifications:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Open window (for current or recently open grants)
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FINDINGS
The information contained in the funding catalog is the best available as of publication.
Though funder priorities may change and new opportunities will appear, we hope that
this information will be helpful in guiding future searches.
General Notes on Foundation Opportunities
The funding catalog provides an overview of 15 possible foundation funding
opportunities that fit the stated functions of the OCAC and CCoE. The most fundable
function appears to be workforce development, especially when this is broadly
interpreted as education initiatives for all ages of Oregon students.
A primary consideration for securing future grant funding is the legal designation of the
CCoE or other grant-seeking entity. As noted in the catalog, the majority of foundation
funders explicitly require a 501(c)(3) designation from the IRS. Depending on the grant,
some specify furthermore the type of entity, such as a library or school. Some funders
may be more willing than others to fund start-up costs, though most in the catalog
prefer a track record for the program requesting funding.
The funders in the catalog represent funding opportunities ranging from $1,000 up to
$75,000, when funding ranges were published. Because of the time and effort involved
in the preparation and submission of most foundation grants, the Council and any other
involved parties may wish to engage with qualified and connected grant writing
professionals at the appropriate stage. While the FDO is a useful resource that the
Council may wish to utilize from time to time, a well-connected grant writer could
provide additional insight. The council may wish to target those grant writers
experienced with major local funders and also those experienced with fundraising for
STEM and/or workforce development proposals.
General Notes on Federal Funding Opportunities
Through searching Grants.gov, it became clear that the National Science Foundation
currently offers, and has offered in the past, most of the relevant opportunities for
funding cybersecurity initiatives as described in SB 90. The catalog includes 9 NSF grants
particularly pertinent to cybersecurity efforts that are statutorily ascribed to the CCoE
and OCAC. Because the National Science Foundation provides more detail on the
funding opportunities than Grants.gov, citations from the former are provided in the
catalog. There are also three grants that fund economic development activities in rural
areas that can be broadly construed to include cybersecurity workforce development or
cybersecurity service provision in rural Oregon communities. Other opportunities
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included are a DHS grant that funds “target hardening” and cybersecurity training for
nonprofit staff, a Centers for Disease Control grant for incident response assistance in
emergency situations, and a Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (Department of
State) grant for an international technology camp. While the latter entails efforts that
may go beyond the initial priorities for the CCoE, it is included with the rest to give a
picture of the potential diversity of federal funding opportunities in cybersecurity.
Current grants offer support for the following activities:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Higher education technology infrastructure updates, paired with research
opportunities for students
K-12 STEM education
Training and education for scientific and engineering workforce development
Career pathways/technician education
Broad economic development activities, including “technology-based economic
development”
Educational exchange programs for young women from the Middle East,
featuring technology camps provided by U.S. entities

Past grants have funded these and activities and also:
•
•
•
•

Direct support for university students studying cybersecurity
Capacity building for cybersecurity education
Security for cyber-physical systems
Cybersecurity-specific education

Additional considerations for seeking federal grants include the diverse entities that may
apply, and which of these entities might be best positioned to do so. Several grants are
available to all NSF-qualified entities, a broad group that includes the following 371:
•
•
•
•

Universities and colleges
Non-profit, non-academic institutions (such as museums, observatories,
laboratories)
For-profit organizations, especially when paired with universities and colleges
State and local governments

National Science Foundation “NSF Proposal & Award Policies & Procedures Guide. Accessed December 21, 2017, pp. 4-5.
https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappg17_1/nsf17_1.pdf.
371
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•

In rare cases: unaffiliated individuals, foreign organizations, or other federal
agencies.

Some grants limit funding to the first two categories, or require a cross-sector
partnership.
Of the various opportunities available for universities, the CyberCorps scholarships may
be of particular interest to the council. One funding stream of CyberCorps (Scholarships
for Service) provides direct support to university students in cybersecurity programs,
which is followed by public service obligations; this funding is not yet available at any
Oregon school. A Portland focus group participant specifically mentioned the program,
and a desire that it be promoted more widely to facilitate interest in the cybersecurity
field; a survey participant wrote that “…merit awards to keep kids here would be good,
but public universities typically do not give out many of those.” CyberCorps provides
one tool for recruiting the future cybersecurity workforce the cybersecure and will
hopefully be funded again after the most recent 2017 call for proposals.
Several Oregon institutions have found success through NSF funding. These successful
grant applications are detailed in the funding catalog, with more information on these
projects available through the linked abstracts. These funded programs include, but are
not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•

Portland State University: funding for development of Capture-the-Flag games
for emerging security practitioners
Portland State University: network infrastructure upgrades coupled with
associated research opportunities for students underrepresented in STEM fields
Klamath Community College: development of a rural virtual internship program
for STEM fields
University of Oregon: travel support for bringing out-of-town students to
annual Oregon Security Day with cybersecurity speakers
Lewis and Clark College: development of tools that automatically assess student
learning in practical cybersecurity tasks

Conclusions and Suggestions
The information provided in the funding catalog in Appendix B captures a moment in
time of funding opportunities. It is necessarily limited by two factors: the oftenincomplete information readily available from private funders, and the fact that federal
opportunities currently considered “open” will expire in 2018 (though two of the NSF
grants have deadlines listed for 2019 and beyond).
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The research team is encouraged by funder interests not only in cybersecurity but in the
general areas of STEM and workforce development. With workforce development as a
CCoE function held in high regard by survey and focus group participants, and a
prominent line of programming in other states’ cybersecurity initiatives considered in
the comparative policy analysis, the OCAC and CCoE may be in a strategic position to
operate as a disinterested broker in coordinating and advancing cybersecurity funding
efforts in Oregon.
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Chapter 6: Current Cybersecurity Efforts in Oregon
The geographical and network analysis categorizes and catalogs current cybersecurity
efforts across the state of Oregon. This information supplements the survey and focus
group responses with additional identification of organizations, programs, and initiatives
throughout Oregon that either are, or can become, resources to a state-wide
cybersecurity effort. Given the sensitive nature of many cybersecurity relationships and
difficulties securing information other than what was publicly available, the ability to
ascertain connections between entities was more difficult than expected. As a result, this
section focuses primarily on cataloging and geographically analyzing cybersecurity
education programs and private organizations that provide cybersecurity services.

METHODS
The intent of the researchers was to complete this task using a combination of
document review and a series of targeted conversations. In both areas, serious
challenges arose that hindered the ability to obtain the depth of information necessary
to be able to accurately display and analyze connections between organizations. This is
attributable to two primary issues:
•

•

The understandable reluctance of private enterprises to share information
regarding clients (based on non-disclosure agreements) and other business
arrangements, and
Difficulties finding organizations of all types (including education organizations,
non-profits, private corporations, and government entities) willing to respond to
researcher requests for information and insight into their relationships with
others, either through documentation or brief conversations with researchers.

Two groups merit special recognition for their enthusiastic response to researcher
inquiries and participation in interviews: the Cybersecurity Education and Research Team
at Oregon State University, and a contingent of staff members at Cayuse Technologies
(Pendleton, Oregon). Insights from these interviews are included in the conclusions
section.
Considering the aforementioned challenges, the research team focused on mapping two
primary categories of resources in Oregon: educational institutions and cybersecurity
professional services. Below, these visualizations are displayed and assessed in
juxtaposition with each other, considering overall concentrations of resources within the
state. This allows for a greater understanding of areas of strength within the state, as
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well as particular institutions or regions that may be under-resourced or have untapped
potential.

EDUCATION RESOURCES: MAPPING AND ANALYSIS
The first graphic depicts the availability of Computer Science and Computer Engineering
education throughout the state, including institutions both public and private and with
terminal degrees ranging from associates to doctoral.
All institutions offering training in either of those two fields are included; physical
locations of for-profit training centers operated by New Horizons and ONLC that
provide access to industry training and certification programs are also included.

OREGON CYBERSECURITY EDUCATION RESOURCES
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Within this group of educational institutions, institutions can distinguish themselves
through affiliations and recognitions. Three are analyzed in-depth below: MECOP
(Multiple Engineering Cooperative Program), CyberWatch West, and the National
Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense designation.

MECOP (Multiple Engineering Cooperative Program)372
The MECOP program is an Oregon education-business partnership offering paid
internships to students from four participating universities (Oregon State University,
Oregon Institute of Technology, Portland State University, and the University of
Portland). MECOP targets students in 18 engineering-related areas of study, including
fields traditionally associated with cybersecurity like computer engineering, computer
science, and information systems.
MECOP provides a progressively involved structure for these students to incorporate
professional development into their undergraduate studies through two paid
internships. Over 140 public and private employers access pre-screened and motivated
future engineers which they may “try out” for six months in an internship capacity. While
there is no requirement to hire interns, over 90% of graduates continue to work in
Oregon, and 70% with MECOP companies.373 These statistics indicate that MECOP may
be valuable resource in providing the kinds of incentives for cybersecurity talent to stay
in Oregon that several focus group participants mentioned in workforce development
discussions.
Publicly available MECOP information does not identify which participating employers
match with students in cybersecurity-related fields, or the size of the cohorts employed
by organizations in a given year. However, the longevity of this program indicates that
it is considered valuable by both the educational institutions and the companies
employing interns. While the program is currently limited to four universities, other
educational institutions are eligible to join MECOP374.

MECOP (Multiple Engineering Cooperative Program). Accessed December 20, 2017. https://www.mecopinc.org/students,
https://www.mecopinc.org/industry,
373
MECOP. “Company Membership.” Accessed December 20, 2017. https://www.mecopinc.org/industry.
374
MECOP. “University Membership.” Accessed December 20, 2017. https://www.mecopinc.org/universities
372
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CyberWatch West
Several schools in Oregon participate in the regional CyberWatch West (CWW)
network. Based out of Whatcom Community College in Bellingham, Washington, the
center is funded through a National Science Foundation Advanced Technological
Education Grant, with the stated mission to “increase the quantity and quality of the
cybersecurity workforce throughout the western United States.” The center was
designed and funded to support fourteen Western states, though membership is open
nationwide.375 In service of that goal CWW offers resources, such as course materials
and a mentoring program376, primarily for instructors in higher education institutions.
There are also resources available for students, including scholarship information and a
variety of cybersecurity competitions.377
The process to join CWW is inclusive and simple: educational institutions, including high
schools, apply through the education pathway, while businesses, nonprofits, and
professional organizations can join as industry partners. Currently five Oregon
institutions participate:
•
•
•
•
•

Lewis & Clark College
Linn-Benton Community College
Mt. Hood Community College
Oregon Institute of Technology
Portland Community College

The review of educational institutions involved in this indicates the following
accomplishments and interests from current Oregon CWW members:

CyberWatchWest. “About Us.” Accessed December 20, 2017. https://www.cyberwatchwest.org/index.php/about-us.
CyberWatchWest. “About Faculty Development.” Accessed December 20, 2017.
https://www.cyberwatchwest.org/index.php/faculty-141.
377
CyberWatchWest. “About Student Development.” Accessed December 20, 2017.
https://www.cyberwatchwest.org/index.php/students-138
375
376
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Institution

Notable accomplishments
and/or areas of interest in
cybersecurity

More information

Lewis and Clark
College

2 National Science Foundation
grants related to cybersecurity

https://college.lclark.edu/live/news/30529cybersecurity-education-tools

Linn-Benton
Community
College

Dual Partnership Program offers
dual enrollment with OSU for
computer science students; no
further details on cybersecurityspecific programming available

https://www.linnbenton.edu/degree-partnership
https://www.linnbenton.edu/currentstudents/student-support/instructionaldepartments/computer-systems/computer-science

Home of Oregon Center for
Cyber Security
Provides cybersecurity services
to small businesses around
Oregon through network of
Small Business Development
Centers (SBDC)

https://www.mhcc.edu/OCCS/

Oregon
Institute of
Technology

Operates Cyber Defense Center
(staffed by students in
Information Technology degree
program)

http://www.oit.edu/cyber-defense-center

Portland
Community
College

Offers a certificate in
Cybersecurity Fundamentals

https://www.pcc.edu/about/events/cyber-security/
https://www.pcc.edu/programs/computerinfo/cyber-security.html

Mt. Hood
Community
College

Page 166

https://bizcenter.org/cybersecurity/

CHAPTER 6: CURRENT CYBERSECURITY EFFORTS IN
OREGON
National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense
Two institutions in Oregon have been recognized through the National Centers of
Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense program jointly sponsored by the National
Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The program
offers three paths for two-year and four-year programs alike to receive national
recognition for their program of cyber defense education378. Mt. Hood Community
College has received the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense 2Year Education (CAE-2Y) designation, while the University of Oregon has received the
National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense Research (CAE-R)
designation; both are effective through 2019.
While these designations create opportunities for students to pay for their education
through CyberCorps Scholarships for Service grants (discussed in the funding chapter),
the designation does not guarantee any institution-specific funding.379
In addition to the current Centers at Mt. Hood Community College and the University of
Oregon, our research identified at least three Oregon schools working on earning the
designation and/or aligning with the pursuant curriculum requirements:
•
•
•

Umpqua Community College380
George Fox University381
Oregon Institute of Technology382

Summary of Education Mapping Strengths and Gaps:
Initial analysis of the resources indicates some gaps in participation and resource
availability. First, several schools with notable strengths in cybersecurity do not
participate in CyberWatch West, including:
•
•

George Fox University (linked above)
Linfield College- offers Cyber Security and Digital Forensics certificate online383

National Security Agency. “National Centers of Academic Excellence
in Cyber Defense”. https://www.nsa.gov/resources/educators/centers-academic-excellence/cyber-defense/. Accessed
December 21, 2017.
378

CAE Community“What is a CAE?”https://www.caecommunity.org/about-us/what-cae. Accessed December 21, 2017.
Umpqua Community College. “Cybersecurity: AAS”. https://www.umpqua.edu/cybersecurity. Accessed December 22, 2017
381
George Fox University. “Cyber Security Concentration”. https://www.georgefox.edu/collegeadmissions/academics/major/cyber-security-concentration.html. Accessed December 22, 2017.
382
Kawasaki, Charlie. “Cybersecurity in Oregon: Overview”. https://cyberoregon.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/Cybersecurity-Education-Summit-Charlie-Kawasaki.pdf. Presented on November 3, 2017.
383
Linfield College. “Cyber Security and Digital Forensics Certificate Program”
http://www.linfield.edu/dce/certificates/cyber-security-and-digital-forensics-certificate.html
379
380
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•

University of Oregon – has been awarded several National Science Foundation
grants and hosts the Center for CyberSecurity and Privacy and Oregon Security
Day, as well as holding the Center of Excellence designation

Also, two of Oregon’s 17 community colleges appear to not have any educational
programs in computer science or computer engineering programming: Tillamook Bay
Community College and Oregon Coast Community College. For this reason, these
schools are not depicted on the map of educational institutions. However, this presents
a clear opportunity to support the development of computer science and cybersecurity
curricula at these institutions and bring new workforce development and training
opportunities to the Oregon coast.

CYBERSECURITY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MAPPING AND ANALYSIS
A second type of data review and visualization considers the cybersecurity services
available in Oregon. Data compiled from a variety of sources were used for this analysis,
including a list of respondents to State of Oregon RFPs for cybersecurity incident
response services and the list of attendees at the 3rd Oregon Cybersecurity Policy
Summit held on August 25, 2017. Organizations that did not appear to offer
cybersecurity services, or no longer appeared to be in business, were removed from the
dataset.
In the map on the next page, the location of an organization’s headquarters are used to
distinguish between three types of companies offering cybersecurity services:
•
•
•

Companies headquartered in Oregon (36 companies) – represented by black stars
Those headquartered elsewhere with an Oregon branch (19 companies) –
represented by green stars
External Business with No Oregon Branch but Established Oregon Presence (8
companies) – not included in map

As the map shows, the Portland-metro area has the highest concentration of
cybersecurity companies by far. This is helped by the fact that most companies
headquartered outside of Oregon appear to locate their Oregon branches in or around
Portland. This is unsurprising given the status of Portland as Oregon’s biggest city and
population center, and only major metropolitan area. There are also small clusters of
businesses located around Eugene and Bend, though they contain substantially less
activity than the Portland cluster. Individual operations located in the Pendleton area,
Roseburg area, and central Oregon coast round out the map.
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It is important to note that this map is not necessarily an exhaustive list of every
company offering any type of cybersecurity service within Oregon. However, to the best
of the research team’s abilities, every organization of a large enough size to potentially
serve as a resource for the CCoE (as opposed to being a recipient of services from the
CCoE) is included. Additionally, the map does not depict or differentiate between the
clientele of these organizations; as mentioned above, obtaining this information was
difficult for a multitude of reasons.

OREGON PRIVATE-SECTOR CYBERSECURITY
ORGANIZATIONS
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Future attempts to quantify and qualify the relationships between private cybersecurity
service providers and other types of organizations should be intentionally designed with
input from these important information sources to ensure that necessary data can be
gathered. Perhaps with appropriate data controls and confidentiality procedures, as
utilized in the anonymous online survey and confidential focus groups described in
Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, would yield better returns on requests for information.

CONCLUSIONS
The Oregon Cybersecurity Landscape: Business, Education, and the Other
Stakeholders
A review of the resulting maps yields several conclusions. First, the majority of Oregon’s
cybersecurity companies, and a substantial portion of overall educational institutions,
are located in the Portland-metro area. The Medford, Klamath Falls, and Salem areas
have educational resources but less in the way of business activity. Several other
community colleges operate in areas without any significant cybersecurity business
activity. With the exception of possibilities for remote work and telecommuting, this
poses a significant problem for students looking to attend educational programs and
participate in the workforce concurrently; it also deters alumni from staying in the areas
that provided their education.
Of course, a holistic understanding of the cybersecurity efforts must also consider
resources not included on the maps in this report. Many organizations and institutions
operate in communities do not have cybersecurity as a core or even periphery goal, but
can serve as conveners for new initiatives or intermittent programming. Depending on
the functions of an eventual CCoE, any or all of the following could be valuable partners:
•
•
•
•
•

Public libraries and community centers with computer education and cyber
hygiene programs
Other Small Business Development Centers throughout the state
School districts
Chapters of industry organizations (for example: ISAC, ISSA)
Certifying organizations (if local)

The Council and CCoE may also wish to consider the value of further interviews with
cybersecurity resources, considering the insights gleaned in the short discussions the
research team was able to conduct. For example, the discussion with OSU Cybersecurity
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faculty members raised the possibility of co-locating cybersecurity resources at already
established OSU Extension Centers.384 The discussion with representatives of Cayuse
Technologies, the first Native-owned onshore delivery center, illuminated some of the
challenges of attracting resources and investment to eastern Oregon in particular. A
participant indicated that those looking for technology services or seeking employment
in the field often do not think to consider the resources in the area before taking their
business to more populous areas of Oregon like Portland.385 The Cayuse representatives
also indicated that even with the resources of the local community college, the
scheduling of classes complicates attendance for those working during the day, and the
location makes attendance in inclement weather difficult.
While two interviews on current networks and relationships is an extremely limited
sample from which to discuss resource strengths and challenges, it does provide a
perspective on the landscape that contributes to the attached visualizations. The
information gleaned in this resource analysis process can be used in conjunction with
the other research methods included in the project proposal to generate
recommendations for the Oregon CCoE.

384
385

Web-based Interview – OSU Cybersecurity Team – September 28, 2017
Interview – Cayuse Technologies – November 8, 2017
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COMPREHENSIVE MAP OF CYBERSECURITY
RESOURCES IN OREGON
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Chapter 7: Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
This report has considered a variety of evidence that can help decision makers draft a
proposal for the Oregon Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CCoE). Both the raw data
and analysis provided in the previous chapters are valuable sources of information that
can support an evidence-based policy process that culminates in a successful CCoE
proposal. However, even with this research as background, the scope of the CCoE’s
potential activities and influence, coupled with an aggressive timeline, make the
proposal-drafting process challenging. Keeping the outcomes of the data collection and
analysis efforts in mind, the research team therefore recommends several tangible “next
steps” for decision makers engaged in this process. These next steps also align with the
public health approach to cybersecurity that has served as a theoretical framework for
this report, and the principles of public cybersecurity practice set forth by Sedenberg
and Mulligan386 more specifically.

NEXT STEP: DECIDE ON A LEGAL STRUCTURE
An essential early step in the proposal drafting process needs to be determining the
legal structure of the CCoE. SB90 does not require a particular structure for the CCoE,
which allows for some flexibility in terms of the kinds of legal structures that decision
makers can consider. Potential structures include a government (state-level, executive)
agency, nonprofit, public-private partnership, or a more cooperative- or consortiumstyle arrangement; a CCoE can also stand alone as an independent entity, or become a
part of another government, nonprofit, or educational institution.
There are several reasons that this step is important to take early on in the drafting
process. First, the legal structure has important implications for funding. Many grants
have limitations on the types of organizations to which they can be awarded, and direct
sponsorships and donations may be more forthcoming with some types of legal
structures than others. The legal structure may also need to allow the CCoE to serve as a
central clearinghouse of funding opportunities for participating organizations, though
this depends on the mission, vision, and specific programming envisioned to fulfill the
functions set out in SB90. Examples of this clearing house function include assisting

Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Berkeley Technology
Law Journal 30, no. 3 (2015): 1737-1738.
386
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small businesses and nonprofits in their own grant applications for cybersecurity
funding, or acting as a neutral convener for multi-institution educational grants for
cybersecurity education.
The CCoE’s legal structure is also important for clarifying its leadership and decisionmaking processes, as well as the extent to which both the State of Oregon and vendors
are involved. Several members of key beneficiary groups expressed concern about the
lack of a clearly identified CCoE mission or set of goals throughout the research process,
as well as concerns regarding the transparency of the processes by which these are
determined. Specific concerns about inefficiencies (“red tape”) and politicization of
cybersecurity initiatives through state involvement were mentioned mainly in the focus
group data. Additionally, participants were unclear about the extent to which
cybersecurity vendors might be involved in any state-wide initiatives. Suggestions for
vendor agnosticism and clarification on the role of the Oregon Cybersecurity Advisory
Council from focus group participants and survey respondents can be accommodated
through intentional design that is clearly communicated. Identifying a legal structure
can help potential participants in the CCoE understand its leadership and decisionmaking processes and the extent to which the State of Oregon is involved in them.
Finally, states that can serve as reference points for Oregon’s CCoE have seen success
with different types of legal structures. The use of other states’ activities as inspiration or
models for the CCoE can be better tailored once a legal structure is determined. The
legal location and structuring of the CCoE within the Oregon Office of the State Chief
Information Officer more closely follows the example of Colorado and its emphasis on
securing state agencies. An official affiliation within an institution of higher education, as
seen in the Florida Center for Cybersecurity’s relationship with the University of South
Florida, may shift leadership and reference points for programming in a different
direction. Considering the types of activities that decision makers are interested in
pursuing to meet the requirements set forth in SB90 is an important endeavor that
requires an appropriate legal scaffolding for the scope and envisioned services to key
beneficiaries.
Choosing a legal structure is a critical step in the proposal drafting process, as this
communicates to key beneficiary groups the nature of the CCoE’s leadership and
programming orientation going forward. This decision should be made early in the
process and with the utmost care for decision makers’ desired role of the CCoE in
statewide cybersecurity. The importance of this decision in the overall design process
cannot be underscored enough.
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NEXT STEP: ENGAGE FUNDING EXPERTS
Ensuring adequate funding is one of the most important aspects of a establishing and
operating a successful CCoE. A variety of sources have been used by other states to fund
cybersecurity initiatives, including state legislative appropriations, federal grants,
sponsorship and donations from businesses, and contribution of resources in-kind.
States like California and Texas receive a substantial portion of cybersecurity funding
from federal sources (primarily the Department of Homeland Security) and legislative
appropriations at the state level, while initiatives like Colorado’s National Cybersecurity
Center received large in-kind contributions of facilities, and specific programs like
Florida’s veterans retraining program (New Skills for a New Fight) were funded by
private corporations. It is important to note that most states with large amounts of
funding tend to receive that funding from federal sources, with much of this funding
coming from successful grant applications.
To navigate the complex funding landscape for cybersecurity initiatives, CCoE decision
makers should consult with grant-writing and funding experts throughout the proposal
drafting process. This expertise can help target sources of funding and provide valuable
insight on the types of grant applications that are likely to be successful in the current
funding climate. As the funding catalog shows, there are many highly competitive grants
that can be pursued to fund CCoE activities, most of which require complex applications
with a variety of supporting documentation and proof of additional financial support
from other sources. Additionally, this expertise can help inform the legal structure
decision described above, as some legal structures may make the CCoE more attractive
for grants than others. Individuals that have successful written grant applications for
initiatives of the size and scope of the CCoE, and especially those well versed in
cybersecurity grants, should be sought out for the unique expertise they can bring to
the funding portion of the proposal.

NEXT STEP: BRING BENEFICIARIES INTO THE PROPOSAL PROCESS
A successful CCoE proposal rests on the ability of decision makers to effectively engage
and consider the perspectives of the diverse key beneficiary groups that the CCoE aims
to serve. It bears repeating that public health approaches to cybersecurity necessarily
involve the public. No less than four of Sedenberg and Mulligan’s 12 practices of public
cybersecurity387 involve seeking input or engaging in collaboration with the public;
387

Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” 1737-1738.
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special emphasis is given to engaging those that are typically disenfranchised from such
decision-making processes. Rowe et al also indicate that engaging a diverse audience
through a variety of communications methods is vital to successful interventions388.
Additionally, as Shane notes, “public participation can aid in agenda setting by clarifying
the problems that need to be addressed and the priorities that ought to attach to
them,”389 especially with complex technology topics. Based on these arguments, actively
seeking and considering public input on cybersecurity policies and initiatives from
impacted communities is an important way to increase the success of a CCoE proposal.
Oregon survey respondents and focus group participants echo this sentiment. The need
to engage a variety of stakeholders in decision-making processes and CCoE programs
and initiatives was continually noted by participants throughout the focus groups,
making “Diverse Involvement” one of the more prevalent themes to emerge in the data
analysis process. This diversity especially includes making efforts to gather perspectives
of those outside of the Portland-Salem I5 corridor, which participants recognized as a
specific shortcoming of previous statewide initiatives. Respondents and participants
from these areas also indicated widespread willingness to continue to be a part of
dialogue and decision-making processes, and encouraged any report resulting from this
research to emphasize this desire to be involved in any capacity moving forward. A key
example from the comparative analysis of this type of effective outreach is Michigan’s
traveling Breakfast Series and Cyber Awareness Luncheon Series390. This series has
provided opportunities for both outreach and dialogue on cybersecurity issues with
communities across the state, including those that are located more remotely. Meeting
face-to-face with members of communities outside of population centers should feature
prominently in any plans for further information gathering by CCoE decision makers.

NEXT STEP: FOCUS ON WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Workforce development can be a major contribution of the CCoE to Oregon’s
cybersecurity landscape, and as such deserves considerable focus in the initial CCoE
programming and initiatives. This subject has featured prominently in every section of
this report: myriad programs exist in other states that seek to increase workforce
Brent Rowe, Michael Halpern, and Tony Lentz, “Is a Public Health Framework the Cure for Cyber Security?” CrossTalk,
November/December 2012, 32.
389389
Peter Shane, “Cybersecurity Policy as if ‘Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making,”
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 8, no. 2 (2012): 455.
390
Michigan Office of the Governor, Michigan Cyber Initiative, 2015: pg. 8-10.
http://www.michigan.gov/cybersecurity/Mich_Cyber_Initiative_11.13_2pm_web_474127_7.pdf
388
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quantity and quality; survey respondents express great interest in increasing training
opportunities; this theme is one of the top five identified through analysis of the focus
group data; and many opportunities for grant funding from both public and private
sources are for workforce development programs and initiatives. This is also one of the
key substantive recommendations identified for the CCoE’s initial structure and
emphases. Taken together, this shows that creating and/or supporting programs that
positively impact the cybersecurity workforce is an important part of the initial CCoE
proposal development process, and warrants more immediate attention. Further
specifics on workforce development needs and recommendations can be found in other
sections of this report.

NEXT STEP: CONTINUE LEARNING FROM OTHER STATES
A final recommendation is simply to continue learning from other states. Make
connections, have conversations, and get perspectives from those who have been a part
of building cybersecurity initiatives from the ground-up in the states discussed in the
comparative policy section of this report. If specific programs or initiatives are being
considered for the proposal, seek out those who have been involved in similar initiatives
elsewhere to learn from their experiences. States and advisory bodies were generally
forthcoming with information for this project, and any decision makers can expect
similar candor when seeking out these perspectives. The public Oregon Cybersecurity
Advisory Council meetings can provide an excellent forum for decision makers and the
interested public to ask questions and gather information from these resources; this is
also a opportunity for identifying possibilities for multistate collaborations (a key
function ascribed to the CCoE under SB90). Attendance at relevant professional
meetings and trainings over the next year can also serve this information-gathering and
learning purpose. Two examples of these kinds of events include the CyberUSA
Conference in January 2018, and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
meeting in December 2018.

This list of basic next steps can be beneficial to the CCoE proposal drafting process,
regardless of the contents of the proposal or the make-up of the decision-making body.
There is considerable interest in this proposal within Oregon’s cybersecurity industry
that can be harnessed to create opportunities for meaningful engagement and
deliberation. It is imperative that this effort results in a proposal that benefits all key
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beneficiary groups. By engaging a broad spectrum of actors and learning from the
successes of others, decision makers can maximize the chances of its success.
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